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Cover
A series of images—variously contempo-
rary, conceptual, and futuristic—that
have been produced for and now support
discussions of sea basing, one of the four
fundamental elements of the U.S. Navy’s
Seapower 21 vision. The broader issue
of operational military bases—in effect,
the context of the modern sea-basing
concept—is the subject of our lead article,
“Thinking about Basing,” by Robert E.
Harkavy of Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity. Two more such images, portraying
“consolidation” of stores between logisti-
cal ships and their transfer ashore, illus-
trate Dr. Harkavy’s text.
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Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in
1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps
program at the University of South Carolina. His initial
assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979,
following a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for
Commander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an
Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the
Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds
master’s degrees in public administration (finance)
from Harvard and in national security studies and
strategy from the Naval War College, where he
graduated with highest distinction.
After completing department head tours in USS Deyo
(DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he com-
manded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washing-
ton included assignments to the staff of the Chief of
Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of
the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and per-
sonal aide to the Secretary.
Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to com-
mand USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed
command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998,
deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet oper-
ating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the
USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the
Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.
Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he di-
rected the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Fol-
lowing this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy
Division as chief of staff of the Navy’s Roles and Mis-
sions Organization. He finished his most recent Penta-
gon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure,
Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint
Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense
mission areas. His most recent Washington assignment
was to the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of
Senate Liaison.
In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Com-
mander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution.
Rear Admiral Shuford assumed command of Cruiser
Destroyer Group 3 in August 2003. He became the fifty-
first President of the Naval War College on 12 August
2004.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
The Naval War College’s Twin Missions
THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE plays two coequal roles in preparing the
Navy for the challenges of the twenty-first century: educating fu-
ture leaders and helping to define naval forces and operational concepts through
research, analysis, and war gaming.
Although for simplicity I have said the College has two distinct missions, in
reality classroom instruction and research, analysis, and war gaming are thor-
oughly intertwined. In order to graduate, all of our students must participate in
at least one large, multiweek war game planned by our Joint Military Operations
Department and executed by our War Gaming Department. An increasing
number of our top students, now around 25 percent, are involved with focused
research, analysis, and war-gaming projects.
Each of the two missions for the Naval War College, education and research,
is critical to the other: We cannot achieve our educational objective without
research, analysis, and gaming capabilities, nor can we achieve our research ob-
jectives for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and our fleet commanders
without our teaching faculty and students.
The complementary relationship of education and research functions is in
the process of becoming deeper, stronger, and more necessary to the College as
we revise our educational curricula.
• First, we are developing from the ground up an intermediate-level command
and staff course of instruction, graduates of which will be Joint Professional
Military Education Phase I (JPME I) certified. But more importantly, these
officers will be critical thinkers with an operational perspective, planners
who are capable of applying operational art in maritime, joint, interagency,
and multinational environments and skilled in the joint planning process.
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They will excel in operational billets on our numbered fleet, joint,
interagency, or multinational staffs.
• Second, we are restructuring and elevating our senior-level professional
military education program, graduates of which will, for the first time ever
at the Naval War College, meet the Joint Chiefs’ requirements for JPME
Phase II. (JPME I and II certification are required by law for promotion to
flag rank.) This curriculum will focus on preparing officers for assignment
to key and essential positions on service, joint, interagency, and multinational
organizations and on developing competencies necessary at the highest
levels of leadership in our nation. Our graduates from the senior course are
expected to serve immediately as trusted, sought-after advisers to civilian
policy makers or senior military commanders and to contribute directly to
the strategic, operational, and resource-planning processes that will shape
the future of our nation’s security.
• Third, we are establishing a short course for flag officers to develop
competencies required to serve as a Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander (JFMCC), the maritime command and control element of the
joint force. (This course will stand up this August.) Each of these new
courses depends heavily on our faculty, researchers, and war gamers,
working together as a tightly coordinated team.
Dialogue with Leadership
I just returned from a ten-day series of visits to Washington, D.C.; Millington,
Tennessee (with all our detailers); San Diego; and Hawaii. I visited all of our
West Coast type commanders, Commander Third Fleet, and Commander Pa-
cific Fleet. The purpose of the trip was twofold. The first objective was to con-
tinue the dialogue with Navy leadership on the range of issues associated with
the implementation of a bona fide continuum of professional military educa-
tion. (As of 2 March 2005, the Naval War College is responsible for establishing
the curricula and course content for professional military education for pay
grades E1 to O8.) The second objective of the trip was to provide results of on-
going analysis vital to the missions of our operational commanders.
The Navy’s head detailer, “Pers 4,” accompanied me on this trip to help ac-
complish my first objective. As head of the office responsible for all enlisted and
officer personnel (except flag officers) assignments and for the establishment
and management of career development tracks with the Navy’s various commu-
nities and its manpower policy apparatus, his presence was invaluable. The im-
plications for career development associated with the initiatives outlined in our
last “President’s Forum”—with the implementation of the continuum—are
many and significant for our Navy. We will continue this dialogue to ensure that
6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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the College moves forward, with the full support of the Navy’s senior leadership,
and plays a lead role in the development of the Navy’s emerging Human Capital
Strategy. Our engagement thus far has been encouraging without exception,
particularly as we focus the traditional (and in many cases unique) strengths of
the College on those war-fighting and leadership competencies most in demand
at the operational and strategic levels of leadership across our armed services.
Also traveling with me were several students currently engaged in one of our
Halsey directed-research groups. The recently instituted Halsey Program is fo-
cused on quantitative analysis of critical war-fighting challenges facing our opera-
tional commanders in their specific theaters. We have stood up different Halsey
groups to conduct rigorous research, analysis, and war gaming in the areas of
antisubmarine warfare (ASW), maritime air and missile defense, and sea basing.
(The logic of these three focus areas becomes clear as one recognizes that sea bas-
ing is the distinguishing element of naval forces, and that success against the un-
dersea and air threats enables the Navy’s unique contribution to joint warfare.)
The research and analysis being produced and briefed to the highest levels of
our service and joint leadership is rapidly gaining a reputation for credibility
and relevance. CNO has noted that “once again the Naval War College is at the
center of operational thinking in the Navy.” Comments from the Navy’s ASW
Task Force commander that the ASW work being done by Halsey II is “the most
useful analysis” he has seen in the ASW mission area typify the feedback we are
getting as we brief-out to the fleet. These results should not be surprising.
The last two years have seen a major shift in distribution of the Navy’s most
promising line officers into our College. These officers bring not only a fresh oper-
ational perspective but also an expectation to move forward through the ranks
to the highest levels of responsibility. The Halsey Program selects the most
prominent and brings them into a cadre of world-class researchers and warfare
analysts in our Center for Naval Warfare Studies. While the expert cadre remains
in place and continues to advance our understanding of particular elements of war
fighting, the students actually conduct the analysis, using the cutting-edge
war-gaming techniques and facilities the College is famous for.
Payoff for the Fleet
The payoff is huge. First, our students achieve key academic objectives while, sec-
ond, developing a comprehensive and profound understanding of real threats,
capabilities, and the key tactical- and operational-level issues they will face in
follow-on command and staff assignments. Finally, third, each Halsey group
yields analysis directly related to war-fighting challenges in a specific theater of
operations. This process discovers and highlights those tactical imperatives
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 7
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or capabilities that are potentially linchpins of operational-level courses of ac-
tion, themselves linked to our national strategic options.
Another set of students—our Mahan Scholars—works at the strategic level.
Linking the operational and strategic analyses of the Halsey and Mahan efforts
forces a detailed examination of how military conditions established by a
commander relate to—and inform—the selection of military strategy and its
political ends. With its career-focused, highly motivated, joint/interagency/
multinational student body and its world-leading war-gaming and analysis ca-
pability, the Naval War College is in a unique position to do this type of com-
prehensive work.
The College is bringing this unique capability into battery to directly support
our fleet commanders not only through the operational analysis driven by our
Halsey groups but also through political-military expertise resident in our Stra-
tegic Research Department and through war gaming performed by both the War
Gaming and Warfare Analysis and Research Departments. The most recent
example of this is the College’s support of the highly impactful Fifth Fleet “stra-
tegic review.”
With a wider aperture, the research arm of the Naval War College is also ex-
ploring a potentially significant role in an area of increasing importance to the
Navy—both national and theater missile defense. The prospect of conducting
missile defense at sea to defend the U.S. homeland, American allies, and U.S. sur-
face ships poses a remarkably complex array of challenges to the Navy and our
regional commanders. How will we apportion and employ our capabilities to
balance the national and theater missions? How are multimission-capable sur-
face ships best used to conduct these missions? How are these platforms best de-
fended, since, presumably, adversaries will assign a high priority to eliminating
them? These are just a few of the questions that must be answered as the sea-based
capabilities for missile defense continue to evolve against a very real threat.
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns
have challenged the Navy and its fellow military services to develop innovative
approaches to defeating the nation’s aggressive and highly adaptive enemies.
Members of our Strategic Research Department, among others, have been at the
forefront of analyzing the Iraqi insurgency and terrorist groups like al-Qa‘ida.
An international collaborative project on the new Proliferation Security Initia-
tive has placed Newport in the lead for development of the U.S. and interna-
tional community’s latest approaches for halting the transshipment of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and their materials. In 2004, the College designed,
executed, and analyzed a war game, held in Newport and attended by seventeen
nations, to test the capability of a multinational effort to collaborate operation-
ally and legally so as to interdict the movement of WMD and related materials at
8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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sea. Also, as a result of the GWOT and the highly constrained nature of modern
warfare more generally, there is a greater appreciation of the importance of in-
ternational law in shaping military operations. Our International Law Depart-
ment is fully engaged in exploring the implications of this development,
especially ways of effectively disseminating the substance of operational inter-
national law to operational commanders.
Whether we are exploring the potential of Sea Power 21 or grappling with the
latest terrorist threat, we construe military research and analysis to be a contin-
uum. Any problem has contained in it other problems at all the levels of military
operations: strategic, operational, tactical, and technical. As analysis proceeds
up and down those levels, different methods and organizations are brought into
play. Our comparative advantage is focusing largely, but not exclusively, on the
strategic and operational levels of military operations. But, obviously, it is im-
portant to be knowledgeable about tactical- and technical-level subjects so as to
make higher-level research, analysis, and gaming possible in the first place. We
do this by maintaining an outstanding faculty and student body and by partner-
ing with other war-gaming and analysis activities in both the public and private
sectors. By reaching out to the fleet, to Joint Forces Command, the U.S. intelli-
gence community, and various other agencies and departments, the Naval War
College leverages its own resources in an era defined by joint, interagency, and
multinational operations.
Following World War II, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz wrote, “The war with
Japan had been reenacted in the game rooms at the War College by so many
people, and in so many different ways, that nothing that happened during the
war was a surprise . . . absolutely nothing except the Kamikaze tactics towards the
end of the war—we had not visualized these.” I have always felt this was a
good-news/bad-news story. The good news is that we successfully prepared for
waging a deadly war across the Pacific. What our predecessors accomplished in
Pringle Hall and Sims Hall hastened victory and saved many lives. The bad news
is that something important was missed that slowed the final victory and cost
more lives than was necessary.
This is why we maintain a small exhibit dedicated to Fleet Admiral Nimitz,
centrally located in McCarty Little Hall, the Navy’s state-of-the-art facility
where we do our world-renowned research, analysis, and war gaming. We want
our people to remember every day as they come to work that thinking carefully
about future wars matters enormously. It has real consequences—good and bad.
We have to get it right. Our criterion of success is a set of insights into military
conflict of such scope, accuracy, and penetration that current and future leaders
can voice the same sentiments as those of Fleet Admiral Nimitz, now a half
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century ago. And when our students leave, they take with them to the fleet and
positions of extraordinary responsibility around the world not only the sub-
stance of these insights but the analytic and intellectual skills to create them.
J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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Dr. Harkavy is professor of political science at Pennsyl-
vania State University. He has also taught, performed
research, or served at the U.S. Army War College, Cor-
nell University, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, Kalamazoo College, and the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission. He earned his PhD in interna-
tional relations at Yale University in 1973, having pur-
sued graduate study also at the University of California
at Berkeley, the Harvard Business School, and Basel
University in Switzerland. After earning his BA at Cor-
nell, he was for eight years a junior officer in the U.S.
Army Reserve (artillery). He has written or edited sev-
eral books, most recently Warfare and the Third World
(2001) and Strategic Geography and the Changing
Middle East (1997).
The author wishes to thank Lucian Czarnecki, Penn
State undergraduate, for research assistance in connec-
tion with this project. An expanded version of this article
(with additional historical and tabular material) is to be
published by the Naval War College Press as a Newport
Paper.
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Recent U.S. experiences—1990–91 in the Persian Gulf, in Bosnia, Kosovo,and then in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003)—have highlighted the
complexities and uncertainties of basing access in the post–Cold War period.
They have involved questions of access to, and overhead transit rights for, a vari-
ety of nations: all over Europe, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Tadzhikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Djibouti, and many others. They have also highlighted the crucial
importance of the future of American basing access at a time of shifting alli-
ances, friendships, and enmities amid wholesale changes in the structure of the
international system, and of the movement to the forefront of the issues of ter-
rorism, radical Islam, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and a loom-
ing hegemonic challenge by China.
There are some initial points to be made regarding definitions. One may
speak variously of bases, facilities, host-nation support, installations, strategic
access, forward presence, global posture, and FMP (foreign military presence).
During the latter part of the Cold War, common usage dictated the use of “facili-
ties” rather than “bases,” because the user nation (primarily the United States)
had only limited discretion over the use of a “base.” The U.S. Defense Depart-
ment’s compilation of domestic and foreign bases is organized according to dis-
crete installations. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute uses
the basic concept of “FMP” in a way roughly synonymous with others’ use of
“base.”1 The concept of “basing access” or “strategic access” is a broader con-
struction, subsuming overflight rights and perhaps access for intelligence opera-
tions. During the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of “power projection” came to be
seen as an overarching one.2
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More recently, “global posture” (also “footprint”) has become the dominant
definitional concept; more theoretically oriented academic studies, working in
historical contexts, have begun to focus on “global reach” or, earlier, “sub-global
reach.”3 Recent Defense Department publications—for instance, the September
2004 report to Congress on the global defense posture—have taken to defining
that posture according to five criteria: relationships (interaction with allies and
partners at all levels), activities (training, exercises, and operations), facilities
(where forces live, train, and operate, and where they preposition materiel), legal
arrangements (the framework of presence, including status-of-forces agree-
ments, both bilateral and multilateral), and global sourcing and surge (a
global-force management system for power projection).4 Thus, although the
main focus of this article will be on bases/facilities, “global posture” does have a
broader frame of reference.
BASING IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In the centuries-long history of the basing systems of the “great powers,” or
“long-cycle hegemons,” several major areas of generalization and trend stand
out, each of which is relevant to current problems. These are complex matters,
and we can merely summarize them here.
• The role of international system structure (bipolarity, multipolarity, etc.)
and the presence or absence of ideological roots of rivalry between
contending major powers
• The basis for basing access: conquest or colonization versus formal
alliances or alignments versus tangible quid pro quos—that is, security and
economic assistance, arms transfers, etc.
• The impact on basing of ever-evolving technological change—for ship
propulsion, from sail to oared galleys to sail to coal to oil to nuclear power
• The nexus of security and economic functions of basing and how that has
shifted over time
• Heartland versus rimland as a basic pattern of rival basing structures
through time.
The relationship of system structure and the ideological basis for conflict
over many centuries is a complicated story. The empire of the Mongols, who
were predominantly a land power, stretched across most of Eurasia but also ex-
ercised maritime and basing dominance in the Far East in the thirteenth century.
Subsequently, the Chinese Ming dynasty, a regional hegemon, had uncontested
access to bases throughout Southeast Asia and around the Indian Ocean. In the
Mediterranean, from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries first Venice and
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Genoa, then Venice (latterly Spain) and the Ottoman Empire were locked in re-
gional competition for maritime dominance and basing structures. Their re-
spective bases, especially those of Venice and Genoa, were often cheek by jowl,
constituting interpenetrating systems. (The Venice-Ottoman rivalry and that of
Spain and the Ottomans was somewhat more demarcated between east and west.)
Portugal and Spain had rival but formally demarcated basing structures, with
Portugal acquiring bases all around Africa and the Indian Ocean and in the Far
East and Brazil, Spain mostly in Latin America but also in the Philippines and
the western Mediterranean. Some scholars do not rate Portugal a great power
during the early modern era, as it was a maritime power only, standing on the
margins of a Europe then dominated by the Habsburg Empire. If so, we have
somewhat of a divorce between great-power status and the facts of semiglobal
basing structure. In the seventeenth century, the Netherlands was a commercial
and maritime hegemon, with the most elaborate basing structure of its day, but
it existed within a multipolar power structure in Europe, and its bases interpen-
etrated the systems of England and France, particularly in India.
The British Empire had maritime predominance and an unmatched global
basing system, also in the overall context of European multipolarity, wherein
other powers—France, Prussia/Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary—were
major land powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and on up to
World War I.
During the Cold War, the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the
Soviet Union saw a global competition for basing access, but an asymmetric one
with respect to maritime power, in which one side, the United States, was pre-
dominant throughout. Only since the early 1990s, however, has the United
States had complete maritime predominance and the only global basing pres-
ence, with no rival whatsoever. Generally speaking, basing structures have corre-
lated with the facts of relative national power, with the exception, perhaps, of
Portugal.
Over time, bases and access in general have resulted from conquest and colo-
nization, alliances, or quid pro quos such as security assistance, though these
have not been mutually exclusive. The Mongols’ few bases were acquired entirely
by conquest. Those of Ming China seem to have been a mix of “forced entry,”
also known as intimidation, and agreements with local potentates interested in
trade. The bases of the Venetian, Genoese, Ottoman, and Spanish fleets of oared
galleys in the Mediterranean were mostly the results of conquest, in some cases
of more consensual arrangements. Spain’s basing structure accrued entirely by
ruthless conquest and colonization. Portugal’s involved some military conquest,
but also a good deal of alliance building among more advanced (relative to those
of Spain’s domain) societies in India, East Africa, and Southeast Asia. The Dutch
H A R K A V Y 1 5
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took over most of the Portuguese basing structure by conquest; the British built
their empire and its attendant basing structure almost entirely on the basis of
conquest “beyond the line,” in what now is called the Third World. But many
British bases in Europe were acquired, often ad hoc, on the basis of ever-shifting
alliances in a multipolar European system sans ideology.
In the early part of the Cold War, the United States availed itself of a large
number of bases via alliances with the United Kingdom and France, before the
possessions and bases of the latter gradually dwindled as a result of decoloni-
zation. After that, starting in the 1960s, the United States (and also the Soviet
Union) built global basing structures on the basis of alliances with ideologically
friendly client states, underpinned by protection and provision of security but
also by extensive security assistance, mostly in the form of arms transfers.
Throughout the past half millennium or more, needless to say, technological
change has been a major driver of basing requirements. Up to World War I and
somewhat beyond, that pattern pertained almost entirely to naval technology.
The Mongols and Ming Chinese built large sailing vessels that gave them
long-range power-projection capability. In the Mediterranean from the thir-
teenth to sixteenth centuries, the contending powers used oared galleys; their
limited ranges and extensive logistical requirements translated into the need by
the Venetians, Genoese, Ottomans, and Spaniards for elaborate basing networks
even in that relatively small theater.5 Portugal, on the basis of technological de-
velopments in shipbuilding, navigational equipment, and naval gunnery, was
able to move to the forefront of naval power and establish bases in a quasi-global
system centered on the Indian Ocean.6 But travel was slow and dependent on
prevailing winds and currents; warships going from Lisbon to Goa around the
Cape of Good Hope had to travel west almost to Brazil to pick up winds favor-
able for the trip around Africa. The Netherlands, France, and Britain improved
the capabilities of sailing ships over several centuries. In the nineteenth century
the advent of coal-fired steam propulsion resulted in faster and more direct
travel for naval ships, but also in a requirement for numerous coaling stations—
a development of which Britain was able to take particular advantage because of
its global empire. The appearance of oil-fired ships (also of fleet oilers and col-
liers) reduced these requirements; later, nuclear propulsion would reduce them
further.
But after World War I, developments in aviation produced entirely new re-
quirements for external air bases; as aircraft ranges were short, the number of
bases required for ferrying combat aircraft or troops and materiel was huge.
Japan in 1941, for instance, had numerous air bases on Taiwan and Hainan Is-
land; Italy had them in Libya and Somaliland.7 The submarine produced yet fur-
ther requirements (for example, Franco’s Spain gave German boats access to the
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Canary Islands for refueling). Beginning with the undersea communications
cables before 1914, after World War I with radio relay and intercept stations, a bas-
ing requirement arose, for technical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR) purposes. After World War II, that became an important matter; the
United States constructed elaborate global networks of AUTOVON/AUTODIN
communications, DSP and other satellite downlinks, the DEW Line and
BMEWS, SOSUS, NUDETS, signals-intelligence ground installations, and much
more.* Oiler refueling (for transfer to operating forces at sea) and constant
ocean surveillance produced still other basing requirements. But, paradoxically,
oiler refueling and increasing aircraft ranges greatly reduced the need for elabo-
rate external networks of air bases.
There had once existed a close nexus between the security and economic
functions of overseas bases. The Ming Chinese Zheng Ho navy, which roamed
the Indian Ocean littoral and its ports, did so mostly with the purpose of ad-
vancing trade. Venetian and Genoese bases in the eastern Mediterranean–Black
Sea area likewise were colocated with a variety of economic enterprises, and
many of the Venetian and Genoese war galleys were actually armed merchant
vessels. Portuguese bases in East Africa, India, and elsewhere were also
entrepôts, hubs of commercial activity. A number of the British and Dutch bases
in Asia were established by semiprivate trading companies closely tied to and
protected by their nations’ fleets and armies. By the heyday of the British Em-
pire, however, this colocation of military bases and entrepôts had largely been
broken, and naval bases were obtained and operated more or less entirely for
military reasons.
During the Cold War, however, the critical issue of Persian Gulf oil became
inextricably linked to basing access. American bases along oil-tanker sea-lanes
to Asia and North America came to be viewed in the context of a possible Soviet
effort (from bases in Angola, Guinea, Somalia, South Yemen, etc.) to interdict
them in case of war. In the late 1980s, with the “reflagging” operation on behalf
of Kuwait, the United States established new points of access in the Persian Gulf.
Today, as is heavily reflected in Defense Department and Congressional Budget
Office publications, overseas bases are seen in connection with potential strug-
gles over oil resources, not only in and around the Persian Gulf but in
Azerbaijan, Libya, Algeria, Gabon, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, etc.8 Economics,
then, in the form of access to oil, has crept back into basing access and global
presence.
H A R K A V Y 1 7
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Satellite Program; DEW = Distant Early Warning; BMEWS = Ballistic Missile Early Warning
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Reporting System.
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Over the past five hundred years, the basing networks of the contending great
powers have corresponded closely with the geopolitical imagery of “heartland”
and “rimland.” As noted by Alfred Thayer Mahan, Colin Gray, and others, the
successive maritime hegemons—Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and
the United States—all established a degree of blue-water sea control based on
superior main fleets and a ring of naval bases all around the Eurasian
supercontinent.9 Periodically, they were challenged by land powers attempting
to develop equivalent seapower: France under Louis XIV, Germany before
World War I, the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
As has been pointed out in connection with
“system leader lineage,” the successive maritime
hegemons typically inherited their predeces-
sors’ basing structures, with modifications.10
The Dutch took the Portuguese bases by force,
but Britain in its turn mostly acquired the
Dutch bases peacefully, as did the United States
when it took over the role of rimland naval
hegemon from Britain after World War II. Cer-
tain bases or strongpoints astride key “choke
points” or adjacent to strategically important
locales, and islands with strategic locations,
have risen to importance with noteworthy frequency over five hundred years:
Hormuz, Angola, Gibraltar, Aden, Trincomalee (in Sri Lanka), the Malabar and
Coromandel coasts of India, Malacca/Singapore, Mauritius, Mogadishu, Hong
Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Cyprus, Malta, and Crete appear again and again in the his-
tory of naval warfare and bases.
During the Cold War, the United States, sometimes relying upon the rem-
nants of the British Empire, established bases in Iceland, Norway, the United
Kingdom, the Azores, Morocco, Spain (at Rota), Italy, Greece/Crete, Turkey, Iran
(up to 1979), Ethiopia (up to 1977), the Seychelles, the Maldives, Pakistan, Diego
Garcia, Thailand, Singapore, Australia, Taiwan (up to 1972), Japan, and South
Korea—in a pattern perfectly reflective of a rimland configuration around the
periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Now, of course, analysts refer to a newer
geopolitical configuration focused on intersecting “arcs of crisis” from North
Africa to South Asia, and from the Horn of Africa to Central Asia, reflective of a
present emphasis on oil politics and on combating Islamist terror and nuclear
proliferation. At least in part the rimland basing structure has been retained, but
the newer geopolitics spotlights the importance of access to Eastern Europe, the
Caucasus, Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel (a narrow band of
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semiarid land south of the Sahara Desert), all around the arcs of crisis. Also, of
course, in view of U.S. naval dominance and the absence of a maritime peer
competitor, there is an emphasis on littoral warfare and control, in lieu of
Mahanian sea control.
CONFLICT TYPOLOGIES, SCENARIOS, CONTINGENCIES:
THE CONTEXT OF U.S. GLOBAL PRESENCE
Recent Defense Department and other studies have focused on outright inter-
vention scenarios (Iraq, Iran, Korea, Taiwan, et al., plus numerous smaller situa-
tions involving various types of low-intensity conflict) as the core of the
problem of forward presence, and accordingly have emphasized the more ad hoc
forms of access. That is appropriate, but it may be worthwhile to present a more
complex framework, with historical examples and possible future scenarios.
Hence, the following analysis refers to both bases and other forms of access, with
a (not always clear-cut) distinction between nuclear deterrence and the various
levels of conventional power projection.
Nuclear Deterrence and Defense
During the Cold War, numerous overseas bases were dedicated to functions re-
lated to the U.S. nuclear deterrence posture vis-à-vis the USSR and, to a lesser
degree, the People’s Republic of China. But many bases served dual purposes
with regard to prospective nuclear and conventional power projection—for in-
stance, forward-based attack aircraft in Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan,
South Korea; access for carriers in the Mediterranean and East Asia; aerial tanker
bases in places like Thule, Gander, and Keflavik; land-based signals intelligence
stations all around the Soviet periphery; U-2 and SR-71 surveillance aircraft
bases; and others.
But some overseas access had functions that were primarily if not solely nu-
clear. Early on there were Strategic Air Command B-47 “Reflex Force” bases in
Spain and Morocco; medium-range ballistic-missile bases in the United King-
dom, Italy, and Turkey, as well as on Okinawa and Taiwan (for the Mace and
Matador missiles); DSP downlinks in Australia and Germany; SOSUS terminals
in a variety of places near choke points and Soviet submarine transit routes and
“bastions”; ground-launched cruise-missile and Pershing II emplacements in
Europe (before the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty); BMEWS sites in the
United Kingdom and Greenland; nuclear detection facilities (seismic arrays) in
numerous countries including Norway and Turkey; signals-intelligence stations
collecting telemetry data (in Iran, among other places, and later in China); Omega
and LORAN navigation aids; TACAMO (related to communications with U.S.
submarines); bases for ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) at Rota and Holy
H A R K A V Y 1 9
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Loch and for attack boats (SSNs) at La Maddalena, Faslane, and Sasebo; and so-
lar flare stations, other communications facilities, and the DEW, PINETREE, and
North Warning System early warning radars in Canada and Greenland. Much of
this structure was dismantled as the USSR disappeared as a rival (SOSUS and
SSBN bases, for example), but some of it remains (such as signals-intelligence
and DSP downlink facilities).
Today the future of nuclear deterrence basing is somewhat indeterminate.
The SSBNs—“boomers”—are now all based in the continental United States, in
Georgia and Washington State. Nuclear-capable forward-based aircraft, such as
the F-111s in the United Kingdom, have been stood down. But some technical
facilities remain—again, for instance, the DSP downlinks. U.S. nuclear deter-
rence today has Russia in mind only in part; basing in the context of nuclear de-
terrence has mostly to do with missile defense vis-à-vis China, North Korea, and
Iran. In Europe, the BMEWS radars at Fylingdale Moor in the United Kingdom
and Thule, Greenland (under Danish sovereignty) are to be upgraded. There ap-
pears to be an agreement in the offing with Britain to base theater missiles at
Fylingdale as well. Farther east, Poland appears the most likely host (Romania
and Hungary have also been considered) for missiles that could defend most of
Europe from threats in the Middle East (Iran, Israel, and Pakistan may all soon
be capable of reaching the heart of Europe with nuclear-armed missiles). In the
Far East, Japan has still to decide whether to host U.S. missile defenses against
North Korea and China; Japan and South Korea may host related warning radars
(Alaska serves this purpose for the defense of the continental United States from
Chinese and North Korean missiles). Finally, the United States could deploy
shipborne theater antiballistic missiles in the waters around Japan and Korea, in
the Mediterranean and Arabian seas, and maybe in the Baltic; the ships that
carry them would (to some extent) need access to nearby ports.
Conventional Conflict
The heart of the problem of global posture is future U.S. access in a wide variety
of possible scenarios in a context of ambiguous threats, uncertain alliances, and
ill-defined international system structure.
Before World War II, a more or less isolationist America had little in the way
of overseas bases, mostly (as also, on a much larger scale, for Great Britain) in co-
lonial possessions or protectorates—the Philippines, Guam, Wake Island, the
Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. The Lend-Lease Act of 1940 pro-
vided the United States a string of bases, on ninety-nine-year leases, reaching
from Newfoundland to British Guyana. During the war, many other bases—in
Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, Acapulco, the Galapagos Islands, Recife and
Fortaleza in Brazil—were provided by a number of countries.
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After World War II, the elaborate alliance system afforded to the United States
bases in the colonial possessions of Britain, France, Portugal, and the Nether-
lands. The use of numerous allied bases all around the Eurasian rimland was a
virtual given. This made it easy for the United States to operate in conflicts large
and small.
In the Korean War, bases in Japan were about all that were needed. In the Viet-
nam War, the United States was availed of air and naval bases in Japan, Taiwan,
the Philippines, and Thailand. Before and during DESERT STORM, access was
available just about everywhere in Europe and the Middle East. For a variety of
contingencies large and small, the United States operated in a permissive environ-
ment for access because of numerous stable alliances and other client relation-
ships, all underpinned by security assistance. Things became tougher in 2003.
At present, and for the future, the security environment is much more ambig-
uous, as are alliance relationships themselves. In place of a set and more or less
stable twilight struggle against the Soviet Union and its allies, there is now a
multilayered and fluid threat environment featuring terrorism, WMD prolifera-
tion, nation building, and peacekeeping in a variety of places, as well as a loom-
ing hegemonic rivalry with China, maybe the European Union, and maybe
Russia (again), in combinations and sequences not easily foreseen.
In fact, even with the best analytical work, conflicts—and hence basing re-
quirements—are not always easily envisaged or predicted. Few people in the
summer of 2001 could have predicted the need within months for U.S. access in
Central Asian ex–Soviet socialist republics to enable large-scale military opera-
tions in Afghanistan. Earlier, presumably, few British analysts foresaw the need
for a large-scale invasion of the Falkland Islands under adverse weather condi-
tions, and a critical associated requirement for access to a (British-owned) air
base on Ascension Island. The critical role of Lajes Air Force Base in the Azores
for arms resupply to Israel in 1973 (which arguably averted resort by the latter to
nuclear weapons) had probably also been only dimly perceived by defense plan-
ners. Whatever the elaborateness of scenarios, then, surprises may be expected,
including some that overwhelm “capabilities-based analysis.”
That said, scenarios for the future can be broken down into two basic catego-
ries, generic and specific. Most current open-source Defense Department analy-
ses rely on the former, if only to organize the subject. The generic scenario types
now commonly utilized are traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive.
“Traditional” refers to familiar force-on-force, large-scale engagements, such as
the two world wars, the Korean War, DESERT STORM, the Iran-Iraq War, and the
1967 and 1973 Middle Eastern wars. In the academic literature—for instance,
in the research emerging from the “Correlates of War” project—the relative
scale of such conflicts is gauged by the variables of magnitude (number of
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combatants involved), severity (number of combat deaths), and duration.11 Ad-
ditionally, one can point to “moving fronts”—that is, an identifiable shifting de-
marcation of large-unit forces, analogous to a football line of scrimmage. Some
analysts speak of a spectrum running from all-out conventional war to various
forms of “limited” conventional war, Korea being an example of warfare charac-
terized by tacit geographical limits. Most traditional conflicts are interstate,
though the Chinese civil war in the late 1940s was an intrastate example.
“Irregular” conflicts refer to a range of conflict types roughly similar to the
spectrum of low-intensity warfare, a term in vogue in the 1980s and 1990s. It
comprises guerrilla and insurgency warfare, civil wars (ethnic wars over terri-
tory and ideological wars over control of governments), coups, terrorism, bor-
der friction, etc.12 Most of these wars, the latter example excepted, are of an
intrastate nature. Over time, the dominant frequency of Marxist insurgencies
gave way to “Reagan Doctrine” anticommunist insurgencies and then, in the
1990s, to a heyday of ethnic warfare.
“Catastrophic” conflicts comprise those in which large-scale casualties are
caused by weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—nuclear, biological, chemi-
cal, and radiological warfare. Hypothetically, some forms of environmental war-
fare might also be envisaged under this heading. Catastrophic conflict can
involve interstate warfare or terrorism. In the former case, it could come in the
form of “bolts from the blue” (preemptive attacks) or could come through esca-
lation of a conventional war to the use of tactical, theater, or strategic WMDs.
“Disruptive” scenarios are perhaps more difficult to categorize than the oth-
ers. Presumably they could include such things as electromagnetic-pulse attacks
that disrupt communications or “cyber warfare,” with or without an identifiable
perpetrator. They might also involve major political changes in nations via elec-
tions or significant shifts in foreign-policy orientation that could heavily impact
on U.S. global presence.
Again, the above generic scenario types seem largely a recasting of the conflict
spectrum elaborated by various authors in the 1990s running from nuclear
to conventional to limited conventional, to high-, medium-, and low-intensity
conflict.13 The shift toward a multipolar system somewhat devoid of ideological
conflict, and the advent of new technological possibilities for conflict such as EMP
and cyberwar, have added new dimensions to a comprehensive scenario menu.
In the Cold War, U.S. government studies openly acknowledged expected,
possible, or actual scenarios, mostly related to the two “base cases,” war in Cen-
tral Europe and in the Persian Gulf, both expected to involve the USSR. War
started in one of these theaters was thought likely to spread to the other (“hori-
zontal escalation”). Korea was, in addition, long an additional “mini–base case.”
Specific scenarios, however, are politically sensitive in an ambiguous political
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environment in which the identities of friends and foes are not always as clear as
in the (in this respect) halcyon Cold War years. Now the scenarios considered are
far more varied, with respect to both type and location. Political sensitivities put
some within the classified realm, and again, there is a high likelihood of the un-
foreseen, though most can be fitted into the aforementioned four-way typology.
Underlined in all of this is the global, diverse, almost open-ended nature of po-
tential problems and the uncertainty of access in the context of shifting, indeter-
minate, and contingent or ad hoc political relationships. We shall return to this.
Arms Resupply during Conflict. Any number of scenarios can be divined regard-
ing future basing problems in connection with arms resupply during conflict. In
numerous past situations, the United States and other major weapons suppliers
have had to choose, in conflicts involving allies or friendly states, policies from a
spectrum ranging from embargo (the U.S. embargo on Pakistan in 1965, which
drove the latter into a long-term alliance with China) to all-out arms resupply,
with a possible time lag in the latter case, as in 1973.14 In 1973, access to bases in
the Azores (territory of Portugal) and perhaps Spain (tanker refueling) was crit-
ical to the resupply effort on behalf of Israel, as was the movement of some ma-
teriel out of Germany. An “air corridor” through the Gibraltar Straits was also
vital. On the other side of the Cold War divide might be noted Soviet use of air
staging bases and overflight corridors for resupplying clients in Angola (1975),
Ethiopia (1977–78), and Vietnam (1979). In Angola and Ethiopia the Soviets
used north-south air corridors similar to what the United States now seeks in its
contingency planning.
As for the future, who can say? Scenarios have been bruited for possible arms
resupply operations involving Israel, Egypt, maybe Iraq, possibly Pakistan or In-
dia. A new round of fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia, or between Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan, could bring this matter into play. In the case of Israel and
Egypt, a new conventional conflict might prompt an American embargo on
both, perhaps coupled with asymmetric Russian or European Union (EU) re-
supply of Egypt; that could trigger a repeat of the near-nuclear scenario of 1973.
In another round, Portugal and Spain might not likely allow the United States
access for resupply of Israel, but longer-range transport aircraft render this a less
crucial matter than before.
Coercive Diplomacy, Air-Based Intelligence. Coercive diplomacy, known as
“gunboat diplomacy” in an earlier time, may also require access. Numerous
cases have been detailed in which this issue came into play during the Cold War,
many cases involving access to bases and overhead air space.15 Once, coercive di-
plomacy usually involved the movement of ships, like the actual “gunboats”
used by the United States to affect behavior in Central American states.16 In
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1970, American ships based in Souda Bay (Crete) and elsewhere coerced Syria
into halting its invasion of Jordan. In 1971, a carrier battle group in the Indian
Ocean signaled an American “tilt” toward Pakistan in its conflict with India, and
friendship toward China as well. More recently, the forward movement of
AWACS* aircraft has become more the norm, though movement of U.S. ships
through the Taiwan Straits in 1996 to signal support for Taiwan was closer to the
earlier model. The firing of Tomahawk missiles as “signals” (some might say fu-
tile gestures) in Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan may be cited, involving ships that
may have had access to regional ports. A related matter is the flying of intelli-
gence aircraft off the shores of rival nations such as China, in which case access
to bases in Okinawa would have been required.
During the Cold War, the United States flew U-2 missions from Bodo (Nor-
way), Wiesbaden (West Germany), Incirlik (Turkey), Peshawar (Pakistan), and
Atsugi (Japan), among other places, and electronic intelligence planes along the
Soviet Arctic coast from bases in Western Europe.17 The shooting down of Ko-
rean Airlines flight 007 may have resulted, accidentally, from such activities.
Electronic intelligence collection is now typically conducted by satellite, but the
need for basing electronic and photographic intelligence aircraft may remain.
Presence/Showing the Flag. “Presence,” or “showing the flag,” mostly through
port visits, is a longtime maritime tradition, an important aspect of the politics of
prestige and alignments. In the nineteenth century, for instance, all the major na-
val powers sent flotillas (one of them the American “Great White Fleet”) around
the globe to show the flag, display might, perhaps intimidate a bit. Such visits are
made to allied nations but also to neutral and even somewhat unfriendly ones.
As was recently the case with U.S. ship visits to Vietnam, “showing the flag”(or the
acceptance by hosts of such visits) can be a way of indicating new political rela-
tionships. The bombing of the USS Cole (DDG 67) took place in that context—in
Aden (Yemen), which had been not much earlier a major Soviet naval base.
Peacekeeping. A more recent phenomenon is the use of foreign facilities in order
to conduct peacekeeping or interposition operations nearby. Here one might
cite U.S. access to facilities in Egypt to support peacekeeping in the Sinai, and in
Hungary and Albania for operations in, respectively, Bosnia and Kosovo. West
African ports like Dakar, Senegal, have been used to support peacekeeping oper-
ations in nearby states, such as Liberia.
A few points stand out from the myriad of possible complex scenarios. Most re-
flect focuses on WMD, terrorism, hegemonic rivalry with China, and competi-
tion over scarce resources—particularly oil, but possibly also such minerals as
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iron ore and manganese—and the possible nexus between the latter two.18 The
possession, existing or possibly pending, of nuclear weapons by Iran, Israel, In-
dia, Pakistan, and North Korea, perhaps later Egypt, Syria, or Taiwan, among
others, is at the heart of numerous scenarios. Islamist terror raises the possibility
of conflict and, hence, access requirements in numerous areas spanning the
West, North and East Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, Central
Asia, etc. Hegemonic China looms large in such scenarios. Most importantly,
maybe, the supply-demand equation for oil also looms large, what with enor-
mously increased demand by China, India (with a projected population of 1.6
billion), and other Asian countries. China is now getting oil in large quantities
from Saudi Arabia, Oman, Angola, Iran, Russia, Sudan, Yemen, Congo, Equato-
rial Guinea, and Indonesia.19 It is looking for additional sources in Chad, Can-
ada, and Peru, among other places.
THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL PRESENCE
The United States has been reshaping its global presence to deal with new
threats, emanating from sometimes new sources, in a very fluid and complex
global environment. It is positioning itself according to new geopolitical em-
phases (arcs of crisis, African oil fields, etc.) and also in line with its own “trans-
formation”—an emphasis on smaller, lighter, more mobile forces. There is a
clear shift away from the residual Cold War global presence, marked by heavy
forces stationed where they would be expected to fight—in Central Europe and
Korea. The upshot of the scenarios themselves, the comparative costs involved,
the necessity to retain military personnel and attend to their families’ needs, and
a desire to lower the intrusiveness of the U.S. presence and infringement on
other nations’ sense of sovereignty is that global presence is being seen in terms
of trade-offs. The traditional option is forward presence/basing; a new possibil-
ity is sea basing; both political and new technological realities, however, increas-
ingly allow for resort to basing military operations in the continental United
States (Conus) itself. The latter two broad options are, of course, linked.
As indicated in recent Defense Department publications, basing access has
come to be viewed along a spectrum embracing the “main operating base,” “for-
ward operating site,” and “cooperative security location.” Main operating bases
involve “permanently stationed combat forces and robust infrastructure” and
“will be characterized by command and control structures, family support facil-
ities, and strengthened force protection measures.”20 Examples mentioned are
Ramstein Air Force Base (Germany), Kadena Air Base (Japan), and Camp
Humphreys (Korea). Others that might fit that category are the air bases at
Thumrait, Seeb, and Masirah in Oman, and Al Udeid in Qatar. Yet others might
be the naval base at Yokosuka, the complex of bases on Guam, the naval facilities
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on Diego Garcia, maybe the air and army bases in Kuwait, and perhaps the main
army bases in Germany at Baumholder, Wurzburg, Wiesbaden, Friedberg,
Schweinfurt, and Vilseck.
A forward operating site is defined as “an expandable warm [i.e., kept in
ready condition] facility maintained with a limited U.S. military support pres-
ence and possibly prepositioned equipment.”21 Further, they “will support rota-
tional rather than permanently stationed forces and be a focus for bilateral and
regional training.” Examples cited include the Sembawang port facility in Singa-
pore (which may be approaching, de facto, the status of a main operating base)
and Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras. Other U.S. Air Force bases around the
world that, as measured by permanently stationed personnel, might qualify are
Keflavik in Iceland, Royal Air Force Stations Lakenheath and Mildenhall in the
United Kingdom, Spangdahlem in Germany, Aviano in Italy, Incirlik in Turkey,
and Utapao in Thailand. Naval Air Station Atsugi in Japan might qualify as well.
Of course, the newer facilities being expanded and utilized in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania fit this model, as do some in the smaller Persian Gulf countries. The
U.S. facility at Sigonella in Sicily (during the Cold War mostly a U.S. Navy P-3
antisubmarine patrol aircraft base), if expanded, would presumably also qualify
as a forward operating site.
Cooperative security locations are “facilities” with “little or no permanent
American presence.” Instead, they are maintained with “periodic service, con-
tractor, or host-nation support.” Cooperative security locations would provide
contingency access and serve as focal points for “security cooperation activi-
ties.”22 According to Defense Department documents, Dakar is one example;
there the U.S. Air Force “has negotiated contingency landing, logistics, and final
contracting arrangements . . . which [made Dakar] a staging area for the 2003
peace support operation in Liberia.”23 According to a recent article in the Chris-
tian Science Monitor, which omits the acronyms and Pentagon jargon, coopera-
tive security arrangements of this sort are being set up in several African
countries: Chad, Djibouti, Uganda, Kenya, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Ni-
geria, and Algeria, among others.24
Obviously, the main thrust here is in the direction of a very limited number of
main operating bases, so as to lessen the U.S. overseas footprint, and an increase
in forward operating sites and cooperative security locations to accommodate
lighter and more mobile forces for a variety of contingencies.
The current, evolving trends are clear. The first is some degree of drawdown in
“old Europe,” mostly in Germany, in favor of forward sites in Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria, and Poland, either with limited permanent personnel or forces rotated
from Germany or the United States.25 The second comprises the maintenance of
forward sites, cooperative locations, and prepositioned materiel in the Middle
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East—in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman (concur-
rent, however, with a reduction of deployments to Saudi Arabia). A third is the
maintenance of bases in relation to Afghanistan—and this apparently in the face
of mounting pressure from President Vladimir Putin of Russia, who claims the
United States promised to withdraw from Central Asia after the end of the crisis
there. Washington has kept its bases in Afghanistan at Bagram, Kandahar, and
Mazar-e Sharif, etc., and has solidified access to air bases in Kyrgyzstan (Marias)
and Uzbekistan (Khanabad).26 That in neighboring Kyrgyzstan has also drawn
notice due to its proximity to western China. Fourth, Diego Garcia remains
(with British permission) a critical U.S. base for prepositioning, refueling, and
crew rest for B-2 and B-1 missions. Finally, in East Asia, Australia continues to
host important American intelligence and surveillance facilities (Exmouth, Pine
Gap) as well as offering American planes and ships access. Singapore, as noted,
now hosts a major U.S. naval facility, and the Philippines now is resuming basing
access for the United States after a long hiatus, prodded by the necessities of co-
operation on antiterrorism.
THE BASIS OF BASING
As we have seen, and historically speaking, nations have acquired basing access
in one of three basic ways: by conquest or colonization, by providing security or
protection for the host via formal alliances or less formal arrangements that still
imply protection, or by tangible quid pro quos—security assistance, arms trans-
fers, subsidies, or what amount to “rents.”
In the current context for the United States, conquest is more or less irrele-
vant, precluded by emerging international norms or “laws”—though some crit-
ics of the Iraq invasion see enhanced basing access as having been a motive for it.
An extreme situation regarding access to oil, oil embargoes, or unacceptably
high oil prices could raise the question of conquest of bases to deal with it. Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger, indeed, warned of this possibility in the 1970s.
As for bases acquired through the provision of security, during the Cold War
a number of nations provided the United States access at least in part because it
provided assurance against Soviet or Chinese aggression. The term “extended
deterrence”was often used to describe such a relationship. It may still be applica-
ble in a number of cases—for example, Japan, South Korea, perhaps again the
Philippines, even Vietnam. Access in Georgia and some of the ex-Soviet states in
Central Asia might be included, in relation to a possibly resurgent and revision-
ist Russia. Around the Persian Gulf, states are being made secure by a U.S. pres-
ence against Iranian aggression and maybe reassured about the implications of a
possible Saudi Islamic revolution. In addition, a growing number of nations—
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again, the Philippines, and some in Africa—may see an American presence as
deterring terrorists.
All of this represents extrapolation from current problems and scenarios.
Perhaps absent here is the broader picture of a changing but indeterminate in-
ternational systems structure that may heavily impact future scenarios, formal
and informal alliances, and hence basing access. Cold War bipolarity based
largely on an ideological divide has now given way to a degree of unipolarity
heavily influencing the facts of basing dominance, admixed with an incipient
though asymmetric multipolarity, the poles of
which are the United States, the EU, Russia,
China, Japan, India, and perhaps a nascent
radical “Islamic world.” Save the remnants of
communism and the growing ideological-
religious aspects of Islamic radicalism, the
new system is largely devoid of an ideological
basis for enmity and friendship, a state of af-
fairs that allows, as was the case in the Europe
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
rapidly shifting alliances based on short-term
or medium-term expedience and balance-
of-power considerations. Russia’s recent oscillation between China (arms trans-
fers, coalescence vis-à-vis the United States), the EU (ganging up on the United
States), and the United States (common front against Islamic terrorism) may be
a harbinger of things to come as well as a reminder of the past.
What of the future? The West versus the rest? The United States aligned with
Japan, India, and maybe Russia against rising Chinese global hegemony, with the
EU as a “balancer” and Islam aligned with China?27 An all-Asia front to drive
U.S. power out of Asia? There are various possibilities, and again, the shifts may
be rapid and frequent. At another level, nuclear proliferation, juxtaposed to
big-power multipolarity, will be critical, and numerous new entrants to the “nu-
clear club” are likely. North Korea (maybe later a nuclear-armed united Korea),
Iran, maybe Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, and Indone-
sia, are all technically qualified.
What will be the impact of all of this on basing and, specifically, on the Amer-
ican basing posture? In the past, multipolar systems devoid of long-term stable
alliances usually have obviated or limited large-scale basing systems; in such a
world today’s “friend” is tomorrow’s rival and someone else’s “friend.” Nuclear
proliferation seems to portend the decoupling of alliances because of the intimi-
dation factor—unless the protection/security factor drives cooperative missile
2 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2005\NWCRSU05\NWC Review Summer 2005.vp
Wednesday, June 01, 2005 3:58:22 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
32
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/22
defense systems. Will Japan, China, Russia, India, and the EU develop effective
ballistic-missile-defense systems? Will some of these powers provide security as-
sistance as quid pro quo for their own bases or to deny access to the United
States? On the whole, decoupling and a very constrained environment for U.S.
basing might be predicted—and hence further reliance on sea-basing or Conus-
basing schemes (see later)—but all of this is uncertain. The effective use of secu-
rity assistance might alter the equation.
Security Assistance
The third category, in the current context, relates primarily to the use of security
assistance as a quid pro quo for basing access. During the Cold War, some of the
largest recipients of American security assistance—Turkey, Greece, Spain, Portugal,
the Philippines—were providers of critically needed access for the United States.
There are several categories of security assistance: the Foreign Military Fi-
nancing Program, the International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program, and the Economic Support Fund.28 Some seventy-four countries re-
ceive foreign military financing, some 130 receive IMET money, and some
twenty-six accept money from the Economic Support Fund, which is also used
to support multilateral programs concerning regional democracy, regional
women’s’ issues, administration of justice funds, and other such initiatives.
Several points stand out regarding the current structure of U.S. security assis-
tance. The first point is the dominance of the numbers by Egypt and Israel. An-
other is the truly remarkable number of countries receiving U.S. funds from one
or more of these sources, more than two-thirds of some 190 sovereign nations in
the world. Many that now receive such assistance are former Soviet allies and
arms clients (or even former Soviet republics), many of which once provided
Moscow basing access and overflight rights; among them are Egypt, Yemen, Algeria,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ethiopia/
Eritrea, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mozam-
bique, Angola, Mongolia, India, and Cambodia.
Regarding the Foreign Military Financing Program, Egypt and Israel are the
largest recipients, primarily as a result of supporting the Camp David peace pro-
cess, though Egypt has provided the United States access in recent times. In
2003–2004, aside from Egypt and Israel, only Jordan, Oman, Morocco, Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Georgia, Turkey, Colombia,
the Philippines, and Pakistan received over twenty million dollars, modest sums.
The low figures for Latin America correlate with low levels of conflict and strate-
gic threat and the near absence of American bases (Colombia, for instance, has
had significant support in relation to drug interdiction). The United States once
provided large amounts of security assistance, as much as five hundred million
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dollars annually, to a small number of key basing hosts: Portugal (the Azores),
Spain, Greece, Turkey, Thailand, the Philippines. Now, aside from the billions re-
quired to support the Egypt-Israel Camp David accords, money is spread out to
a much larger number of recipients in smaller amounts (though some are still
quite large): Jordan near a half billion (in part for underwriting the “peace pro-
cess,” but perhaps also for American access in the Iraq war), and Afghanistan
$190 million.
Djibouti and the Philippines have the largest accounts in the Economic Sup-
port Fund, each around twenty-five million dollars, no doubt reflecting Ameri-
can military access. U.S.-Philippines collaboration on the war on terrorism is
germane here. The IMET goes to a number of states, but the amounts are small,
only a handful above a million dollars per year: the Philippines, Malaysia, Thai-
land, India, Senegal, South Africa, Colombia, Mexico, Turkey, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman,
Tunisia, Yemen, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary,
Kazahkstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, and Romania. The
relation to basing access is clear in many of these cases.
Hence, it would appear that in many cases all over the world, relatively small
increases in absolute levels of assistance would represent large proportional
jumps. Such increases could judiciously be used in exchange for enhanced access.
What potentially is involved was illustrated in recent cooperative security and
training exercises in various African states. The focus is on counterterrorist
training, particularly in and around the Sahara Desert and the Sahel; “These are
vast lawless lands where terrorists linked to Al Qaeda are known to operate—
and where the region’s large Muslim populations sometimes offer support or
sympathy to extremists.”29 There are promising oil fields around and near the
Gulf of Guinea—in Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Angola, Chad, Equatorial
Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe. Reportedly China has been scouring the
African continent to line up deals regarding a variety of nonfuel natural re-
sources. As we have noted in this connection, the United States has been devel-
oping north-south air corridors to support military operations. U.S. forces are
also training personnel in Chad, Botswana, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, and Dji-
bouti; in the last-named now are some two thousand American troops poised to
launch antiterrorist operations in the Horn of Africa or the southern part of the
Arabian Peninsula. The amounts of IMET targeted for these countries range
from around one or two hundred thousand dollars per year on up to about a
million for Senegal.
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ACCESS PERMISSIVENESS AND SCENARIOS, PAST AND PRESENT
As previously discussed, basing access has become more ad hoc and situational
since the end of the Cold War and, with it, the weakening of the formal alliance
structure constructed by the United States during that protracted struggle. Dur-
ing the Cold War, the United States was able, almost always, to utilize its overseas
facilities and the airspace of friendly nations. For instance, air bases in Japan, the
Philippines, and Thailand were used to prosecute the war in Vietnam. U-2 air-
craft were flown over the USSR from bases in Turkey, Germany, the United King-
dom, Pakistan, and Japan. Germany was a jumping-off point for American
intervention in Lebanon in 1958. Various nations allowed access for satellite
downlinks in connection with nuclear early warning and satellite control: Ger-
many, Australia, the United Kingdom, the Seychelles, even Madagascar for a pe-
riod. The United Kingdom, Turkey, Italy, and Taiwan allowed forward basing of
land-based missiles aimed at the Soviet Union and China. There were few excep-
tions—denial of airspace by France and Spain for the raid on Libya in 1986 was
one example. Also, numerous nations tied in one way or another to the USSR al-
lowed Moscow access and denied it to Washington: Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia,
South Yemen, Iraq, Libya, India, and the whole contiguous Warsaw Pact bloc
from Eastern Europe to Mongolia.
The keys here, in the prior period, were systems structure (a bipolar struggle
with ideological cement on both sides), shared threats, protection of basing
hosts, and perhaps a lower level of the anti-Americanism that is now the hall-
mark of diplomacy.
After the end of the Cold War, permissiveness persisted at least for the 1990–
91 DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM operation. There the United States led an ef-
fective coalition that was underpinned by the collective security mandate of the
UN and that enjoyed strong support from Saudi Arabia, hence also from most of
the Middle East. Only Jordan seems to have denied the United States relevant ac-
cess, which was provided fully by the Saudis and other Gulf states, Egypt, Mo-
rocco, Kenya, Turkey, all of the other NATO allies, and even the newly
“independent” Eastern bloc countries.30 Some political problems arose, how-
ever, in India and Thailand, as a result of the granting of permission to stage U.S.
Air Force transport planes.
In the Afghanistan war, the United States also was provided access almost ev-
erywhere necessary. The ex-Soviet states in Central Asia, with the permission of
Moscow, gave the United States vital air bases and jumping-off points to the
north of Afghanistan. Britain provided Diego Garcia. Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qa-
tar, and others allowed the United States to fly missions from their territory to
Afghanistan. Nations in Eastern Europe and in the Caucasus granted overhead-
transit access. Perhaps the only problem (other than Iraq and Iran, for obvious
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reasons) was Pakistan, and even that nation, under pressure from the United
States (and fearing American encouragement of an invasion from India) al-
lowed overflights and some access for heliborne ground operations. Intimida-
tion was a factor in that case. But overall, sympathy in the wake of 9/11 and
perhaps fear of an aroused and dangerous United States made for a permissive
basing access environment. Enhanced security assistance and the promise of
more were important.
In the invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, there was an overall less permissive
environment for U.S. access, for reasons of political disagreements with states in
“old Europe” and pressure from the “Arab street” in the Middle East. Access to
European bases and overhead airspace was mostly maintained (Switzerland, ir-
relevantly, denied the latter). But reluctance by Saudi Arabia prompted the mov-
ing of air command and control operations to Qatar (which, with Kuwait and
Oman, was solidly favorable to American access). Egypt quietly allowed over-
flights, refueling, Suez Canal transit, and use of a major military hospital. But
permission for the movement of the 4th Infantry Division across Turkish terri-
tory was denied; there were hints of covert pressure from France and Germany
in connection with Turkey’s prospective admission to the EU. During this pe-
riod, also, there were reports of Russian complaints about continuing U.S. access
to the Central Asian states.
For the future, access may be even more situational and ad hoc. The keys are
likely to be alliance and security assistance relationships, the overall global level
of support for American policies on antiterrorism and WMD proliferation, the
political specifics of given situations, and the balance between reliance on U.S.
provision of protection and security and the counterleverage of foes of the
United States or states pressured or intimidated by the latter. Europe’s growing
divorce from the United States, and perhaps its growing competition with the
United States over access to Middle Eastern oil, may be a growing factor. Paki-
stani and Iranian nuclear arsenals may increasingly be intimidating factors. The
Muslim “street,” in Africa and Southeast Asia as well as the core Middle East,
may be another. Japan’s fear of nuclear-armed North Korea, not to mention
China, may be a strong factor in the Far East. In general, and short of actual cri-
sis, U.S. access all over Africa, in the Persian Gulf area, and in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia seems to be growing and solidly assured, but in specific situations
things may be different.
It is difficult to predict the extent to which permissiveness of access may vary
by scenario type—traditional, irregular, catastrophic, disruptive. This question
involves a spectrum that can be measured as macro to micro—that is, a nuclear
or biological terrorist event to a peacekeeping operation—but also in techno-
logical terms, running from force-on-force military operations to, say, a cyber-
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attack out of nowhere. Again, degrees of access allowed may be scenario specific,
depending upon the identity of the foe (Islamic or not, raising the issue of reli-
gious identification), fear and intimidation (in both directions), influence af-
forded by oil politics or other types of leverage (EU admission, security
assistance, various quid pro quos), and the overall intensity of anti-Americanism
(perhaps with regional variations). Relatively small “disruptive” scenarios in-
volving peacekeeping, responses to coups, etc., would appear to be most permis-
sive in terms of access; likewise, catastrophic scenarios would probably result in
sympathy for U.S. operations, though perhaps counterbalanced by the fear and
intimidation factor. One may note here the extensive granting of access to Amer-
ican military forces engaged in the tsunami rescue operation in places like Thai-
land, but also the skittishness of the Indonesian government about U.S. military
activities on Sumatra.
It is worth pointing out that aside from broadly systemic factors and prevail-
ing moods, global or regional, the domestic politics in given nations may be a
determining factor, with respect either to electoral change or coups and revolu-
tions. There are any number of historical examples, even from the period of sta-
ble alliances during the Cold War. France, under Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s,
canceled U.S. access to air and naval bases (Villefranche in the latter case) and to
crucial petroleum pipelines running from France’s Atlantic coast to Germany.
Iran’s revolution in 1979 cut off important access to telemetry intercept facilities
in northern Iran (the Iraqi revolution in 1958 had ended Western access to air
bases there). In the latter part of the Cold War, American access to Greek bases
was curtailed when anti-American governments came to power. Later, the
United States had to withdraw from Spanish air bases, obtaining additional ac-
cess to Italian bases to offset the loss. The Turkish situation in 2003 has widely
been reported upon; it came in the wake of the accession to power of an Islamic
party. In the Philippines, post-Marcos politics expelled the United States from
major air and naval bases. On the other side of the coin, in recent years friendly
governments in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Australia have translated into
very permissive access. Shifting political winds could later cause problems in
these countries, and in Japan and South Korea as well.
Conus Basing and Sea Basing
Alternatives to contingent basing access, or perhaps supplements to it, are Co-
nus basing and sea basing. Their utility will depend greatly on the scenario, both
in terms of distance and location, and also the sheer scale of operations required.
Conus Basing. The option of relying more on basing within the continental
United States has been illustrated by, among other things, B-1 and B-2 bomber
missions in Operations DESERT STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM,
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mounted from Barksdale and Whiteman Air Force bases, the latter at least mak-
ing some use of Diego Garcia. Also, military transformation, translating into
lower force levels and logistical requirements for given operations, has resulted
in more optimism about being able to rely more, if not wholly, on Conus basing.
Operation from the United States might be particularly applicable to preemp-
tive strikes on WMD installations or terrorist facilities, as well as to interdiction
operations in a “traditional” conflict. This option might be furthered by techno-
logical developments—faster attack aircraft with longer ranges and more accu-
rate bombing systems, enhanced capabilities for conventional interdiction by
SSBNs, etc. Also, satellite capabilities and reduced requirements for overseas
downlinks might in the future allow reduced dependence on foreign bases for
intelligence and surveillance. Better and faster sealift and airlift would also help,
but obviously only within limits, for traditional and disruptive scenarios at least.
Sea Basing. Sea basing has captured increased attention. It is, indeed, one of the
four elements of Seapower 21, along with Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and ForceNet.31
This new emphasis is the result of worry that land bases may not so readily be
available for future power projection operations, for reasons we have enumer-
ated. So some analysts now foresee greater use of seaborne platforms for opera-
tions ashore, a trend already foreshadowed by several small crisis operations
(removal of American embassy personnel, small-scale interpositions), mostly in
Africa, and by some aspects of the Afghanistan conflict. The Congressional Bud-
get Office (CBO) observes,
But the third, Sea Basing, is considered by many in the Department of Defense to be
the most transformational of the three ideas. It envisions putting a substantial Ma-
rine Corps ground force on shore and sustaining it from ships at sea rather than
from a land base. Thus, the Navy and Marine Corps could conduct amphibious as-
saults (including “forcible-entry” operations, like those conducted on Japanese-held
Pacific islands during World War II) without needing to seize the enemy territory to
build a base or to get permission from a nearby country to use an existing base. Sup-
porters argue that sea basing would therefore allow U.S. forces to operate overseas
more independently, flexibly, and quickly.32
The U.S. Navy’s present 293-ship fleet includes thirty-five amphibious
ships.33 The latter comprise five amphibious assault ships of the Tarawa (LHA 1)
and Wasp (LHD 1) classes, eleven Austin (LPD 4) amphibious transport docks,
and eight Whidbey Island (LSD 41) and four Harpers Ferry (LSD 49) dock land-
ing ships. In addition, there are now sixteen maritime prepositioning ships. The
first three types of ships “carry Marines, vehicles, and the landing craft that are
used to ferry troops and equipment to shore; some also carry helicopters and
fixed wing aircraft.”34 The L-type ships together provide lift transport capacity
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of 1.9 Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) amounting to twenty-seven thou-
sand troops and their equipment. According to the CBO, in the past these ships
were arranged into twelve amphibious ready groups, three ships apiece, which
operated independently from the fleet and carried a Marine expeditionary unit
of about 2,200 troops, a battalion equivalent. Now the Navy is reorganizing its
fleet to make three surface combatant ships and one submarine available to each
amphibious ready group, producing what is known as an expeditionary strike
group. Clearly, this reflects a shift away from blue-water sea dominance toward
littoral warfare, under a myriad of possible scenarios.
The maritime prepositioning ships carry equipment only, no troops; they are or-
ganized into three squadrons of five or six ships apiece, based at ports in the Medi-
terranean, the Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia), and the western Pacific (Guam). Each
squadron carries enough materiel to equip an MEB and sustain it for thirty days,
thus a lift capacity of three MEBs. So that is the current basis for sea basing.
In March 2003, the Navy proposed to Congress a fleet of 375 ships, including
thirty-seven amphibious ships and eighteen new MPSs capable of conducting
sea-basing operations. Over a thirty-year period up to 2035, this would involve
purchasing twelve LPD 17s (San Antonio class), ten amphibious ships of a new
class (LHA-R) similar to the present LHDs but carrying more aircraft, twelve
dock landing ships of a new class (LSD-X), and up to twenty-one new MPF(F)s,
far more capable than the current maritime prepositioning ships. Thus by 2035
the Navy would have fifty-seven combined amphibious warfare ships and mari-
time prepositioning ships, organized into twelve expeditionary strike groups
and three MPF(F) squadrons.
The CBO sums up the Navy and Marine Corps plans for sea basing as follows:
In the Navy’s and Marine Corps’s vision for sea basing, amphibious ships would con-
tinue to carry the “assault echelons”—the first wave of troops—in any expeditionary
operation. The MPF(F) ships would carry most of the materiel needed to sustain that
force in the first 20 days of operations. They would also hold all of the equipment for
“follow-on assault echelons”—successive waves of troops that would be transported
to the theater on aircraft or high-speed surface craft. With sea basing, no land base
would be necessary for the follow-on forces to assemble themselves and deploy—all
of that would occur on the ships comprising the sea base. Nor would there be a large
supply depot on land to offer a prime, stationary target for attacks by enemy ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, or aircraft. The MPF(F)s are the linchpin of the sea base;
without them, the Navy and Marine Corps would not be able to implement that new
approach to amphibious warfare or forcible-entry operations.35
There are several lower-cost options: first, buy fewer more-capable ships
within the historical spending level; second, buy more less-capable ships at the
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historical spending level; third, create a more survivable sea-basing force; and
fourth, deemphasize sea basing in favor of forward presence. These options in-
volve a blizzard of possible options with regard to types and mixes of ships,
trade-offs between men, equipment, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft, defensive
systems and survivability based on ship construction, etc., each to be costed out.
Another layer of complexity is the question of connectors for the sea bases—
that is, how to get troops from the continental United States (or Europe or U.S.
bases in the Far East) to combat zones, get them ashore, and then sustain them.
One option mentioned by the CBO is to purchase fast sealift ships capable of ferry-
ing troops from Conus (or European or Asian bases) at high speeds. Another
would be to fly troops to an advanced base and then ferry them to the sea base
using short-range, higher-speed vessels. Ships of the latter type already exist, but
new, scaled-up designs would be required. Other needed connectors are
flow-on/flow-off ships to bring landing craft close to shore, large air-cushion
landing craft to get everything to the beach, a new heavy lift helicopter to replace
the CH-53, or a new aircraft with quad-tilt rotors.
The CBO report briefly discusses four arguments against sea basing, whether
on a modest or major scale.36 Those arguments are the possible inability of even
maximal sea-basing schemes to deal with large-scale military operations, such as
in Iraq in 1990–91 and 2003; the vulnerability of sea bases to attack from ballis-
tic and cruise missiles, maybe even greater than that of less concentrated land
bases; the seeming unlikelihood that the United States would attempt large-scale
amphibious operations when it has not done so since the Korean War; and the
expense of all the new ships and connectors needed. Though the third argument
may be specious—this is what sea basing is all about, the projected lesser avail-
ability of land bases in an ambiguously evolving global political climate—but
the other three are serious. For instance, the sea-basing force envisioned by the
CBO for 2035 could cost seventy to ninety billion dollars over that period. Such
numbers would dwarf the current non-Egypt/Israel security assistance budgets,
raising the prospect of trade-offs between them and sea basing.
The CBO and other recent studies of sea basing have focused almost entirely
on force structures and associated budgets, with little reference to conflict sce-
narios—the possible locations and sizes of conflicts, impact of alignments,
availability of land bases, etc. The CBO’s overseas basing study is also stingy with
reference to possible or most likely scenarios, aside from brief mention of Nige-
ria and Azerbaijan (potentially important future sources of oil) and of Uganda
and Djibouti (potential staging bases for conducting operations in Africa and
the Arabian Peninsula to counter instability and terrorism).37 Likewise missing
is any juxtaposition to or cross-referencing with the now-standard general
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breakdown of conflict scenarios. An agenda for further, broader analysis in-
volves such issues as these:
• The relationship of projected sea-basing capabilities to generic and more
specific scenarios
• Sea-basing capabilities in a variety of regions, littoral scenarios versus
inland scenarios, etc.
• The viability of force structure planning with a long (thirty-year) time
frame
• Jointness—the disconnect between CBO’s Navy/Marine sea-basing studies
and its Army-related study focused on Europe and Korea
• The relative costs of sea basing and of enhanced security assistance to
land-base hosts, to the extent the latter is politically feasible.
A sea-basing scheme that allows for lift of 1.5–2.5 Marine expeditionary bri-
gades, up to forty thousand Marines, might be suitable for littoral operations on
the scale of the Afghanistan war or, given overflight rights, somewhat inland. Sea
basing would easily be capable, as it has been in the past in Africa and elsewhere,
of dealing with extraction and peacekeeping operations on a small scale. With-
out supplementation from the Army, however, or maybe even with it, a sea base
might not be capable of operations on the scale of DESERT STORM or IRAQI
FREEDOM, transformation to smaller, more mobile, and more lethal forces
notwithstanding.
Further, the relevance of sea basing to “catastrophic” generic scenarios is am-
biguous, as is preemption of sources of such threats. The limitations of sea bas-
ing away from littorals needs further analysis. Could, for instance, a MEB with
submarines and aircraft attached be useful in Azerbaijan, Tibet, Chad, or
Uganda?38 Presumably such issues, and the nexus generally between sea-basing
force structures and specific and generic scenarios, are being studied on a classi-
fied basis. The political sensitivity is strongly implied in the almost antiseptic
CBO studies.
Another conspicuous absence in the two CBO studies (Navy and Army re-
lated) is jointness. Army forces are hardly mentioned in connection with sea
basing, nor are Air Force capabilities in relation to littoral warfare. In the CBO
study of the Army’s overseas bases, the Marines are largely missing and the Navy
figures only in connection with “locations with the fastest deployment by sea to
potential areas of conflict.” Hence, regarding the latter, Diego Garcia is seen as
the best launching pad for operations in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, East Af-
rica, etc., and Bulgaria and Romania for operations in the Mediterranean–Black
Sea area. Emphasis here is on the degree of forward deployment, use of
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cooperative security locations, rotation of units back and forth to the continen-
tal United States, etc. Missing is an analysis of how the lift capabilities laid out in
the sea-basing study could help both the Army and Marines deal with large-scale
traditional scenarios, or of the limits upon deployment of the troops of the two
services imposed by sea basing, even with extensive airlift.
CONNECTING THE DOTS
The future of U.S. force-projection capability is, of course, a maddeningly com-
plex subject. There are many unknowns—in contrast to the Cold War period,
with its known potential enemies, known and stable system structure and alli-
ances, and a limited set of likely scenarios. Now, the enemy or threat may be large
or small, a state or something else, and may or may not have weapons of mass de-
struction. The identities of allies or “friends” in myriad possible scenarios are
contingent, unclear. Hence, the confused set of possibilities for basing, ranging
from land basing on the territories of allies to sea basing or to greater reliance on
bases at home.
Much has been made of the (perhaps overdrawn or nebulous) distinction, in
this context, between threat-based and capabilities-based planning. Threats, of
course, are only partly predictable, but capabilities and resources have their lim-
its, so planning for capabilities to deal with all possible threats would be unreal-
istic even if all could be known. Also, at least in peacetime, capabilities can be
acquired only over long stretches of time; for instance, the Navy would not have
the amphibious and prepositioning ships envisioned by the Congressional Bud-
get Office, largely on the basis of current projections of threats, until 2030–35.
But over the next thirty years, just about anything could happen to alter threat
perceptions: terrorist WMD attacks on the homeland could occur; China could
overtake the United States as the world’s premier power; Japan could join China
in an all-Asia alliance. The European Union could become a hegemonic rival to
the United States. Russia might try to reconstitute the Soviet Union, or orient it-
self to the EU, China, or parts of the Islamic world. Israel or Pakistan could in
desperation use nuclear weapons, perhaps suffering nuclear responses from, re-
spectively, Iran or India. Ever-rising oil prices, propelled by massively rising de-
mand in China and India, could cause another worldwide depression, and with
it military competition over oil resources in the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea,
North Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea. In addition, there is the looming danger,
now taken seriously by the Defense Department, of catastrophic climate
change.39 Then again, a far more benign set of events (which extrapolation from
the present would suggest are more likely) might occur.
A special case is the emerging and important issue of external basing in rela-
tion to ballistic missile defense, which involves both defense of the United States
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itself from nuclear attack, and theater defense of U.S. forces abroad and allies in
Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East.
Regarding defense of Conus from missile attack (China, Russia, Iran, North
Korea are concerns), the main basing issues today have to do with the upgrading
of the BMEWS radars in the United Kingdom at Fylingdale Moor and at Thule,
Greenland, under Danish sovereignty. For many years enhanced access to those
sites was threatened by political forces in Europe unhappy in general with U.S.
ballistic missile defense schemes. But the external basing of missile defense
should be seen also in the context of the defense of allies. In that connection, I
have developed elsewhere the concept of “triangular” or “indirect” deterrence,
whereby nations targeted by a U.S. strategic or preemptive campaign that are
unable to respond against the American homeland or installations overseas may
instead threaten U.S. allies.40 The value of the deterrent depends somewhat on
U.S. concern for the well-being of allies.
The 1991 Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia (Iraq having no capac-
ity to attack the continental United States) constituted an early example. North
Korean missile tests over Japan imply such a threat to strike Japan in response to
American preemption against Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities. Iran and perhaps
Pakistan could do likewise; both will be acquiring missiles that can reach
throughout their respective regions—to Israel, to the Central Asian states, etc.
As nations acquire still longer range missiles, the threatened area will expand—
in the case of Iran, all over Europe. Hence the United States must think in terms
of comprehensive regional ballistic-missile-defense capabilities. But some po-
tentially threatened nations, such as Japan, may be wary of acquiring such de-
fenses as “provocative” (this is a widely held view among the Japanese left) and
may indeed decouple from the United States and withdraw access for U.S.
forces.41 States intimidated by Iran or Pakistan could also decline offers of mis-
sile defense.
Europe may be less likely to block installation of theater defense systems un-
der intimidation or for fear of provocation, but some similarities may exist. An
“old” European nation might now conceive of its “grand strategy” as one of
building a “counterweight” to the United States, taking advantage of U.S. sup-
port for Israel to ingratiate itself with the Islamic world so as to attain preferen-
tial access to oil and the greater use of euros to pay for it. That could lead such a
nation to decouple itself from American defense policy, including theater mis-
sile defenses intended to protect it from “triangular” retaliation.
Poland, in contrast, appears to be negotiating the possibility of basing U.S.
theater antimissile systems within its borders, missiles that could cover much of
Europe. Britain seems willing to allow the United States to upgrade the
Fylingdale Moor site and maybe install missiles. Of course, U.S. warships
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capable of antimissile defense could be stationed in the Mediterranean or Baltic
seas, or off Europe’s Atlantic coast.
American antiballistic missiles could conceivably be used to “shut down” nu-
clear exchanges in progress in the Greater Middle East. That could be done by
shipboard missiles, but the possibility of doing so with land-based missiles
somewhere in the region (Persian Gulf, Central Asia, the Caucasus) cannot be
ruled out.
Out of all these complex and contingent sets of scenarios and possible policies in
connection with the future of the U.S. global defense posture, a number of gen-
eral points deserve emphasis. The first is that the diverse, uncertain, and global
nature of the emerging threat environment requires an elaborate global basing
and posture strategy. Threats include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction,
traditional warfare possibilities in Iran, Taiwan, and Korea, perhaps hegemonic
rivalry with China and, maybe, the European Union. But looming quietly be-
hind them may be a struggle for oil, gas, and nonfuel minerals, perhaps to be
linked to terrorism, WMD, and great-power hegemonic rivalry.
A second point, related to the above, is the uncertainty surrounding the fu-
ture of the international system, specifically whether the current U.S. unipolar
dominance and alliance structure will hold up. In terms of basing, the issue is a
continuing permissive environment for American basing access versus a far
more restrictive one marked by withering alliances, a systemic shift toward
multipolarity, “ganging up” on the United States, etc. Historically, multipolarity
has meant less stable alliances and hence less durable, more contingent, and ad
hoc basing access.
A third concerns the present and prospective state of the three historical
routes to basing access: conquest/colonization, alliances and provision of se-
curity umbrellas (extended deterrence), and the quid pro quo of security/
economic assistance. The first-named is mostly now ruled out by prevailing in-
ternational legal norms. Alliances and security provision may be in jeopardy as
sources of access, because of changing international system structure and intim-
idation related to WMD proliferation. Security and economic assistance, how-
ever, may be at present an underutilized instrument of acquisition and
maintenance of bases, and a less expensive one than sea basing.
Fourth, and while sea basing and Conus basing are serious alternatives to
land basing by virtue of technological changes in ships, aircraft, etc., there are se-
rious questions of cost and of feasibility in relation to important categories of
scenarios.
Finally, and while I am not privy to the gaming of future possible conflicts
within the Department of Defense, attention clearly needs to be paid to a
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complex plethora of scenarios, along the lines of type (traditional, disruptive,
catastrophic, irregular) and cross-referenced both to expected availability of
bases and to various possible levels of basing at sea.
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James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara
The past four years have witnessed an unexpected warming of relations be-tween the United States and China. The rancor generated by the EP-3
spy-plane controversy and the debate over American arms sales to Taiwan dissi-
pated in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington. Beijing supported the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan. It has co-
operated with the United States in the war on terror,
sharing intelligence and coordinating law-enforcement
efforts.1 Perhaps most strikingly, Chinese officials
have worked quietly but assiduously to break the nu-
clear impasse on the Korean Peninsula.
Understandably, many observers in the West have
hailed the seeming shift in Chinese foreign policy in a
more pro-American direction, interpreting it as evi-
dence that Sino-American relations will remain on
the upswing. Other moves by Beijing, however, cast
doubt on this optimistic view. Wary of Taiwan’s seem-
ing drift toward independence, China has stationed
some five hundred ballistic missiles across the Taiwan
Strait from the island and is deploying additional mis-
siles each year.2 These missiles have no plausible pur-
pose other than to coerce Taipei into opening talks on
reunification with the mainland—or, failing that, to
batter the island into submission.
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Chinese leaders have talked, loudly and often, about doing just that if the Tai-
wanese persevere in President Chen Shui-bian’s plans to enact a new constitu-
tion by 2008.3 Beijing interprets Chen’s advocacy of a new constitution as a
precursor to de jure independence from the mainland. In the meantime China
has pursued an aggressive program of military modernization, purchasing or
building the armaments it would need to make good its threats against the
island.4 Of particular note are purchases of aircraft, warships, and missiles
overtly intended to give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) the ability to fend
off U.S. reinforcements if indeed Beijing chooses war.5
On the other side of the Strait, the deeply divided Taiwanese electorate and
legislature have been unable to agree to arm themselves.6 Plans to purchase die-
sel submarines from the United States, for example, have effectively been
shelved;7 that decision leaves the Taiwanese navy with only four boats—two of
World War II vintage—to fight off China’s large, increasingly potent undersea
force.8 The outlook for Taiwan’s surface fleet is equally bleak. Four retired Amer-
ican guided-missile destroyers are scheduled for delivery starting this year, but
Washington, fearful of antagonizing Beijing, has yet to approve the sale of Aegis
destroyers that Taiwan really needs if it is to shoot down the barrage of ballistic
missiles likely to be lofted its way in wartime.9 Even if the Bush administration
relents on an Aegis sale, it remains doubtful that Taiwanese lawmakers will be
able to set aside their factional bickering long enough to approve the billions
needed for such a purchase.
In short, the cross-Strait military balance is tipping rapidly in favor of the
mainland at a time when pressure is mounting on Beijing to act. The likelihood
of a war in the Strait in the near term has risen sharply. If the military imbalance
continues to grow and Taipei persists with Chen’s plans for a new constitution,
thus edging toward one of Beijing’s red lines for military action, Taiwan could
suffer the fate that befell another island nation that dared, two and a half millen-
nia ago, to defy a powerful neighbor that coveted its territory. Taiwan needs to
consider that fate and how it can be avoided. China too could learn from island
wars of antiquity. Beijing ought to take a clear-eyed look at the hazards of pro-
tracted maritime war before it reaches for the gun. Finally, the United States
could find in this historical case grist for some of the hard thinking it has to do
about the cross-Strait impasse.
MELOS AND TAIWAN
The classics can help Taiwanese, Chinese, and American leaders sort out the sit-
uation in the Taiwan Strait. In 416 BC the leadership of the Greek city-state of
Melos opted to fight the mighty Athenian empire rather than accept vassal sta-
tus. Athens had been at war against Sparta, to the south in the Peloponnesus,
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more or less continuously since 431 BC (see map). Athens had been unable to
make much headway on land against the vaunted Spartan infantry, while Sparta
was no match for Athens at sea. Frustrations were mounting on both sides. A
fragile peace was in place, but it was in the process of unraveling.10
Athens chose this moment to target Melos. Why? Thucydides, the premier
historian of the Peloponnesian War and an eyewitness to many of the war’s
events, sheds light on Athenian motives in his account of the Melian Dialogue,
the famous exchange be-
tween top Melian leaders
and an Athenian delega-
tion dispatched to wring




allow the island to main-
tain its neutrality, the
Melian Council opted for
defiance. Melos fell after a
brief siege. The Athenian
assembly voted to kill its
adult male population
and enslave the women
and children.
Several themes emerge from the Melian Dialogue that bear on China-Taiwan
relations. First of all, questions of justice do not arise in international politics
absent a rough parity of arms between the contending sides. This elemental real-
ity was not lost on the Melian spokesmen, who seem to have resigned themselves
to defeat from the beginning. “We see that you have come prepared to judge the
argument yourselves, and that the likely end of it all will be either war, if we
prove that we are in the right, and so refuse to surrender, or else slavery.”11
The Athenians agreed, noting that in practical terms “the standard of justice
depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what
they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” For
them this was divine law. “Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men
lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule what-
ever one can.” This was a permanent precept of international relations, con-
cluded the Athenians: “Anybody else with the same power as ours”—including
the Melians—“would be acting in precisely the same way.”
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The geopolitical realities and the power disparity involved in today’s cross-
Strait relations are as stark as they were in classical Greece. Even a quick glance at
the map (page 48) shows that China, by its size and proximity to Taiwan, casts a
long and ominous shadow over the island. China’s military and economic resur-
gence and its pretensions to great-power status have already sown doubt that
Taipei could hold Beijing at bay for long. Not surprisingly, some analysts and
policy makers in the West have already resigned themselves to the apparently in-
evitable outcome for Taiwan.12 In essence they have succumbed to Thucydides’
maxim concerning the repercussions of fundamental power imbalances be-
tween nations.
This is more than mere perception—the military balance is shifting in
China’s favor. As we have seen, Beijing is pursuing a determined, methodical
military modernization program, while the Taiwanese legislature remains dead-
locked over the future of the nation’s defense. The qualitative advantage long en-
joyed by the Taiwanese armed forces began to slip away in the mid-1990s, and it
continues to do so.
As the preponderance of power shifts toward the mainland, the arguments
proffered by those with a sanguine view of the cross-Strait stalemate lose cre-
dence.13 China will gain a decisive military edge in the Strait, and sooner rather
than later. Indeed, by some accounts a reckoning with Chen’s regime could take
place this decade. If dominant power does in fact negate considerations of jus-
tice in asymmetric relationships, as the Athenian ambassadors maintained,
China may soon be able to act against Taiwan with impunity.
Second, a powerful nation can use its armed might for a variety of purposes de-
rived from the Thucydidean motives of fear, honor, and interest. An empire might,
for instance, use its military power to acquire strategically placed territories. “By
conquering you,” proclaimed the Athenian ambassadors, “we shall increase not
only the size but the security of our empire.” For Athens there were obvious
geostrategic advantages to wresting Melos from its inhabitants. The island was
ideally positioned off the southeast coast of the Peloponnesus. Operating from
bases on the island, the formidable Athenian navy could conduct operations along
the Spartan periphery, amplifying the already dominant seapower of Athens.
The Athenians also wanted to make an example of Melos, which had stub-
bornly maintained its independence in past years and had taken up arms to re-
sist the imperial will. Many Athenian allies, weary of the high cost of war and the
increasingly tyrannical behavior of Athens, had grown restive. The Athenians
could not allow the Melians to defy them, lest they embolden others to seek lib-
erty from imperial rule. “We rule the sea and you are islanders, and weaker
islanders too than the others,” observed the Athenian emissaries to the Melians;
“it is therefore particularly important that you should not escape.”
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The strategic calculations evident in the Athenians’ deliberations about
Melos, particularly with respect to the island’s favorable geographic position
and its potential to encourage would-be rebels, can be detected in Chinese
thinking about Taiwan. Another look at the map makes it abundantly clear that
geographic destiny binds Taiwan to China. The island’s position off the Chinese
coast imposes a natural constraint on naval power-projection from the main-
land. In a very real sense, then, Beijing’s aspirations to regional and world power
hinge on gaining control of Taiwan.14
The Chinese landmass radiates outward into the Pacific in a broad arc reach-
ing from the Shandong Peninsula in the north to Hainan Island in the south. Yet
the island chain that stretches from the Japanese home islands to the Philippine
archipelago envelops this continental crest. Taiwan holds a central position in
the island chain, sitting directly and conspicuously opposite the center point of
the mainland’s coastline.
For Beijing, in short, Taiwan represents either a gateway to the western Pacific,
a vast expanse long dominated by the U.S. Navy, or a sentinel blocking China’s
strategic access to the high seas.15 Chinese analysts are quick to quote Secretary
of State Dean Acheson, who in
1950 sketched a “defense per-
imeter of the Pacific” running
along the island chain;16 they
also recall General Douglas MacArthur, who famously depicted Taiwan as “an
unsinkable aircraft carrier,” able to radiate power along China’s coasts.17
Not surprisingly, Chinese strategists have repeatedly urged Beijing to neutral-
ize the hostile forces occupying the island, thereby ensuring that China’s navy
can operate freely along the nation’s maritime periphery and project power be-
yond the island-chain perimeter.18 They hope to extend China’s own defense
perimeter seaward, in effect inverting Acheson’s strategy.
There is also an inescapable imperial dimension to China’s strategic calculus,
just as there was for the Athens of antiquity. The Chinese leadership understands
that failure to subdue Taiwan could embolden independence movements within
its own far-flung and ethnically disparate western provinces, namely Tibet and
Xinjiang.19 Just as Athens’s increasingly tenuous hold over its empire hardened
its position over Melos, Beijing can ill afford to “lose” Taiwan, for fear of un-
leashing even greater centrifugal forces in China’s hinterlands. Unification with
Taiwan promises to foreclose the possibility that separatists will draw inspira-
tion from Taiwanese insolence.
Beyond its imperial possessions, Beijing worries about China’s domestic con-
stituents, who are riven by deeply ingrained regionalism and suffer from socio-
economic dislocations, the latter an unintended by-product of two-plus decades
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of government-instituted economic reform.20 As the appeal of communist ide-
ology dwindles, Communist Party leaders have increasingly invoked economic
prosperity and nationalism to shore up their legitimacy and hold together a
deeply fractured polity.21
Should Taiwan declare and successfully maintain its independence, failure by
Beijing to fulfill its decades-long promise to recover the motherland’s last piece
of lost territory would surely discredit Chinese rulers and might foment domes-
tic instability. Just as the Athenians worried about the integrity of their empire,
so too are national unity and survival of the regime at stake for China.
Third, the side endowed with
preponderant armed strength
has the luxury of pursuing a
harsh diplomacy with the objec-
tive of winning without resort to
arms (the “acme of skill” in Chi-
nese statecraft).22 It can attempt
to browbeat a weaker opponent
into submission by holding out
the prospect of defeat and
destruction.
This, as much as any coarsen-
ing of Athenian virtue during
the course of protracted war,
helps account for the ruthless,
frankly immoral tone of the
Athenian pronouncements to
the Melians.23 The Athenian
ambassadors waved away the
Melian petition for justice: “We
on our side will use no fine
phrases saying, for example, that
we have a right to our empire
because we defeated the Per-
sians, or that we have come
against you now because of the
injuries you have done us—a
great mass of words that nobody
would believe.”24 Not persuasion
but brute power was deployed
at Melos.
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China’s rhetoric over Taiwan has been equally stark.25 President Chen’s talk of
independence has aroused consistent, severe consternation among the Chinese
leadership. Even top leaders have not shied from bombast: “We totally have the de-
termination and the ability to crush any attempt to separate Taiwan from China,”
Communist Party chief Hu Jintao
told an enthusiastic crowd of Chi-
nese officials who had gathered to
mark Deng Xiaoping’s hundredth
birthday. “We should extensively
unite all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, including all Taiwan compatri-
ots, to jointly oppose and contain Taiwan independence splittist forces.”26 Hu’s
brand of exhortation, which dominates China’s cross-Strait diplomacy, closely
mirrors Athens’s morally dubious attitude toward Melos.
Lieutenant General Liu Yuan of the People’s Liberation Army was even more
blunt and graphic. Writing in the official China Youth Daily in response to ru-
mors that Taipei might attack the Three Gorges Dam during a cross-Strait war,
Liu vowed that China would “be seriously on guard against threats from ‘Taiwan
independence terrorists.’ ” He insisted that China would not be deterred by such
tactics, promising “retaliation that will ‘blot out the sky and cover up the
earth.’”27 If Liu’s words are any guide, the Chinese are prepared to inflict un-
thinkable (perhaps nuclear) devastation on the island.
Admittedly, bluster is a staple of Chinese diplomacy, but Beijing has put steel
behind its pronouncements, placing force and coercion at the forefront of its
strategy toward Taipei. Chinese rulers have clearly set out to use fear, the un-
avoidable consequence of a sharp power imbalance between contending na-
tions, to modulate Taiwanese behavior.
Fourth, hope is not a strategy in international politics. The Melian represen-
tatives held that because their cause was just, they could trust to fortune, or to
the Spartans to intervene and avert disaster. They maintained that “in war for-
tune sometimes makes the odds more level than could be expected from the dif-
ference of numbers of the two sides.” They also pointed to the geographic
proximity of Sparta and an ethnic affinity between Spartans and Melians: “We
think [the Spartans] would even endanger themselves for our sake and count the
risk more worth taking than in the case of others, because we are so close to the
Peloponnese that they could operate more easily,” and because “we are of the
same race and share the same feelings.”
Hoping to disabuse the Melians of their illusions, the Athenians delivered a
blunt rejoinder. “Hope, that comforter in danger!” they sneered. Unless “one has
solid advantages to fall back upon,” in the form of hard power, hope is folly. The
Melian army could not compete with the Athenian expeditionary force. The
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Athenians, moreover, scoffed at Spartan seapower, a central element in any relief ef-
fort. No outside power, let alone fortune or the gods, would step in to save Melos.
Taiwan’s apparent overconfidence in the ability and willingness of the United
States to defend it during a cross-Strait conflict suggests that Taipei harbors sim-
ilar hope. Some observers have warned that Taipei’s behavior in the past few
years, especially following President George W. Bush’s 2001 pledge to do “what-
ever it [takes] to help Taiwan defend herself,” reflects a misguided calculation
that Washington’s support is and will remain unconditional.28 President Chen’s
provocative referendum bid prior to the most recent presidential elections
seemed to confirm his faith in the United States.29 In other words, Chen, encour-
aged by Bush’s words, may have concluded that he holds a blank check from
Washington to push his agenda, regardless of how Beijing reacts.
Far from being chastened by President Bush’s rebuke over the referendum issue
or Chen’s setback in the December 2004 legislative elections, independence-
minded leaders in Taiwan have continued to goad China.30 The logjam in the
Legislative Yuan over the U.S. arms package provides further evidence of a belief
among Taiwanese leaders that Washington’s defense commitments are absolute.
In a stunning display of naiveté, one opposition member reportedly argued that
since Taiwan could not possibly defend itself, even with new weaponry, the
island should simply hope for American intervention.31 Another, responding to
American pleas to approve the arms package, likened the United States to a “ma-
fia leader” demanding “protection money.”32
Such statements bespeak a fundamental unseriousness of purpose. The Tai-
wanese leadership may truly believe that America’s resolve to help the island is
unshakable. Alternatively, Taipei’s inaction could simply be a symptom of the
island’s venomous partisan politics. Either way, Taiwan could soon find itself in
a Melian predicament.
Taipei should not blindly count on the United States to defend it. Even if the
political case for U.S. intervention were beyond dispute—say, if China launched
an unprovoked attack on the island—Washington’s ability to deter and to fight a
cross-Strait contingency stands on increasingly shaky ground. Over the next de-
cade, the growing capacity of Chinese naval, air, and missile forces will pose an
ever more daunting challenge to American defense planners.33 Indeed, fears that
Beijing will soon be able to deny the U.S. Navy access to the Taiwan Strait in war-
time are already palpable in certain Pentagon documents.34
China’s ability to pursue a strategy of sea denial, then, is growing and will
have direct consequences, for both the U.S. military and Taiwan’s security.35 As-
suming that the PLA proceeds along its modernization path, it will soon field a
force capable of keeping U.S. reinforcements at a distance while Beijing prose-
cutes a showdown with Taiwan in which the balance of forces overwhelmingly
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favors China. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has estimated that the Chi-
nese military will gain the upper hand by 2006.36 Lee Jye, the minister of national
defense, recently told lawmakers that the mainland would pose a “reliable
threat” by 2015.37
If these predictions come to pass, China will have gained the ability to inflict a
Melian fate on Chen’s regime, securing a swift victory that would forestall Amer-
ican intervention. Beijing could then thereby present the world with the fait ac-
compli of a reunified China. These emerging strategic realities should impel
Taipei and Washington to rethink their long-standing assumptions surrounding
the cross-Strait military balance and its political implications. Taipei must guard
against the temptation to free-ride on U.S. defense commitments. As the Chi-
nese military improves its war-fighting capabilities and doctrine, Washington
cannot continue to take the PLA as lightly as it has for decades. It behooves the
Pentagon to begin thinking ahead about its military strategy for a cross-Strait war.
At the same time, the United States should remain vigilant about Taiwanese
actions that could trigger a Chinese military response. In their discussions with
Taiwanese leaders, U.S. leaders should attempt to inject a measure of realism
into Taipei’s strategic thinking. Taiwan is of course free to pursue its destiny as a
de facto independent country. If it opts for de jure independence, however, it
must generate the military means necessary to uphold its political aspirations.
Washington must caution the island’s leadership against the kind of brinkman-
ship that could end up costing American lives.
Taiwan cannot pin its desire for more international space and independence
on American political sympathies alone. No amount of shared democratic val-
ues between the two nations will compel the United States to sacrifice its vital
national interests. Over the course of its history, argues one perceptive Chinese
analyst, “America shows itself to be a country that acts most on its strongest in-
terests. It has never shown a willingness to help a ‘drowning dog’” such as Tai-
wan. Concludes this analyst, “ ‘American honor’ seems unlikely to provide a
sufficient motivation for American intervention” in the Strait.38
Fear, honor, interest—Thucydides could scarcely have phrased it better.
TAIWAN AS PYLOS
Thucydides’ account of the impending demise of Melos underscores the politico-
military difficulties that Taiwan will face in the coming years, particularly in
light of Taipei’s apparent indecision over its defense. Even if Taiwan finds itself
in a Melian predicament, however, China will still face daunting operational
barriers that will keep very steep the military costs of imposing such a fate on the
island. Notwithstanding the Melian precedent, China should be wary of a clash
of arms in the Strait, at least in the short term.
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If Thucydides’ account of the Melian Dialogue provides a cautionary tale for
Taipei, his account of another battle, at Pylos, offers the same for Beijing. The
battle took place in 425 BC, a few years before the encounter at Melos. The out-
come demonstrates the practical difficulties involved with island warfare, even
for a combatant that, like Sparta, enjoys military superiority on land, can
achieve temporary superiority at sea, and is fighting close to home against an en-
emy encumbered by long, hazardous lines of communication. If the Melian
Dialogue shows that Taiwan needs to beware of the emerging military imbalance
in the Strait, the Pylos case warns China that it should not blithely assume that
its growing military power would assure it an easy victory over Taiwan.
China, which occupies an operational position similar to that of Sparta,
would do well to heed Thucydides’ observations on the Athenian-Spartan en-
counter at Pylos. The Athenian experience shows how difficult it is to take an
island by force, even with the advantage of dominant seapower; Sparta’s experi-
ence shows that a land power can achieve initial success in island warfare yet see
its expeditionary force cut off and defeated by an adversary with a superior navy.
What transpired at Pylos? In the spring of 425 BC, “before the corn was ripe,”
an Athenian fleet under Demosthenes was cruising off the west coast of the
Peloponnesus, ostensibly to succor embattled democrats in Corcyra (modern
Corfu, off the northwestern coast of Greece near the modern Albanian border)
before sailing on to Sicily.39 But the Athenian commander in fact “had other
ideas.”40 He intended to break
with Pericles’ strategy of periph-
eral amphibious raids, landing at
Pylos, some fifty miles from
Sparta, and building a permanent
fort there. Demosthenes’ fellow
commanders, Eurymedon and Sophocles, wanted to push on to Corcyra, there
to confront a Spartan flotilla.41 Luck favored Demosthenes—a squall carried the
Athenian fleet into Pylos, where he “at once urged them to fortify the place,”
pointing out that it “was distinguished from others of the kind by having a har-
bor close by.”42
The advantages of fortifying Pylos were many. From a permanent base in the
Peloponnesus, Athenian triremes could range across the peninsula’s maritime
frontiers. From there the Athenians could foment rebellion among the large
population of Spartan helots (slaves), threatening the survival of the Spartan re-
gime. Local allies could “do [the Spartans] the greatest harm from it.”43 Pylos
would be a magnet for escaped helots.44 In short, it would be a permanent irri-
tant to the Spartans, much as the Spartans’ periodic invasions of Attica vexed the
Athenians. Sparta would find itself, in effect, in the position of modern China
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with respect to Taiwan: China’s Cold War confrontations with the United States
over Taiwan stemmed in part from fears that the island might be exploited as a
geopolitical springboard from which hostile external forces would seek to inter-
fere in the mainland’s internal affairs. This sentiment persists. Indeed, Chinese
leaders have long asserted that overt Taiwanese collusion with “foreign forces” (a
thinly veiled reference to the United States) would constitute a casus belli com-
parable to an outright declaration of independence.
As for the Spartans, although they “at first made light of the news” that
Demosthenes’ troops were building a fort, they quickly grasped the geopolitical
significance of a nearby Athenian outpost.45 The Spartans recalled an invasion
force then in Attica after only fifteen days and diverted it toward Pylos by land
and by sea, “hoping to capture with ease a work constructed in haste, and held by
a feeble garrison” by joint action.46 The Spartan commander planned to block
the two channels into the harbor, using “a line of ships placed close together with
their prows turned toward the sea” to turn away the expected Athenian rein-
forcements.47 To buttress the Spartan defenses further, a force of some 420 hop-
lite warriors (heavy infantry in armor) landed on Sphacteria, a long, narrow
island that sat athwart the harbor mouth.
By this means both the island and the continent would be hostile to the Athenians, as
they would be unable to land on either; and since the shore of Pylos itself outside the
inlet toward the open sea had no harbor, there would be no point that the Athenians
could use as a base from which to relieve their countrymen. Thus the Spartans would
in all probability become masters of the place without a sea fight or risk, as there had
been little preparation for the occupation and there was no food [in the Athenian fort].48
Meanwhile, Demosthenes, realizing that a joint Spartan assault was immi-
nent, “was himself not idle.”49 He took charge of the Athenian defenses, paying
particular attention to the beaches, the weakest point in the defensive perimeter.
The Spartan troops were ultimately unable to establish a beachhead, “owing to
the difficulty of the ground,” which kept them from landing except in small de-
tachments, as well as to “the unflinching tenacity of the Athenians.” “It was a
strange reversal of the order of things,” observes Thucydides, “for Athenians to
be fighting from land . . . against Spartans coming from the sea,” since Spartans
“were chiefly famous at the time as an inland people and superior by land” while
Athenians were “a maritime people with a navy that had no equal.”50 China, a
traditional continental power with minimal amphibious forces, would do well
to bear this Spartan example in mind.51
The Spartans desisted from their attacks after two days of fighting and pre-
pared to invest Pylos. Before they could do so, however, Athenian reinforce-
ments arrived on the scene, in the form of fifty warships. The Athenians
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immediately assailed the Spartan vessels, some of them lined up for battle, some
still beached and being manned. The Athenian triremes put the Spartan ships to
flight “at once,” disabled “a good many vessels” and captured five, rammed some
of the ships that had fled to shore, and began towing away beached vessels aban-
doned by their crews. “Maddened by a disaster” that cut them off on Sphacteria,
proud Spartan infantrymen were reduced to wading into the surf in a vain effort
to drag their vessels back ashore.52 “The stunning effect and importance” of the
Athenian action, notes a recent historian of the campaign, “cannot be exagger-
ated.” Spartan commanders immediately requested an armistice, agreeing
among other things to turn over their fleet to the Athenians and to allow the
Athenian fleet to continue with the blockade it had imposed on the island while
Spartan envoys set sail for Athens to parley.53 As for contemporary China, the
reigning consensus among Western analysts holds that it would likely meet
Sparta’s fate should it attempt a conventional military assault on the island.
Whether Beijing would accept a diplomatic settlement following a disastrous
military defeat in the Taiwan Strait is less certain.
The Spartan delegates, upon arriving in Attica, appealed to the Athenian as-
sembly to conclude a magnanimous peace. They exhorted the Athenians to “em-
ploy your present success to advantage, to keep what you have got and gain
honor and reputation besides,” while suggesting that Athens would pay dearly if
it opted to “grasp continually at something further.” The Spartans were
uncowed, however, claiming that their defeat had been the result of miscalcula-
tion rather than “any decay in our power.” For “what power in Hellas stood
higher than we did?”54 Accepting peace now, they claimed, would spare the Athe-
nians the permanent enmity of Sparta while helping them gain the acceptance of
the Greek world, which would be grateful for concord between the two great
powers. Nonetheless, Cleon, a popular—and belligerent—Athenian leader, pre-
vailed upon the assembly to demand more: the Spartans must agree to allow
their infantrymen to be brought from Sphacteria to Athens, and they must sur-
render certain territories.
Thucydides offers here some telling commentary about the perils of island
warfare. Even Athens, the preeminent sea power of Greek antiquity, encountered
difficulties at Pylos. The Athenians besieging Sphacteria found the Spartan re-
sistance frustratingly resilient until their own reinforcements arrived, giving
them an unchallengeable numerical edge. Athenian logistics were strained,
making it difficult to maintain the blockade. The Spartans, for their part, dis-
played considerable ingenuity, promising to reward with their freedom helots
willing to carry provisions to Sphacteria and thus risk capture by the besieging
force. The Athenians’ “greatest discouragement arose from the unexpectedly
long time which it took to reduce a body of men shut up in a desert island, with
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only brackish water to drink.” The Athenian garrison received few seaborne pro-
visions, even in good weather; the surrounding countryside “offered no re-
sources in itself ”; and the onset of winter would have ultimately compelled
Athens to lift the siege, allowing Spartan troops to sail away in the craft that de-
livered their stores.55
In any event, Cleon’s harsh demands carried in the Athenian assembly, but
the Spartans rejected them. Cleon “violently assailed” the emissaries, then ex-
horted the assembly to send a new expeditionary force to Pylos to overpower the
Spartan resistance. The assembly took him up on the idea; having boasted that
he could achieve victory in a matter of weeks and reacting to needling from his
critics, Cleon consented to lead the force. Detachments of the new force landed
on opposite sides of the island; the Athenians all together now outnumbered the
Spartans on Sphacteria on the order of twenty-five to one. Given these lopsided
numbers, the outcome was certain, notwithstanding the Spartan hoplites’ indi-
vidual superiority over the assailants.56 Peace ultimately followed—vindicating
Cleon’s more bellicose approach to the war in the minds of some scholars: “The
events at Pylos completely changed the outlook of the war.”
With valuable Spartan hostages, Athens needed no longer fear a Spartan inva-
sion. It had little to fear at sea, since it had kept the fleet surrendered by Sparta
under the terms of the armistice (reneging on its commitments under that armi-
stice). It was free to exact new tribute from its allies, replenishing a treasury
depleted by prolonged war. Athens had also gained the upper hand on a
broader level. Until Pylos, the Peloponnesians had inflicted damage upon their
enemies while suffering little damage to their own interests. “Now the Athenians
could inflict continuing harm on their enemies, on land and by sea, fearing no
retaliation.”57
To apply the case to the present day, a similarly propitious outcome for the
United States after a conflict over Taiwan would surely prove to be a strategic
nightmare for China. What other lessons does the Pylos episode hold? First, as
Athens learned during the early stages of its offensive against Sphacteria, islands
can be at once invaluable from a geopolitical standpoint and difficult to in-
vade—especially when they are in the hands of stubborn defenders. Even coun-
tries with powerful naval forces should leaven their calculations with a healthy
respect for this reality. The political and military costs of naval and amphibious
warfare can be prohibitive. Despite the geopolitical value that China attaches to
Taiwan, the island may not be the pushover Beijing seemingly expects.
Second, and closely related, time may not be on China’s side during a Taiwan
Strait contingency. Whether a barrage of ballistic missiles would cow Taipei into
suing for peace, as Beijing seems to assume, is an open question. Nor does China
have the means to land a large expeditionary force on the island. While the PLA
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Navy may be able to fend off the U.S. reinforcements for weeks, that might not be
enough. Should the U.S. Navy force the Strait, any Chinese forces on Taiwan
could find themselves blockaded by the Seventh Fleet, much as the Spartans on
Sphacteria found themselves encircled by Athenian triremes. Humiliating defeat
could follow.
Third, military failure can endanger the survival of a regime as easily as can
allowing the defiance of a wayward province to go unpunished. Sparta had to
fear the possibility of a helot-led revolution after the debacle at Pylos. So too
might China’s social, economic, and political fissures widen if Beijing tried—
and failed—to reunify the motherland by force of arms.
Fourth, the repercussions of failure for China’s international standing could
be dire, as they were for Sparta. “After the victory at Pylos,” observes the promi-
nent historian Donald Kagan, “no island could think of defying the Athenians.”58
Likewise, an American victory in a Taiwan contingency could bind not only Tai-
wan but Asia’s other island nations to the United States, setting back China’s
quest to resume its “central position” in Asian politics.59 Like Taiwan, China
should take note of Thucydides’ enduring wisdom.
A MELIAN FATE?
If taken to heart, lessons of the Peloponnesian War could help clarify thinking—
and dispel dangerous illusions—in Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. Does Tai-
wan’s predicament resemble that of Melos? Will China heed the lessons of Pylos
and take a cautious stance in the Strait, or will it plunge ahead and risk suffering
Sparta’s fate? Will the United States clarify its cross-Strait diplomacy and ready
its military strategy and forces in case diplomacy fails?
While historical comparisons of this kind are always inexact, four factors will
determine which model applies. First is the matter of the military balance. As has
been seen, China is poised to seize its advantage over Taiwan. Beijing is develop-
ing military means commensurate with its expansive political ends and will, by
many measures, soon hold a commanding position in the Strait. Yet a Chinese
victory is far from foreordained. The Chinese navy’s feeble amphibious fleet, for
instance, appears unequal to the missions likely to be assigned it. If China
chooses to act against Taiwan without substantially strengthening its military
capabilities in such areas, Beijing could well meet the fate of the Spartans on
Pylos. In fact, Chinese weakness at present suggests that Beijing will continue to
demonstrate a measure of restraint for the rest of this decade, biding its time
while marshaling the capacity to subdue Taiwan. If Beijing remedies such weak-
nesses, gaining true military dominance not only over Taiwan but over any
American force likely to be sent against it, it could skew cross-Strait relations in a
Melian direction.
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Second, the decisions taken by China’s political leadership are another obvi-
ous factor shaping events in the Strait. In keeping with the Melian precedent,
Beijing may well opt to pursue an even more assertive, no-nonsense diplomacy
as its strategic posture improves. Beijing’s calculations, however, could and
should be different from those of the Athenians. Athens could justly scoff at
Spartan seapower, which at the time was no match for their own. It was foolish,
consequently, for the Melians to wager their survival on Peloponnesian rein-
forcements. China cannot so lightly discount U.S. military power. Nor will Chi-
nese leaders be eager to earn the enmity of the world superpower at a time when
they covet international commerce and the economic development that comes
with it. These considerations warrant caution on Beijing’s part.
Third, Taipei’s actions will have an impact. The contrast between Chinese reso-
lution and Taiwanese irresolution could scarcely be sharper where military affairs
are concerned. Whether by conscious decision or through Taiwanese lawmakers’
inability to set aside partisanship, Taiwan’s means are increasingly out of sync
with its own political ends. That
will be doubly true if Chen Shui-
bian expands those ends by press-
ing ahead with his plans for a new
constitution and ultimate inde-
pendence. Taipei needs to put its
military affairs in order and think twice about provoking Beijing—else it could
meet a Melian fate. Taipei must also come to terms with the operational con-
straints intrinsic to a contingency in the Strait for the U.S. military, the exigen-
cies of worldwide American security commitments, and the reluctance of the
United States to make an enemy of China, East Asia’s foremost power. These fac-
tors could impel Washington to hesitate in a crisis, allowing Beijing to achieve a
Melian outcome. Taipei’s confidence in American intervention, then, could be
misplaced.
Finally, the United States faces daunting challenges in managing the volatility
of cross-Strait dynamics. Washington’s ability to prevent either side from edging
toward conflict could come under increasing strain. In particular, U.S. deter-
rence and reassurance in the Strait could continue to erode, especially in light of
other pressing global security commitments. The shifting military balance in
Beijing’s favor and China’s growing geopolitical preponderance have increased
the likelihood that Taipei will be forced to make the unsavory choices that Melos
had to face. From an operational perspective, China is steadily rectifying its mili-
tary shortfalls, easing the operational problems that both Athens and Sparta
confronted at Pylos. Diplomatically, Washington’s limited influence over the
course of events in Taiwanese politics could further exacerbate the deteriorating
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strategic equation if the island’s leadership continues to permit its military
means to languish. What the United States can do to arrest these trends remains
uncertain. In short, Washington may find it increasingly difficult to dissuade
China from attempting a Melian solution to the cross-Strait impasse.
Leaders in all three nations should take Thucydides’ lessons to heart as they
frame their diplomatic and military strategies. On balance, the four factors ex-
amined above suggest that the belligerent logic behind the Melian analogy will
eventually outweigh the operational constraints intrinsic to the lessons of
Pylos—making war thinkable for Beijing. The Melian outcome was determined
by basic structural features of international politics: power and fear. In contrast,
the operational constraints demonstrated at Pylos may prove to be transitory for
China, soluble as its military modernization continues. One thing is clear: Taipei
cannot afford to put off work on its own defense needs. China is watching. Taiwan
must put its own house in order—or run the risk of becoming a latter-day Melos.
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THE GROWING PROSPECTS FOR MARITIME SECURITY
COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Lieutenant John F. Bradford, U.S. Navy
The sea dominates Southeast Asia, covering roughly 80 percent of its area. Theregion’s islands and peninsulas, wedged between the Pacific and Indian
oceans, border major arteries of communication and commerce. Thus the eco-
nomic and political affairs of Southeast Asia have been dominated by the sea. In
the premodern period, ports such as Svirijaya and Malacca established empires
based upon sea power in area waters. In succeeding centuries European warships
and their heavy guns were the keys to colonization. Today more than half of the
world’s annual merchant tonnage traverses Southeast Asian waters; its oceans
and seas yield vast revenues in such industries as fishing, hydrocarbon extrac-
tion, and tourism. In fact, more than 60 percent of Southeast Asians today live in
or rely economically on the maritime zones. However, the sea is also the source
of a variety of dangers that not only menace the prosperity of local populations
but directly threaten the security of states. Those dangers include territorial dis-
putes, nonstate political violence, transnational
crime, and environmental degradation. Maritime se-
curity, accordingly, is at the forefront of Southeast
Asian political concerns.
Successful response to maritime security threats
requires international cooperation, because those
threats are primarily transnational. As Singapore’s
deputy prime minister has eloquently explained, “in-
dividual state action is not enough. The oceans are
indivisible and maritime security threats do not re-
spect boundaries.”1 Southeast Asian cooperation is
currently inadequate in terms of the maritime threat;
Lieutenant Bradford, a Surface Warfare Officer, was in
2003–2004 an Olmsted Scholar at the Institute for De-
fense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore, earning an MSc in strategic
studies. His naval service has included assignments as
navigator of the dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry
(LSD 43), forward deployed to Sasebo, Japan; first lieu-
tenant of the guided-missile destroyer USS John S.
McCain (DDG 56), based in Yokosuka; Assistant Plans
Officer, Commander Naval Forces Japan; and South-
east Asia Politico-Military Officer on the Navy Staff. He
is currently training to assume duties as the chief engi-
neer of the guided-missile destroyer USS Stethem
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however, structural, economic, and normative factors are leading to greater co-
operation. In the last four years there have been notable steps forward, and the
factors responsible for them should soon produce greater cooperation.
This article discusses the threats to maritime security in Southeast Asia, de-
scribes the factors tending toward strengthened maritime security cooperation,
and argues that networks of bilateral relationships may be more fruitful than
purely multilateral arrangements. The first section, a historical overview of mar-
itime cooperation in Southeast Asia from the end of the Cold War through De-
cember 2004, is followed by a survey of contemporary maritime security threats.
The article then discusses five significant factors that now favor improved mari-
time cooperation. It concludes with the various forms that future cooperation
might take and speculation as to which are mostly likely in light of evolving state
interests and constraints.
It is necessary first to limit the scope of analysis. Warfare is unlikely to break
out among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Accordingly, the focus here is on cooperation to counter extraregional and trans-
national threats, rather than to prevent interstate conflict. In that context, the
concern is not simply cooperation but operationalized security cooperation. Co-
operation, in its broad sense, occurs when states, in order to realize their own
goals, modify policies to meet preferences of other states. “Operationalized” se-
curity cooperation is a specific type and degree of cooperation in which policies
addressing common threats can be carried out by midlevel officials of the states
involved without immediate or direct supervision from strategic-level authori-
ties. Consultation and information sharing between security ministries are ex-
amples of “cooperation,” whereas the data assessment and intelligence briefing
by combined teams of analysts would involve operationalized cooperation. In
the maritime environment, international staff consultations exemplify coopera-
tion. A highly orchestrated and closely supervised combined search-and-rescue
exercise would be considered very thinly operationalized at best. Complex naval
exercises and regularly scheduled combined law enforcement patrols are more
substantial examples of operationalized cooperation.
MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
SINCE THE COLD WAR
In 1991, Southeast Asia was regarded as a relatively stable region in which the
maturity of ASEAN had made significant contributions to management of dis-
putes between member states. During the Cold War, the region had been polar-
ized between the communist and free market states, but the collapse of Soviet
support relaxed tension and produced a general reconciliation between the two
camps. The addition of Laos and Vietnam in 1992, and of Cambodia and
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Myanmar in 1995, to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation—originally con-
cluded in 1976 for the peaceful settlement of intraregional disputes in a frame-
work of absolute respect for state sovereignty—cemented the inclusion of the
former communist-bloc states into the ASEAN community. Similarly, by 1991 the
region’s few remaining communist-inspired insurgencies had been localized, and
almost all of its states had earned unquestioned international legitimacy.2
The revolutionary structural changes that accompanied the end of the Cold
War complemented regional dynamics already in motion—improvements in
domestic security, rapid economic development, and the maturing of regional
identity—to produce an environment conducive to increased cooperation and
the reorganization of security priorities in Southeast Asia. Analysts quickly
identified maritime security as a major concern.3 Many studies focused on
state-to-state naval conflict, but some looked beyond “traditional” threats to ex-
amine a diverse range of broader, “nontraditional” maritime concerns, such as
ocean resource management, changes in patterns of commercial shipping,
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transnational crime, and environmental pollution.4 Even as these studies were
going on, regional states launched cooperative efforts to address maritime secu-
rity issues.
The enhanced maritime security cooperation developed during the decade
immediately following the Cold War has been called “particularly noteworthy”
and “notable.”5 In 1992, ASEAN’s first communiqué on a security issue, “Decla-
ration on the South China Sea,” emphasized “the necessity to resolve all sover-
eignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful
means” and urged “all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to
creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes.” In the
same period, a handful of new institutions emerged. For example, the Indone-
sian South China Sea
Workshops (known as
the SCS Workshops)
sought to reduce the
likelihood of interstate
conflict in the South
China Sea, while the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Mari-
time Cooperation Working Group (CSCAP-MCWG), the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) Working Group on Maritime Security, and the Western
Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) tackled Southeast Asian issues within the
broader Asia-Pacific maritime context.6 However, progress at this point was almost
entirely limited to transparency, dialogue, pledges of greater future cooperation,
and other maritime confidence- and security-building measures (MCSBMs).7
By the end of the twentieth century, cooperation was not yet sufficiently ori-
ented to the region’s new nontraditional security threats, and the few examples
of operationalized cooperation were very weak. Several Cold War–era defense
arrangements, such as the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA) and various
bilateral U.S. security agreements, were adapted to new functions. However, the
usefulness of the FPDA was questioned, and the American presence in Southeast
Asia had decreased with the withdrawal of military forces from the Philippines
in 1991 and limitations placed by Congress on military-to-military contacts with
Indonesia beginning in 1993.8 There were new operationalized cooperation
endeavors; such pairings as Indonesia-Malaysia, Malaysia-Cambodia, Brunei-
Australia, Singapore-India, and Malaysia-Philippines initiated bilateral naval-
exercise programs. Of these new bilateral agreements, the Malaysia-Singapore,
Singapore-Indonesia, and Malaysia-Indonesia coordinated patrols in the Strait
of Malacca were the most operationalized. However, shipboard officers privately
lamented that bilateral coordination of these patrols amounted to little more
than exchanges of schedules, to which in many cases partners did not adhere.9
6 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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From 2000 to 2002, a series of events propelled the Southeast Asian maritime
sector from the post–Cold War years into the new world of the twenty-first cen-
tury. The first was the February 2000 bombing of the Philippine ferry Our Lady
Mediatrix, which killed forty people and wounded another fifty. The attack was
blamed on the Moro Islamic Liberation Front; however, being regarded as just an-
other statistic of the ongoing violence in the southern Philippines, it had less psy-
chological impact than the next transformative event, the October 2000
suicide-boat attack on the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67). Al-
though the attack on Cole occurred in Aden, outside Southeast Asia, the public-
ity generated and the fact that this powerful attack had succeeded against one of
the U.S. Navy’s most sophisticated warships raised awareness about the mari-
time terror threat in Southeast Asia and started security experts there thinking
about the dangers in their own region. Third, a rash of amphibious kidnapping
operations carried out by the Abu Sayyaff Group—especially high-profile
kidnappings of Western tourists from resorts on Sipadan, Malaysia, in March
2000 and in Palawan, Philippines, in May 2001—demonstrated the capabilities
of Southeast Asia’s indigenous transnational maritime terrorists.
The possibility of truly unbearable terrorist attacks was driven home for
Southeast Asians on 11 September 2001. A few months later, Singaporean intel-
ligence discovered a series of al-Qa‘ida-related plots to attack several interna-
tional targets, including visiting American warships, in that island state. These
findings were corroborated by the discovery of planning videos and documents
in Afghanistan. In December 2001 the ferry Kalifornia, transporting Christians
in Indonesia’s Maluku Archipelago, was bombed. The attack killed ten, injured
forty-six, and began a cycle of violence in which several other passenger vessels
were attacked.10
Maritime Southeast Asia completed its initiation into the “age of terror” in
October 2002. On the 6th, Islamist terrorists struck the tanker Limburg in the
Arabian Sea, demonstrating that international maritime trade was a target.
Finally, the 12 October triple bombing in Bali proved that Southeast Asia was on
the front lines of international terrorism. Today, while some Southeast Asia offi-
cials and captains of industry remain “in denial,” terrorism has become the pre-
eminent security issue in the region, and maritime terror is broadly recognized
as a very dangerous threat.
Accordingly, maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia is now develop-
ing more quickly than in the preceding decade. States have demonstrated greater
commitment to expanding MCSBMs and operationalizing cooperation. Appro-
priately, the bulk of the new cooperation has been oriented toward such trans-
national threats as terrorism and piracy. Although considerable obstacles remain
and states have not been equally proactive, commitments have been reinvigorated
B R A D F O R D 6 7
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and several new arrangements created. Clear statements of renewed interest in
improving cooperation include the June 2003 “ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF]
Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Se-
curity” and the “Work Programme to Implement the ASEAN Plan of Action to
Combat Transnational Crime,” which was endorsed by the January 2004
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime. More concretely, most
regional shippers and nearly all major port facilities achieved compliance with
the International Maritime Organization’s December 2002 International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) before or shortly after its July
2004 deadline. Also in 2004, Singapore acceded to the Rome Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(known as the SUA Convention). Singapore’s accession was considered by
many analysts as an important step toward wider regional acceptance of the
SUA Convention.
Examples of new operationalized interstate cooperation began to emerge al-
most immediately after 9/11, when the United States began including counter-
terrorism packages in its bilateral exercises with regional states and sent naval
forces to assist the Philippines against the Abu Sayyaff Group. Indigenous
operationalized cooperation also began to grow. In September 2003 Thailand
and Malaysia announced that, concerned about insurgents and terrorists, they
had invigorated cooperative maritime patrols in the northern Strait of Malacca.
In June 2004, a meeting of FDPA defense ministers in Penang, Malaysia, decided
to orient their organization for the first time toward nontraditional maritime
security, focusing on counterterrorism, maritime interception, and antipiracy.
In July 2004 Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia began a program of trilateral
coordinated patrols throughout the Strait of Malacca. These patrols are of par-
ticular significance, for a number of reasons. First, the strong endorsement given
by regional media and the positive public response to the first patrols demon-
strated the desire of governments
to appear committed to the pro-
gram and widespread support for
the project. Indonesia’s December
2004 mobilization of two mari-
time patrol aircraft and four
warships to recover a hijacked
Singaporean tug exemplifies the program’s positive benefits. Second, this is the
first significantly operationalized multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia to
develop without an extraregional partner. Commitment to operationalizing
maritime security cooperation continues to grow; India and Thailand, neigh-
boring states that control the northern approaches to the Strait of Malacca, have
6 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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expressed interest in joining the patrols, and the founding states have responded favor-
ably.Nonetheless,officers directly involved in the patrols state privately that the trilateral
patrols are often matters more of “show” than of real utility and that it is too soon to
assess their impact on piracy, smuggling, and other maritime crimes in the strait.
In November 2004 sixteen countries (the ASEAN members plus China, South
Korea, Japan, Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka) concluded the Regional Coop-
eration Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in
Asia (ReCAAP). This agreement, first proposed by Japanese prime minister
Junichiro Koizumi at the 2001 ASEAN-plus-Three Summit in Brunei, had been
deadlocked for months by disagreement over where to locate the ReCAAP Infor-
mation Sharing Center (ISC), which would maintain databases, conduct analy-
sis, and act as an information clearinghouse. As explained by the Indonesian
Foreign Ministry’s Director for ASEAN Politics and Communications,
sensitivity stemmed from the possibility that the ISC might publish reports un-
fairly critical to member states. This official shared that concern, arguing that
the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center has misrepresented
incidents in Malaysia waters as having occurred on the Indonesian side of the
Strait of Malacca because the center is located in Kuala Lumpur.11
ReCAAP is a positive step, being an indigenous pan-Asian initiative devised
primarily to deal with piracy, a phenomenon most conspicuous in Southeast
Asia. The fact that members ultimately agreed to locate the ISC in Singapore
demonstrates willingness to compromise in order to advance maritime security
issues. However, the agreement does not obligate members to any specific action
other than sharing information that they deem pertinent to imminent piracy at-
tacks; furthermore, the ISC’s funding will be based on “voluntary contribu-
tions.”12 Although not insignificant, ReCAAP alone will not eradicate Asian
piracy.
Taken together, these many developments constitute significant progress. Di-
alogue and information sharing have been enhanced, states seem firmly com-
mitted, and some states have begun to operationalize their maritime security
cooperation. However, the few operational arrangements that have been created
are insufficient to counter the grave maritime threats the region faces.
CONTEMPORARY MARITIME SECURITY THREATS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Although the regional states have declared commitments to settling differences
peacefully, the threat of traditional conflict cannot be completely ruled out, and
the proximity of international sea lanes guarantees that any such conflict would
have very serious implications. One potential trigger for such conflict is the
remaining territorial disputes between states. Other, less traditional security
B R A D F O R D 6 9
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concerns pose a more immediate threat. These include terrorism and insur-
gency; transnational maritime crime; and harm to the maritime environment.
Territorial Disputes
Territorial disputes, most of them maritime in nature and involving conflicting
claims to either islands or littoral waters, contribute to interstate tension in
Southeast Asia. Among the disputes with significant maritime dimensions are
the Philippine claims to Sabah, overlapping claims to economic exclusive zones,
and multilateral disputes over islands and waters in the South China Sea. One
such issue was seemingly resolved in 2002, when the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) ruled in favor of Malaysia over Indonesia with regard to claims to
Sipadan and Litigan islands. Similarly, Malaysia and Singapore have submitted
to the ICJ for arbitration a dispute regarding sovereignty over Pedra Blanca
(Pulau Batu Puteh), an island in the Singapore Strait with an important aid to
navigation that is passed by about fifty thousand ships every year. However,
given the history of Malaysian activities that Singapore regards as provocative,
the latter still devotes sizable forces to sustaining its claim. Other disputes have
even less prospect for resolution in the near future.
The most troublesome disputes are those in the South China Sea, where In-
donesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, China, and Taiwan assert
conflicting claims to sea and island territories.13 These claims are deemed to be
of vital importance, because the archipelagic seas may have vast petroleum re-
sources and the islands are strategically positioned for support of sea-lane con-
trol or amphibious warfare. In recent history claimants have clashed violently,
and the possibility of renewed fighting (short of open warfare) clearly exists.
The current situation is “volatile and could, through an unexpected political or
military event, deteriorate into open conflict.”14 Any escalation could disrupt the
South China Sea’s huge volume of shipping, with grave consequences.15 In 2002
the ASEAN members and China indicated their desire to minimize the risk by
agreeing to a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
However, the declaration is something less than a binding code of conduct or a
consensus about the way forward; the South China Sea remains a flashpoint.16
Terrorism and Insurgency
Several Southeast Asian guerrilla and terrorist groups possess substantial mari-
time capabilities. Since 2000, al-Qa‘ida, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the
Abu Sayyaff Group, Jemaah Islamiyah, the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, the
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, and Laskar Jihad have all been suspected of planning or
executing maritime attacks. Other groups have used the sea to transport weap-
ons, move forces, and raise funds.
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The most successful has been Abu Sayyaff, which has conducted dozens of
successful maritime operations in the southern Philippines, metropolitan Ma-
nila, and East Malaysia. In 1995, Abu Sayyaff conducted its first large-scale at-
tack: amphibious forces landed by boat, torched the Philippine town of Ipil,
robbed seven banks, and killed about a hundred people. Abu Sayyaff gained
global notoriety in 2000 and 2001 when it kidnapped dozens of people, among
them Filipinos, Malaysians, Chinese, Europeans, and Americans, in a series of
raids on villages, resorts, and ships in and near the Sulu and Celebes Seas. De-
spite a large-scale government offensive backed by American forces, Philippine
officials have confirmed Abu Sayyaff claims of responsibility for the 26 February
2004 sinking of Superferry 14 near Manila, in which 116 people were killed.17
Although so far less successful in maritime Southeast Asia than Abu Sayyaff,
al-Qa‘ida and its close regional allies Jemaah Islamiyah and the Kumpulan
Militan Malaysia have demonstrated their intent to conduct large-scale opera-
tions against the U.S. Navy and global trade. Since 2000, regional security forces
have disrupted half a dozen plots to attack American warships transiting narrow
waterways or visiting ports in Southeast Asia.18 The 2002 attack on the Limburg
demonstrated al-Qa‘ida’s desire to strike the petroleum distribution infrastruc-
ture, a desire also confirmed by al-Qa‘ida literature, including a December 2004
edict issued by Osama bin Laden. There has also been increasing concern that
al-Qa‘ida or its affiliates might use a merchant vessel to administer a cataclysmic
attack—perhaps a nuclear bomb, radiological “dirty nuke,” or other weapon of
mass destruction—in a shipping container. Alternatively, a large petroleum, liq-
uefied gas, or chemical carrier could be hijacked and either sunk in a key water-
way or crashed into a port facility or population center, turning the vessel’s cargo
into a gigantic bomb. Many of these scenarios could cause unprecedented loss of
life and economic disruption.19
Transnational Maritime Crime
Transnational maritime crime involves such economically motivated activity as
piracy, smuggling, and illegal migration. Transnational maritime crime has sub-
stantial security ramifications. It is costly in human terms and is a major drain on
national resources. Furthermore, it has a synergetic effect that exacerbates inter-
state conflict and nonstate political violence. For instance, illegal migration fuels
tension between Malaysia and Indonesia. Transnational maritime crime pro-
vides terrorist and guerrilla groups the means to move weapons and personnel,
raise funds, and recruit new members. For example, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
is heavily involved in the smuggling of people, weapons, and other contraband
across the Strait of Malacca to sustain its struggle against the Indonesian
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government. Similarly, Islamist terrorists are believed to maintain routes in the
Celebes Sea to move operatives, explosives, and firearms between Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines.20
Though transnational maritime crime rarely presents a direct threat to states,
piracy and robbery at sea are such severe problems that they are now perceived
to do just that. These attacks take a variety of forms. In their most innocuous
form, unarmed robbers slip on board ships and remove such valuables as cash,
jewelry, and electronics. At the other extreme, pirates hijack ships outright, kill-
ing the crews or setting them adrift, removing the cargo, and fraudulently alter-
ing the ship’s identity. As shown by the table, the frequency of pirate attacks,




the Sulu Sea, and
since 2001 in the
Strait of Malacca,
pirates have been
taking crew members prisoner and ransoming them from hidden jungle camps.
Similarly, automatic weapons and grenade launchers, previously found mainly in
the hands of Filipino pirates, have also become commonplace in the Strait of
Malacca.21
Piracy may have a nexus with terrorism. Security officials have suggested that
terrorists might work with pirates or adopt their techniques. A case in point was
the March 2003 hijacking of the chemical tanker Dewi Madrim, during which
pirates wielding assault rifles and VHF radios disabled the ship’s radio and took
over the helm for about half an hour before kidnapping the captain and first of-
ficer for ransom. What looked like just another act of piracy may in fact have
been—as many observers, including Singapore’s deputy prime minister, Tony
Tan, have suggested—a training run for a future terrorist mission.22
Harm to the Maritime Environment
The power of environmental phenomena is unquestionable, given the recent
memory of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunamis that killed (according to
estimates at the time of publication) well over two hundred thousand people. In
addition, environmental damage not only causes direct harm to land, water, and
populations but can precipitate tension or conflict within or between states.
This being the case, resource depletion and human degradation of the environ-
ment have been recognized as directly relevant to Southeast Asia’s security
agenda.23 Hydrocarbon resources are central factors in the strategic calculus in
7 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998
Global Attacks 445 370 335 469 300 202
Attacks in Southeast Asia 189 170 170 257 167 99
REPORTED PIRACY AND SEA ROBBERY ATTACKS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Source: International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report, 1 January–30 December
2003 ([Kuala Lumpur]: January 2004), p. 5.
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such conflicts and disputes as those in Aceh and the South China Sea. Although
less frequently discussed, damage done to the marine environment—damage to
tropical reefs, oil spills, overexploitation of fisheries, etc.—has also impacted
Southeast Asian security. For example, the destruction of reefs and
overexploitation of fishing groups are contributing to Indonesian poverty and
exacerbating domestic violence.24 Similarly, foreign trawlers have been targeted
by guerrillas in the southern Philippines because these are seen as holding unfair
technical advantages in the race to harvest fish from traditional Moro fishing
grounds.25 At the interstate level, rapid depletion of fisheries has contributed to
tension between Thailand and Malaysia and between Thailand and Myanmar.26
While environmental degradation is unlikely to be the direct cause of military
conflict in Southeast Asia, it poses a real threat by undermining international re-
lationships, economic development, and social welfare. As regional industries
continue to abuse the environment, these security threats will continue to rise.
FACTORS ENABLING GREATER COOPERATION
Structural, normative, and economic changes to the regional system are en-
abling greater maritime security cooperation. Some of these changes are direct
results of the global recognition of terrorism as a preeminent security threat,
while others are a continuation of older regional trends already visible in the
post–Cold War era. The changes can be summarized by looking at five key fac-
tors: relaxing sovereignty sensitivities, extraregional power interests, increased
prevalence of cooperation norms, improving state resources, and increasing pri-
oritization of maritime security. These five factors are not necessarily distinct;
they are analytical concepts used to describe interrelated and complementary
themes present in the evolving regional “orchestra.”
Relaxing Sovereignty Sensitivities
Sovereignty sensitivities are traditionally extremely high among Southeast
Asian states, and they play defining roles in the foreign policy formulations of
these states. These sensitivities have made the principle of nonintervention the
bedrock of intraregional state relations; they are undoubtedly the single most
powerful inhibitor of maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia. In fact, they have
until very recently been seen as almost completely eliminating the possibility of
cooperative ventures that even might compromise or qualify exclusive sovereign
rights.27 Even cooperative ventures that do not directly undermine sovereignty,
such as joint exercises or voluntary information sharing, are viewed with cau-
tion lest they lead to creeping infringement. In some cases, reduction of sover-
eignty seems tantamount to decreased security; in other cases, leaders fear that
cooperation might expose to their domestic constituencies problems that they
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desire to downplay. In yet other cases, national pride and the desire for prestige
make governments reluctant to reveal inadequacies to their neighbors.28
There are signs, however, that sovereignty sensitivities may be relaxing, at
least in the maritime area. Even a slight easing would be remarkable, since aside
from the factors above, many Southeast Asian states have strong practical rea-
sons for maintaining exclusive sovereignty over their waters. Most of the coastal
states rely heavily on offshore economic resources. Furthermore, foreign powers
have historically operated within the national waters of several, specifically to
undermine state security. In more recent years regional states have seen ample
need for legal restrictions on shipping in their waters. For example, in May 2003
Indonesia banned foreign vessels without explicit permission from waters adja-
cent to the province of Aceh, where it was attempting to suppress a rebellion.
Similarly, Malaysian authorities have restricted maritime traffic to specific cor-
ridors in order to improve security on Sabah’s eastern coast and offshore islands.
In general, the region’s few operationalized cooperation arrangements have
been carefully crafted to minimize their impact upon state sovereignty. For
example, coordinated maritime patrols have not been coupled with extrater-
ritorial law-enforcement rights, extradition guarantees, or “hot pursuit”
arrangements.
Nonetheless, in recent years states have been increasingly willing to allow in-
fringement upon or qualification of their sovereignty for the sake of improved
maritime security. Perhaps most significantly, in 1998 Malaysia and Indonesia
requested the ICJ to arbitrate the ownership of Litigan and Sipadan Islands, and
in 2002 Indonesia accepted a ruling in favor of Malaysia. To provide another ex-
ample, Singapore and Malaysia have also accepted what they might have consid-
ered infringement of their sovereign rights by allowing the stationing of
American personnel in their ports to ensure the fulfillment of International
Maritime Organization and U.S. security standards. Thailand has accepted simi-
lar arrangements in principle.
The decision by Indonesia and Malaysia not to protest Indian and U.S. naval
escort operations in the Strait of Malacca in 2001 and 2002 is a further example
of increasing flexibility with regard to maritime sovereignty. Although these
extraregional navies only escorted vessels through the Strait of Malacca—an
activity clearly legal under the terms of the Third UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea—these operations could easily have been construed by sovereignty-
sensitive states as akin more to law enforcement than to transit passage. Indeed,
media outlets commonly (and incorrectly) referred to the operations as “pa-
trols.” Furthermore, both Indian and American officials were reported as mak-
ing statements that could imply that the operations were more than just
escorting. The Straits Times, which characterized the operations as “the joint
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patrolling of sensitive, pirate-prone waters,” quoted an Indian official as describ-
ing the mission as “regional policing.”29 Similarly, Navy Times referred to “joint
patrols” and reported American sailors as saying that their “attention to detail
on [the] patrol mission” had been heightened by anger over the events of 11 Sep-
tember.30 Navy Times also quoted the assistant operations officer of one of the
ships involved as saying, “We didn’t catch anybody,” which could have been in-
terpreted as evidence that the crew was seeking out criminals rather than simply
safeguarding ships exercising free navigation.31 Although the regional
accommodativeness followed considerable U.S. preemptive diplomacy and a re-
luctance to interfere with American security efforts in the wake of 9/11, it none-
theless demonstrates Malaysian and Indonesian willingness to make
concessions when doing so seems advantageous.
Indonesian and Malaysian officials did not show the same restraint in 2004
after misleading reports regarding the Regional Maritime Security Initiative
(RMSI), a U.S.-suggested protocol to foster the sharing of information. When
international media sources incorrectly reported that Admiral Thomas B. Fargo,
USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, had testified before Congress that
Special Forces and Marines in small craft would be deployed under RMSI to
safeguard the Strait of Malacca, Malaysian and Indonesian officials asserted in
strong language their sovereign control over the waterway. Though their state-
ments did not completely bar cooperation, the very public, highly rhetorical,
and inflammatory nature of the episode put the United States on the diplomatic
defensive.32 RMSI had been discussed openly for months and would have in no
way challenged the sovereign rights of regional states. 33 Nonetheless, the fallout
was so severe that the U.S. State Department issued special press releases cor-
recting the media reports of Admiral Fargo’s testimony.34 Six months later senior
Malaysian and Indonesian officials, such as Malaysian deputy prime minister
Najib Tun Razak and Indonesian navy chief Bernard Kent Sondahk, were still
criticizing perceived American intentions to violate their sovereignty.35 If sover-
eignty sensitivities have relaxed, then, they remain central. Still, they do not
amount to absolute limits on maritime cooperation when the perceived benefits
are suitably high.
Extraregional Power Interests
Maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia has been historically limited by
extraregional rivalries. During the Cold War all security arrangements were
managed within the context of the Soviet-U.S.-Chinese bi/tripolar structure.36
In the immediate post–Cold War era, the Soviet Union’s role in Southeast Asian
affairs evaporated, but developing rivalry between China and the United States
now constrained cooperation. Some American policy makers sought to contain
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China, while China’s generally realpolitik outlook made it distrustful of mari-
time security cooperation through the 1990s.37
Today, however, all extraregional powers involved in Southeast Asian mari-
time affairs have aligned their interests toward maritime security cooperation,
especially protecting navigation in strategic sea lanes from transnational threats.
Most important among these powers are the United States, Japan, and China,
but Australia and India, two large neighbors with substantial navies, have also
demonstrated commitment to maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia.
This convergence of interests not only removes inhibitors previously at play but
encourages new cooperation.
Since 11 September 2001, the United States has furthered regional maritime
security in a number of ways, including promoting an “alphabet soup” of
antiterrorism-focused cooperation in Southeast Asia. Two such initiatives are
the CSI (Container Security Initiative) and PSI (Proliferation Security Initia-
tive), global initiatives that focus to a considerable degree upon Southeast Asia.
In contrast, the RMSI and its follow-on programs are limited to the Asia-Pacific.
American maritime authorities
like Secretary of Navy Gordon
England and Admiral Fargo have
used speaking engagements to
draw attention to transnational
maritime threats and the desir-
ability of greater international cooperation.38 An April 2004 joint U.S.-ASEAN
workshop on “Enhancing Maritime Anti-Piracy and Counter Terrorism Coop-
eration in the ASEAN Region” reflected American commitment to that end. In
fact, U.S. enthusiasm for maritime security cooperation is so strong that it risks
being seen as hegemonic and inspiring a regional backlash, like that surround-
ing RMSI.
Japanese devotion to improving Southeast Asian maritime security coopera-
tion predates the events of 2001 and should be regarded as separate from, if in
alignment with, American interests. Japan is economically dependent on South-
east Asian sea lanes for more than 80 percent of its petroleum, as well as other
strategic commodities, such as coal, uranium, grain, and iron ore. These water-
ways also carry Japanese manufactured goods to Europe, Australia, the Middle
East, and Africa. Therefore, safety of navigation is vital to Japanese comprehen-
sive security and a major policy objective. To this end, Japanese non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and the government in Tokyo have funded
navigation aids, conducted hydrographic surveys, and supported various other
maritime safety programs for decades. Since 1999, Japan has vigorously pro-
moted a number of more direct security initiatives. The most radical of these,
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the Ocean-Peacekeeping concept, which called for a multinational naval force to
patrol both international and national waters, has been tabled; nonetheless, Jap-
anese NGOs like the Nippon Foundation, the Ship and Ocean Foundation, and
the Okazaki Institute continue to press for multilateral operationalized mari-
time security solutions. Since 2000, the Japanese Coast Guard has formed bilateral
training and exercise agreements with the maritime law enforcement agencies of
six Southeast Asian states. Its ReCAAP endeavors have also been successful, al-
though ReCAAP’s results are far less ambitious than the Japanese ideal concept.39
Since the mid-1990s China’s stance on maritime security cooperation has
been reoriented away from a belligerent position characterized by hard stances
and the absolute value of sovereignty toward a posture favorable to discussion
and dispute management.40 As late as 2000 China was still strongly opposed to
multilateral maritime cooperation, as demonstrated by its positions at an ARF
antipiracy meeting in Mumbai and Japanese-sponsored conferences in Tokyo.41
Since then its position has grown considerably less obstructive, and it has posi-
tively contributed to discussions on enhancing security cooperation. This trend
seems to mirror, but perhaps run a couple of years behind, a general Chinese
shift away from defensiveness and toward cooperativeness. In late 2003, China
conducted its first international maritime exercises in decades—brief
search-and-rescue programs with India and Pakistan.
Australia—with a longtime involvement in Southeast Asian security exem-
plified by its deployment of troops to fight communist insurgents in Malaya and
Vietnam, continued commitment to the FPDA, and its peacekeeping mission in
East Timor—has made recent contributions to regional maritime and nontradi-
tional security. The Royal Australian Navy has increasingly assumed constabu-
lary roles appropriate to transnational threats, and in 2004 it carried out
command-level sea-lane security exercises with several regional states.42 Strong
Australian support for improved regional maritime security is reflected in
Prime Minister John Howard’s commitment to fighting terrorism and to a vast
new program that includes a maritime security zone reaching into Southeast
Asian waters.43
India also has become increasingly involved in Southeast Asian maritime se-
curity, as part of its reinvigorated activism in the wider Asia-Pacific region and
its “Look East” policy, aimed at strengthening its influence in Southeast Asia
specifically. As seen above, in 2002 the Indian and U.S. navies worked together to
ensure the safe transit of high-value units through the Strait of Malacca. In 2003
a Singapore-India agreement to improve maritime and counterterrorism coop-
eration resulted in the planning for joint exercises on sea-lane control, the first
Indian exercise in Singaporean waters. Shortly after the previously described
Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore coordinated trilateral patrols of the Strait of
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Malacca began, India raised the possibility of contributing itself. In September
2004, India and the Indonesian navy began joint patrols of the Six Degree Chan-
nel, the waterway just west of the Strait of Malacca, which lies between Indone-
sia’s Aceh Province and India’s Nicobar Islands. These active measures have been
complemented by Indian navy port visits throughout the region and training
exercises with the navies of almost every coastal state.44 In addition, India has
sought to coordinate with other extraregional maritime powers, such as the United
States, Australia, and Japan. For example, New Delhi has suggested to Prime Minis-
ter Koizumi that Japan resume some of its more aggressive initiatives.45
Increasing the Prevalence of Cooperation Norms
Although the Southeast Asian states coexist peacefully, their conflicting inter-
ests, contrasting populations, nationalistic tendencies, and histories of warfare
continue to burden interstate relations. Even disputes without specific maritime
dimensions inhibit maritime security cooperation, by limiting dialogue and ag-
gravating distrust. However, since the end of the Cold War regional institutions
and NGOs have made considerable progress in fostering cooperation norms.
The blossoming of maritime confidence- and security-building measures
and other cooperation agreements have established such norms of cooperation
and made the operationalizing of future endeavors much easier. The dialogue
norms are embodied in and sustained by institutions like CSCAP-MCWG, SCS
Workshops, WPNS, the ARF Maritime Focus Group, the APEC Working Group
on Maritime Security, and ReCAAP (all mentioned above). Although obligating
member states to relatively little and consistently reaffirming the “ASEAN way”
norms of sovereignty preservation and nonintervention, recent ARF and
ASEAN documents exemplify the increasing prevalence of cooperation norms.
Although some scholars might debate their specifics, the value of dialogue and
MCSBMs cannot be simply disregarded.46 Even the most skeptical would not
suggest that the new cooperation norms in Southeast Asia reflect a negative
trend. Regular cooperation improves the information available to states, builds
familiarity, lowers transaction costs, reduces distrust, and creates habits of con-
sultation. Therefore, it may be that the decade of maritime confidence and secu-
rity building that preceded the emergence of terrorism as a major threat enabled
the relatively rapid development of cooperation in the last two years.
Improving State Resources
Regional maritime security cooperation has also been limited by a lack of re-
sources. Not only have many of the Southeast Asian states faced challenges to
their economic development, but most of them possess sea territories dispro-
portionately large with respect to their land areas and cannot properly patrol
them. Only Singapore and Brunei, relatively wealthy states with modest
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territorial seas, are capable of adequately securing their maritime territories.
This is one of the reasons states have generally given their own operations prior-
ity over international cooperation.47
Resource shortages were exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis of 1997,
which caused several states, including Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, to de-
lay plans to expand and improve their maritime capabilities. The effect was es-
pecially profound in Indonesia, where economic hardship and an American
spare-parts embargo have so immobilized the national fleet that only an esti-
mated 15 percent of Indonesia’s naval and law enforcement ships can get under
way at any one time.48
In recent years, Southeast Asian economies have recovered, and the resources
necessary to sustain the deployment, and in some cases even expand the capabil-
ities, of maritime forces are again available. Since 2001, Malaysia, Singapore, the
Philippines, and Thailand have all taken possession of new naval ships. Malaysia
is committing the resources necessary to establish a new coast guard force to re-
lieve its currently overburdened navy and maritime police. These trends are ex-
pected to accelerate in the near future, and regional governments are expected to
double their expenditures on new naval ships by 2010.49 This is not to say that
the problem of resource shortages has been solved. Most significantly, in the
state with the largest sea territory, the Indonesian maritime forces continue to
suffer from a critical lack of resources to maintain and operate their ships. How-
ever, speaking generally of the region, economic recovery is encouraging im-
proved maritime security cooperation.
Increasing Prioritization of Maritime Security
Maritime security concerns compete for attention with traditional military
threats, guerrilla insurgencies, narcotics production, organized crime, and pov-
erty; accordingly they have historically held rather low positions in the interest
hierarchies of most Southeast Asian states, even those with large maritime terri-
tories, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. Since the Cold War ended, and
even more so in the twenty-first century, however, maritime threats have been
steadily rising as state priorities. Singapore, which sees maritime security as an
existential issue, has clearly taken the most interest in improving it.50 However,
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines are all giving maritime secu-
rity increasing priority as well. This shift has been due to a combination of the
disappearance of Cold War menaces and the increasing recognition of maritime
dangers.51 Deadly terrorist attacks like those against Our Lady Mediatrix, Cole,
Lindberg, Kalifornia, and Superferry 14, let alone those in New York City, Bali,
and Madrid, have further sensitized policy makers to the need for action. Their
growing concern is clearly reflected in their public comments.
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THE FUTURE OF COOPERATION
The structural, economic, and normative changes that have accompanied
Southeast Asia’s transition from the immediate post–Cold War years into the
twenty-first century are creating unprecedented opportunities for maritime co-
operation. However, powerful constraints, most notably acute sensitivities over
sovereignty, interstate distrust, resource competition, and fiscal shortages, re-
main. Therefore, cooperation will not be unlimited, but will grow incrementally.
Within this framework certain forms of cooperation—those that maximize per-
ceived benefits but minimize perceived costs—will develop more quickly than
others.
Global Cooperation
Global cooperation is characterized by the accession of states to international
conventions or other cooperative agreements of worldwide scale. Although
global institutions like the United Nations, the International Maritime Organi-
zation, and the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Maritime
Bureau are proactive about improving maritime security through increased co-
operation, the diverse interests of their constituencies suggest that their mea-
sures will progress slowly. Southeast Asian states, with the exception of
Singapore, will most likely be followers rather than leaders in the development
of these measures, complying with initiatives that offer net advantages. Singa-
pore, a relatively rich nation with a strong maritime outlook, a critical depen-
dence on international trade, and a security strategy that relies heavily upon
international cooperation, may lead the way.
The regional responses to global cooperation initiatives will be similar to
those executed in response to the International Maritime Organization’s com-
prehensive ISPS Code, which came into force on 1 July 2004. In general, and as
noted, Southeast Asian states, ports, and shippers have made significant progress
toward compliance; Singapore did so months ahead of schedule, implementing
measures significantly beyond the minimum requirements. Nonetheless, and
despite the threat of lost tonnage and increased insurance rates, there are still
port facilities—less prosperous, many of them handling only small volumes of
cargo bound outside the region—that remain noncompliant several months af-
ter the deadline.
Regional Cooperation
Even when extraregional powers participate, a multilateral cooperative arrange-
ment may be considered regional if its goals are primarily regional. In Southeast
Asia, the development of stronger multilateral arrangements for maritime secu-
rity cooperation has received wide discursive endorsement. Such cooperation
could come in the form of new multilateral agreements or be superimposed on
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an existing organization, such as ASEAN, ARF, or APEC. In particular, it seems
quite likely that existing regional organizations will develop new initiatives,
most probably expanded dialogue, issuance of declaratory statements of intent,
and improved information sharing. However, considering the diverse interests
of their members, sensitivities, and long-standing insistence upon
nonintervention, they are unlikely to institute major operational measures.
New regional agreements, however, are less promising than those that build
on existing institutions, for a number of reasons. Most importantly, regional
states are distrustful of new organizations for fear of hidden agendas or that im-
properly crafted entities may spiral out of control and infringe upon state sover-
eignty and resources. Not surprisingly, extraregional powers prefer new
multilateral frameworks, precisely because the protocols can be customized for
their purposes. The result is typically an unsatisfactory compromise; the newly
formed ReCAAP is a case in point. After long negotiations, this Japanese-
sponsored group emerged as a nonbinding, externally funded organization em-
powered only to collate information voluntarily submitted. A senior Japanese
government official directly involved in operationalizing maritime security ef-
forts calls it “a very, very small step forward.” 52
Bilateral Cooperation
Bilateral cooperation, though it involves only two states, can be more productive
than multilateral initiatives in producing operational maritime cooperation.
Where multilateral cooperation often develops only to the level acceptable to the
least keen partner, bilateral arrangements match the aligned interests and so
maximize productivity. Bilateral approaches can also minimize distrust and sov-
ereignty sensitivities; areas of disagreement can be more readily identified and
then capitalized upon or adapted around, as appropriate, when only two states
are involved.
Bilateral agreements are most likely to be operationalized between states that
have generally cooperative outlooks, are least distrustful of each other, and share
security interests. A prototype would be the coordinated Malaysian-Thai border
patrols. The two states have a history of cooperation, going back to joint prose-
cution of the communist insurgents who once used bases in Thailand for attacks
in Malaysia. Although tenuous at times, this cooperation eventually allowed
cross-border “hot pursuit,” the only such instance between ASEAN states.53 Al-
though the imperfection of this relationship can be seen in Thai prime minister
Thaksin Sinawatra’s December 2004 charges (and the angry responses to those
statements) that insurgents in the south of his country had received training and
support in Malaysia, this history has underlain bilateral cooperation against the
current separatist insurgency in southern Thailand. Though some Malaysian
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government officials may personally sympathize with the Malay rebels, who are
ethnic brethren, Malaysian policy makers clearly understand the security risks
involved. In addition, Thailand and Malaysia both worry that the unrest in Aceh
could cross the Strait of Malacca if not managed carefully. Similar cooperation
will probably occur between other states as well—though constrained by a vari-
ety of factors and emerging only where security threats are most direct and per-
ceived costs are lowest.
Networked Cooperation
If bilateral agreements are more likely than multilateral endeavors to produce
operational cooperation, the most profitable form of future cooperation will be
synergetic networks of bilateral arrangements. Because they are based on bilat-
eral agreements, networked cooperation arrangements enable states to custom-
ize the most direct relationships so as to maximize value and minimize risk. The
networks, however, also increase trust and understanding between all their
members, thus reducing the costs of building further cooperative relationships.
Such networks would be informal at first, but once formalized would provide
benefits to parallel those of multilateral arrangements. Even as informal ar-
rangements, however, cooperative networks promote security. The idea draws
upon the American “hub-and-spokes” strategy of alliance building in Asia but,
as is characteristic of networks, does not necessarily require a “hub.” In other
words, although cooperative networks often arise through the leadership of a
powerful state, they can develop without a hegemon. Simply increasing the
number of bilateral agreements within the region expands the network and
binds regional states more thoroughly into ever greater cooperation.
An example of a mature cooperative network underpinned by a major power
is the annual COBRA GOLD military exercise held in Thailand. COBRA GOLD be-
gan as a bilateral maritime warfare exercise between the United States and Thai-
land in 1982. In 1999 the United States capitalized on its strong relationship with
Singapore to persuade its armed forces to participate. Since then the exercise has
continued to expand on the basis of American bilateral agreements and now in-
cludes the Philippines and Mongolia, as well as observers from ten other coun-
tries. Participants remark on how the exercises bring them not only closer to the
United States but to each other, and how the common training experiences im-
prove mutual understanding. With even more participants invited for future ex-
ercises, COBRA GOLD is the region’s most developed formal cooperation network
and a model for operational improvement in regional maritime security.
The trilateral Strait of Malacca patrols (involving Singapore, Indonesia, and
Malaysia) constitute a cooperation network that developed from an informal
network of bilateral agreements without external leadership. In fact, it seems
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that one motivation for their development was to exclude the United States and,
to a lesser extent, Japan from direct, visible roles in Strait of Malacca security.
The trilateral patrols built upon bilateral patrols conducted by all possible pairs
of the three states for more than a decade. Without the history of bilateral coop-
eration, the trilateral patrols are unlikely to have been formalized so quickly or
to have reached the same level of operationalization.
The potential for the strengthening of this network is clear from suggestions
that Thailand and India might join. As India already executes coordinated pa-
trols near the Strait of Malacca with Indonesia, and Thailand does so with Ma-
laysia, these two states are already part of an informal cooperative network. The
public discussion of the potential for expanding the currently trilateral program
is one way in which a five-state network may become formalized.
An example of a nascent network involves Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
Already the Japanese Coast Guard cooperates extensively with both Southeast
Asian states. It has conducted antipiracy training with both states, has designed
new training curricula for the Philippine Coast Guard, and is advising Malaysia in
the establishment of that country’s own coast guard. These two bilateral relation-
ships are growing stronger and as they mature will naturally proliferate into a net-
work by which the Malaysian and Philippine coast guards will develop greater
trust and understanding of each other through their common involvement with
the Japanese.54 Although it may take time to develop, this network will reduce
tension, ease the flow of information, and perhaps lay the groundwork for new
bilateral relationships between Malaysia and the Philippines.
Although networked cooperation holds the most potential for improving
regional security, such networks are not necessarily easy to create. An example
of an unsuccessful attempt is the Japan Coast Guard’s failure to organize exist-
ing exercise programs with Singaporean and Indonesian maritime security
forces into a trilateral agreement. The hurdles include Indonesia’s lack of re-
sources, Japanese constitutional provisions that ban the Japan Coast Guard
from working with the Indonesian navy, and the anti-Japanese sentiment that
still persists more than fifty years after World War II. Still, networked coopera-
tion holds the greatest potential for tangible improvement in regional maritime
security.
CAPITALIZING ON OPPORTUNITIES
Although Southeast Asian states have taken significant steps toward improving
their maritime security cooperation during the post–Cold War period, serious
maritime threats endanger the regional states and their populations. At the same
time, structural, economic, and normative changes in the Southeast Asian secu-
rity complex are broadening and operationalizing maritime cooperation.
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Despite these improvements, major obstacles remain. Although sovereignty
sensitivities have relaxed slightly, states continue to be wary of even small ero-
sions of exclusive rights. Similarly, although dialogue is becoming a behavioral
norm, distrust remains high and threatens to stymie efforts to develop maritime
cooperation that goes beyond discourse.
Nonetheless, neither sovereignty issues nor distrust are absolute restraints on
cooperation. Given the alignment of interest among extraregional powers, the
strengthening of regional cooperation norms, the higher priority now given to
maritime security, and the growing resources available to regional maritime secu-
rity forces, the time is right to press for enhanced maritime security cooperation.
Bilateral and multilateral efforts both have potential when states can identify in-
terests, capitalize on opportunities, and ameliorate obstructions. At the same
time, governments should seek to network existing relationships, bearing in
mind that while formal networks are most valuable, informal arrangements are
also of benefit. Further research into how policy makers perceive the stakes would
be valuable. Such studies will improve their ability to exploit current opportuni-
ties and create new opportunities for maximizing security cooperation—as
they must do in the immediate future, because the maritime threats in contem-
porary Southeast Asia are dire.
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TECHNOLOGY AND NAVAL BLOCKADE
Past Impact and Future Prospects
Roger W. Barnett
Anyone who wishes to cope with the future should travel back in imagi-
nation a single lifetime . . . and ask himself just how much of today’s
technology would be, not merely incredible, but incomprehensible to
the keenest scientific brains of that time.
ARTHUR C. CLARKE
Through the centuries major changes have taken place in the ability of statesto prevent the movement of ships or particular goods over the sea lanes of
the world.1 Some of the changes have been wrought by technological evolution,
some by increasing importance of seaborne trade, and some by alterations in the
structure of international relations. The combined effect has profoundly af-
fected both the way maritime blockades are conducted in the twenty-first cen-
tury and the means employed for them. In large measure, it has also rendered the
traditional law of blockade obsolete.
BLOCKADE OPERATIONS
Until World War I maritime blockades were undertaken by states seeking to pre-
vent the movement of ships or cargoes that would assist in the ability of adver-
saries to conduct international armed conflict. Blockade law evolved in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to regulate
how states conducted blockades while concurrently
safeguarding the rights of neutrals to use the open seas
to conduct nonproscribed trade.
The appearance in the last half of the nineteenth
century and first decades of the twentieth of sea
mines, surface and submarine torpedo-attack craft,
long-range rifled guns with exploding projectiles, and
eventually aircraft meant that the traditional form
of blockade—in close proximity to the adversary’s
Dr. Barnett is professor emeritus at the Naval War Col-
lege, where until September 2001 he held the Jerry O.
Tuttle Military Chair of Information Operations.
Holder of a PhD in international relations from the
University of Southern California, Dr. Barnett was a
member of the U.S. delegation to the strategic arms talks
with the Soviet Union in 1970–71. From 1983 to 1984
he led the Strategic Concepts Branch of the office of the
Chief of Naval Operations. He retired from the U.S.
Navy in the grade of captain before joining the Naval
War College faculty in 1993.
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coastline, where ships could be kept under surveillance and discouraged from
departing their ports—could no longer be sustained.2 Thus maritime blockade
evolved into long-range operations or blockade zones, and the rules that had
been laid down for the conduct of blockade were for the most part ignored or ra-
tionalized away.
New technologies had required blockading states to move farther from the
adversary’s coastline, and at the same time they promoted the use of submarines
and mines as instruments of blockade, because they were relatively immune to
countermeasures by the blockaded party. In both the First and Second World
Wars the law-imposed requirements to visit and search ships, before attacking
them, in order to determine whether they were carrying contraband and to pro-
vide for the safety of people on ships attempting to breach the blockade were
massively violated.
A prescient Yale Law Journal article over a decade ago declared,
In the future blockade may become even more important as the need of a blockading
state to stop every merchant ship grows more vital. The recent willingness of ostensi-
bly neutral states to supply not simply technical know-how and materials for weap-
ons construction, but also ready-for-use missiles and other decisive weapons, to the
highest bidder portends such a future. As the negative consequences of allowing even
one ship to pass uninspected grow more severe, blockading states will become more
willing to use the new blockade forms [long-range blockade and blockade zones] at
the expense of neutral interests.3
What the writer could not have foreseen happened on 11 September 2001—
events that changed the world, and in ways not yet fully comprehended. What
was extraordinary about the events on that date was that a nonstate entity had
succeeded in conducting a coordinated attack against a sovereign state on its
home territory with a hitherto unappreciated weapon of mass destruction, a
fully fueled airliner. Historically, weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—such
as nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons—have been under
the strict control of sovereign states, their manufacture, storage, and use care-
fully constrained physically by security measures and strategically by deterrence
and international law.4 The message conveyed on 11 September was that hence-
forth weapons of mass destruction could be controlled, distributed, and perhaps
used by nonstate entities or even individuals. This was an unanticipated, and
very unwelcome, extension of the envisioned “negative consequences.”
After 9/11 the central security problem, for the United States at least, became
how to ensure that no weapons of mass destruction could be used by nonstate
entities against American citizens in the homeland. Thus the Homeland Secu-
rity Department was created, and new initiatives to prevent the international
8 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2005\NWCRSU05\NWC Review Summer 2005.vp
Wednesday, June 01, 2005 3:58:31 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
92
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/22
transfer of such weapons and of launching and support mechanisms for them
were instituted. Because no WMD use against the United States could be toler-
ated; because nonstate entities are difficult—and perhaps impossible—to deter;
and because no retaliatory measures could repair the damage that the use of
WMD could wreak, a new policy of preemption was announced and codified in
a new national security strategy in September 2002.5
It is far better to seek to control shipping or the shipment of contraband at the
source rather than at the destination. This has long been a guiding principle of
blockade, recognized and enunciated by Alfred Thayer Mahan in his seminal
article “Blockade in Relation to
Naval Strategy”: “Whatever the
number of ships needed to watch
those in an enemy’s port, they are
fewer by far than those that will
be required to protect the scattered interests imperiled by an enemy’s escape.”6
In Mahan’s time ships carried all of the international trade that took place be-
tween states separated by water. Cargoes might be liquid or bulk, but they were
not containerized.
Since Mahan wrote, however, international trade has mushroomed. The
value of U.S. imports and exports in 2002 was a thousand times what it was in
1900. Roughly 80 percent by volume of all international trade travels the sea
lanes of the world, and some 90 percent of that portion is transported in cargo
containers. Nearly nine million containers arrive annually in the 301 American
ports of entry. Any form of WMD could be shipped in a container, and any use
of such a weapon could be politically and economically catastrophic for the
United States.7
Whereas a blockade is a “belligerent operation to prevent vessels and/or air-
craft of all nations, enemy as well as neutral, from entering or exiting specified
ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control
of an enemy nation,” and the belligerent right of blockade is “intended to pre-
vent vessels and aircraft, regardless of their cargo, from crossing an established
and publicized cordon separating the enemy from international waters and/or
airspace,” a belligerent right of visit and search “is designed to interdict the flow
of contraband goods.”8 In today’s context, contraband WMD can be shipped
from states, nonstate entities, or individuals, or consigned to any of the three.
The form of blockade operations, accordingly, has changed dramatically from
close blockade through distant blockade and blockade zones, to prevention of
movement of specific items at, or as close as possible to, their source.
The better to control the international movement of WMD, their associated
delivery systems, and related materials, the United States announced a
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Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in the spring of 2003, complementing the
Container Security Initiative (CSI), which had been announced a year earlier.
The PSI is indicative of the form the modern-day “belligerent right of visit and
search” has taken. The context is one of global armed conflict against terrorists,
sovereign states that would support them, and other WMD proliferators; the fo-
cus is on preventing the shipment of “contraband” WMD.
The PSI commits its over sixty participating states to:
• Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states,
for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems,
and related materials
• Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information
• Work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities to accomplish
these objectives and to strengthen international law and frameworks
• Not transport or assist in the transport of any cargoes of WMD, their
delivery systems, or related materials to or from countries or groups of
proliferation concern
• Board and search any suspect vessels flying their flags in their internal
waters, territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state
• Consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and
searching of their own flag vessels by other states and to the seizure of
WMD-related cargoes
• Stop or search suspect vessels in their internal waters, territorial seas, or
contiguous zones and enforce conditions on suspect vessels entering or
leaving their ports, internal waters, or territorial seas
• Require suspect aircraft that are transiting their airspace to land for
inspection and seize any such cargoes, and deny to these aircraft transit
rights through their airspace
• Prevent their ports, airfields, or other facilities from being used as
transshipment points for WMD-related cargo.9
The CSI has a narrower focus—containers that are being shipped to the
United States—and the following elements: security criteria to identify
high-risk containers; prescreening of containers before they arrive at U.S. ports;
technology to prescreen high-risk containers; and “smart” secure containers. As
of November 2004, the CSI had twenty participating countries, with some
thirty-seven ports committed. These include the world’s twenty largest ports,
accounting for almost two-thirds of containers shipped to the United States.
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As can be seen, over time the ways maritime blockades have been accom-
plished and the means for conducting them have changed dramatically. The ob-
jective of maritime blockade operations has remained constant, however: to
prevent the movement of particular ships and aircraft, or of particular cargoes
in ships and aircraft, on or over specified waters of the world—excluding inland
rivers and seas.
In view of the foregoing, this article takes a broad view of what constitutes a
“blockade.” For our purposes “blockade operations” encompasses not only ac-
tions embraced by the traditional legal definition of “blockade” cited above but
also all others having the same objective—to prevent the movement of ships or
aircraft in maritime sea areas or in the skies above them, or of particular cargoes
(including people) of the blockaded party. Clearly, this approach widens the
scope of what constitutes a “blockade” beyond the strict legal sense. States have
been rather inventive over the years in conducting blockade operations but call-
ing them something else in order to evade the legal requirements of blockade
law. Accordingly, this article rolls up what have been called quarantine opera-
tions, close or tactical and distant or strategic blockades, pacific blockades, ex-
clusion zones, and maritime intercept operations as simply “blockade
operations.”
In this sense, blockade operations encompass both the objective of the block-
ading force and the enforcement mechanisms it employs. In contrast, “embar-
goes” or “economic sanctions” refer only to objectives. According to one expert,
for example,
Between 1993 and 1998 alone, the United States imposed sanctions 61 times—out of
a total of 125 cases since World War I. Sanctions eventually targeted 75 countries and
some 42 percent of the world’s population for reasons ranging from support for ter-
rorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or other sensitive technologies, to
concerns over human rights and the environment and even the mislabeling of tuna.10
Moreover, “blockaded party” includes both states and nonstate entities, such
as terrorist organizations. This takes on additional relevance in the wake of re-
ports of the operation of merchant ships by the terrorist organization al-Qa‘ida;
such a vessel might have delivered the explosives used in the embassy bombings
in Africa.11
Some additional elucidation of terms is necessary. The effectiveness of a
blockade as used here refers to the degree to which it accomplishes its objectives.
This is an operational sense of the term, as opposed to the legal usage, which
harks back to the words in the Paris Declaration of 1856: “Blockades, in order to
be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really
to prevent access to the coast of the enemy.” The idea of legal effectiveness,
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adopted in order to delegitimize unenforced, or “paper,” blockades, was gener-
ally regarded to require the presence of at least one surface warship in or near the
area that had been declared as blockaded. This is an “input” measure of effec-
tiveness, established by a legal regimen, and its relationship is tenuous at best to
the accomplishment of the blockade’s objectives, which is an “output,” or opera-
tional, measure.
TECHNOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MARITIME
BLOCKADE OPERATIONS
Technology has historically played a key role on both sides of the question of
maritime blockade operations. The imposer of the blockade requires special
types of technology in order to make the blockade effective, and the target of the
blockade has certain technological needs in any effort to breach the blockade.
The right of visit and search requires its own separate category of technology.
In the future, then, technological requirements for maritime blockade opera-
tions will generally fall under four headings: ship propulsion; reconnaissance
(finding) and surveillance (watching) techniques and devices; weapons with
which to threaten or to attack ships and aircraft; and methods to inspect for and
detect specific cargoes (contraband).
Ship Propulsion
Ship propulsion is an important category because of the effect it can have on the
capability and the number of ships necessary to mount and sustain traditional
blockade operations. When galleys were the primary form of warship blockade
was rarely attempted, because of their short endurance and poor sea-keeping
ability. The advent of much more seaworthy sailing ships meant that extended
blockades could be undertaken; their effectiveness, however, was influenced sig-
nificantly by the speed and direction of the wind. Prevailing westerly winds
aided the English in their blockade of French Atlantic ports, for example; for the
same reason, blockade of the eastern seaboard of the United States was difficult
for sailing ships. Sailing ships could operate outside the range of shore batteries
and still maintain surveillance of the blockaded port. For sailing ships the en-
durance limit tended to be not technological but human—victuals and the
health of the crews. For example, in the age of sail far more British sailors died of
disease on blockade station than were killed in battle.
When ships powered by fossil fuel (coal and then oil) appeared, the limiting
logistic factor became the supply of fuel rather than the well-being of crews.
Higher patrol speeds could be employed, and transit times from home port to
blockade stations became shorter, but provision to refuel the steamships at or
near their blockade stations had to be made. At first colliers and coaling stations
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were used, and later—when oil was adopted, in the early twentieth century—
refueling tankers were developed. Submarines were used in both world wars as
blockading forces not only because they were stealthy but also because they had
very long unrefueled range; they could remain on distant patrol station for many
weeks without refueling. In World War II the German navy even deployed
reprovisioning submarines, known to the Allies as “milchcows,” so that torpedo
submarines could remain on patrol longer. Nuclear power for surface ships and
submarines restored crew endurance rather than fuel as the limiting factor.
For hydrodynamic reasons, the speed of oceangoing ships has not changed
appreciably in the past century. Prospects for significant increases in surface
ship speed in the future are not rosy. The effective speed of ships, however, can be
greatly enhanced by the embarkation of aircraft—either fixed-wing aircraft in
the case of aircraft carriers or helicopters for many other types of ships. With
embarked aircraft, ships can scout much greater areas and project their presence
hundreds of miles from their actual positions.
Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Reconnaissance and surveillance are critical to the maintenance of effective
blockades. At the same time, reconnaissance and surveillance have become both
more important and in some ways more difficult: “The need to track thousands
of civilian ships worldwide has intensified given the potential for seemingly
harmless shipping to be involved in nuclear, chemical or biological terrorist op-
erations. It was easier to track Soviet warships than a far larger number of civil-
ian ships with unknown cargos and crew.”12
Once again, technology has played a key role. From the time of the ancient
Greeks, who conducted the first maritime blockades in the fifth century BC, un-
til the appearance of aircraft, reconnaissance and surveillance were limited by
visibility and the curvature of the earth. Thus, even on a
clear day one cannot see forever—only as far as the horizon
(or to some object beyond it, like a mast or mountain, tall
enough to extend above a line from the observer tangent to
the horizon). The distance to the horizon depends on the
height above the surface of the observer. The table illus-
trates the relationship.
Surface ships typically have a “height of eye” between
fifty and one hundred feet, so their horizon distance is
roughly ten miles. Low height of eye (especially for subma-
rines), night, weather, and distance make reconnaissance
and surveillance for blockading nonairborne forces diffi-
cult. The absence of wireless communications until the
B A R N E T T 9 3











DISTANCE TO THE HORIZON
Source: Nathaniel Bowditch, American Practical Navigator:
An Epitome of Navigation, HO Pub 9 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office, 1958), table 8, p. 1254.
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early part of the twentieth century, moreover, meant that collaboration among
ships on blockade station was also limited to the line of sight, and then only at
the very low data rates provided by flag hoist and flashing light.
From the table it is evident that the way to expand the reconnaissance and
surveillance horizon is to put a sensor aloft. High-frequency line-of-sight com-
munications systems would experience a concurrent boost in their ranges as
well. Not only did aircraft extend the horizon for detection and tracking, but
their high speeds compared to ships allowed, as we have seen, significantly larger
areas to be scouted, and more quickly. It was due to their height of eye, then, as
well as their speed, that aircraft—especially ones that could be carried on
ships—represented a major improvement in the ability to find, track, and report
the movements of potential blockade runners. When ship- and air-borne radar
became available during the Second World War, detection capability experi-
enced a further major advance, since it mitigated the effects of darkness and
weather; the human eyeball was supplemented with electronic imaging.
The ultimate reconnaissance and surveillance platform—a geostationary sat-
ellite that could stare at the planet below—is impractical, because of the altitude
at which it would have to orbit, some 22,300 miles. Satellites in somewhat lower
orbit use radar, electronic, or electro-optical sensors and can perform recon-
naissance, but except for radar their surveillance capability is poor. Satellites in
low earth orbits have their own limitations; for example, clouds and darkness
limit photographic satellites that use the visual spectrum, while other reconnais-
sance techniques (passive electronic intercept and infrared) require detectable
emanations by the target. Satel-
lites with active radar are ex-
tremely expensive because of
weight and power requirements;
good capability for both recon-
naissance and surveillance requires large constellations—on the order of
twenty-four to forty-eight satellites—compounding the expense. In this regard
it has been asked, “Will any technology similarly [to nuclear weapons] trans-
form war in the next 25 years? . . . Some have suggested that space technology,
currently providing reconnaissance and communications support to military
operations, is in the same relative position that aviation technology was in 1919.
The high cost of producing and orbiting satellites may, however, prevent such a
pervasive transformation.”13
A variety of new small and inexpensive (compared to satellites or manned re-
connaissance aircraft) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is appearing. Some are
lighter-than-air systems, either floating or steered-floater platforms; others are
classified as high-altitude maneuvering systems. These new capabilities, in
9 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
It is far better to seek to control shipping or the
shipment of contraband at the source rather
than at the destination.
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various stages of development, are projected to have operating cycles of from
two days to five years and cost from a thousand dollars per eight-hour flight to
five million dollars in the case of a high-altitude airship with multiyear endur-
ance.14 Interest in such new technology is high within the United States. Interest
abroad has been keen at least since 1996, when it was reported that “30 other
countries also make UAVs of varying degrees of sophistication. . . . Given their spe-
cial capabilities, UAV sensors can identify an object, when sensors on a satellite can
only spot it. . . . Unlike stealth aircraft, UAVs are useless if not communicating.”15
Weapons
Weapons for enforcement of blockade operations have become virtually global
in range and potentially unlimited in power. They range from sea mines, which
are inexpensive and effective, to long-range stealth bombers with sophisticated
air-to-ground weapons, at over a billion dollars apiece. Fixed-wing aircraft, of
course, are incapable of visit and search, but with air-to-ground weapons they
have the means to stop or turn around would-be blockade runners. Submarines
likewise, while very deadly, as history has demonstrated, have severe limitations
in terms of visit and search, and of providing for the safety of crews and passen-
gers of attacked ships.
The effect of late-nineteenth-century weapons on blockade operations has
been outlined in a seminal work on technology and naval warfare: “Torpedo
boats could threaten fleet operations in confined waters along a coast. But the
fleet adopted quick-firing guns as a defense, and with new high-freeboard bat-
tleships, it moved farther out to sea where it could operate effectively but tor-
pedo boats could not. This is the period when the strategy of distant blockade
began to replace the traditional close blockade.”16
The combination of naval mines, torpedo boats, and submarines doomed the
close blockade and rendered blockades much more difficult to impose effec-
tively. It increased the premium on over-the-horizon reconnaissance and sur-
veillance, a problem that was intractable prior to the introduction of the aircraft.
Weapons for enforcement of blockade operations have to be employed only if
a ship or aircraft attempts to breach the blockade. Weapons to prevent the impo-
sition of a maritime blockade tend to be similar to those used for enforcement.
Technologically, weapons for use in maritime environments have become longer
in range, more stealthy (which makes them more difficult to counter), and more
accurate. Air-to-surface weapons have achieved high precision owing to satellite
guidance against fixed targets and to terminal homing against moving ones.
Mines by and large are cost-effective weapons for use against ships and subma-
rines. Submarines have proven very deadly in the enforcement of blockades—
most recently in the Falklands War of 1982.
B A R N E T T 9 5
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Using submarines for blockade running could be a future possibility, espe-
cially carrying teams of infiltrators with weapons of mass destruction. The lim-
iting factor will be that states with submarines that might be used for such a
purpose tend not to operate them competently. While about forty states in the
world have submarines in their naval orders of battle, those of only a few rou-
tinely submerge or leave their territorial waters. Of course, that could change in
the future, but it could not happen quickly or undetectably, without intelligence
warning. Further, it is unlikely that a nonstate entity, such as a terrorist group,
could acquire and competently operate a submarine.
Inspecting for and Detecting “Contraband”
The fourth of the technologies arises from the need to do more, having detected
and stopped a ship, than check its manifests and match them against the cargo.
Fortunately, “Technology has enhanced the capabilities of naval forces to con-
duct reconnaissance and identification over wide areas of the ocean and to de-
tect the presence of some contrabands that were previously undetectable.”17
Containerization can easily foil off-board detection, however, and WMD can
be very small and difficult to detect. Detection equipment exists for all known
weapons of mass destruction; the problems are those of intrusiveness and sheer
volume. This is where the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Container Se-
curity Initiative supplement inspections at the destination port. They seek to en-
sure that no WMD or other materials that would assist terrorists are loaded into
containers at their origin or added while the container is in transit. Technology
is very much in an “assist mode” in this application; the first line of defense is to
ensure that “contraband” is never placed in a container. The need to ensure that
containers are not opened nor contents disturbed in any way makes seals and
detection devices important. Significant technological efforts are under way in
all these areas.18
If this book seems completely reasonable and all my extrapolations con-
vincing, I will not have succeeded in looking very far ahead; for the one
fact about the future of which we can be certain is that it will be utterly
fantastic.
ARTHUR C. CLARKE
The U.S. Maritime Transportation Security Act requires, in a provision that be-
came effective 1 July 2004, that all foreign ships entering American ports have
international shipping security certifications as well as secured bridges and en-
gine rooms.19 The intent of the act, and of the CSI and PSI, is to ensure that no
materials, such as weapons of mass destruction, can be shipped to underwrite
acts of terrorism.
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How blockade operations—to prevent the movement of ships, aircraft, and
their specific cargoes—have been conducted and the means by which they have
been conducted have changed significantly over time. Technology has been the
handmaiden of change, and, especially recently, it has had to bear the burden of
making blockades operationally effective. Blockade law has not evolved to meet
the new demands placed upon it. International law, of course, is impotent to
control international terrorist acts; in any case, the international movement of
WMD would render moot any idea of “neutrals” whose rights need to be pro-
tected in the event of blockade operations.
As was clear even in the early 1990s, however, “over the history of naval and
administrative blockade there has been a steady improvement in the technology
of enforcement, but there has never been a blockade of a major state which was
impermeable.”20 Unfortunately, since one terrorist act with weapons of mass de-
struction could have cataclysmic effects, the success rate of blockades against
them must be 100 percent. No blockade in history has been 100 percent effective
in preventing “contraband” from entering a blockaded state or in completely
suppressing blockade running. The odds favor the perpetrator in these cases.
That is all the more reason why states must take all possible precautions and pur-
sue as many approaches as possible to prevent such a calamity.
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WHEN IS COERCION SUCCESSFUL?
And Why Can’t We Agree on It?
Patrick C. Bratton
When is coercion successful? How is success to be defined? Coercion,broadly speaking, is the use of threats to influence another’s behavior.1 Al-
though there is a substantial and growing literature on coercion, there is little con-
sensus within that literature as to what qualifies as a successful example of coercion.
Different authors formulate their own definitions of “success” and apply them to
case studies, often with contrasting findings within the same cases.2 That is because
the literature lacks a clear conceptual framework to analyze coercion. This absence
of a shared framework limits the usefulness of the concept, even though much has
been written about coercion since the seminal work of Thomas Schelling, Arms and
Influence, was published in 1966. There are several deficiencies in the coercion liter-
ature, deficiencies that often lead authors to separate coercion from its actual con-
text within foreign policy. Rather than judging the relative merits of coercive
tools—different types of air power or the effectiveness of economic sanctions—or
the short-term success of a coercive strategy, theorists should look at how and when
coercion actually assists policy makers achieve their greater foreign policy goals.
Two principal weaknesses result from the lack of a conceptual framework: the
absence of agreed definitions of what coercion is and who the coercer and target
are; and disagreement on how to determine success.
At this stage, it is useful to assess the coercion litera-
ture to see why these deficiencies exist and what can be
done in future studies to deal with them. This article,
then, is less an empirical study of coercion than a re-
flective essay attempting to assess where we currently
stand and to explain why there is so little agreement as
Patrick Bratton is a PhD student in the Department of
Politics at the Catholic University of America and a re-
search assistant at the National War College, both in
Washington, D.C.
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to when coercion is successful.3 Coercion needs to be placed within the larger
field of foreign policies of the relevant actors in order to see how it meets the
needs, concerns, and options of policy makers.4
COERCION: WHAT IS IT, AND WHO DOES IT?
In the almost forty years that have passed since Schelling’s work, the coercion lit-
erature has proved to be less rich and less cumulative than that of its strategic
counterpart, deterrence. Although authors generally agree on what is at the core
of coercion—the use of threats to influence another’s behavior—the coercion
literature suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity as each author seeks to build
his or her own concept rather than refine the work of others.5 This is evident
from the various terms used more or less interchangeably as synonyms for coer-
cion: compellence, coercive diplomacy, military coercion, coercive military
strategy, and strategic coercion.6 This proliferation of terminology has compli-
cated the study of what makes coercion successful, since writers have their own
criteria in mind and studies of even the same cases can lead to opposite conclu-
sions.7 Depending on the author and the term used, the qualities imputed to the
coercive process can vary in three principal ways: the types of threats that are in-
cluded within coercion, the role of the use of force as compared to the threat of
the use of force in coercion, and who the actors are.
What Types of Threats Are Involved?
Coercion is the use of threats to influence the behavior of another (usually a tar-
get state but occasionally a nonstate actor) by making it choose to comply rather
than directly forcing it to comply (i.e., by brute force).8 Some authors separate
compellent threats, made to cause an opponent to stop a current action or to un-
dertake another, from deterrent threats, made to cause an opponent to not take a
certain action, and on that basis discuss compellent threats as if the same as co-
ercion.9 Others include both deterrent and compellent threats as two types of
coercion.10 (Please refer to table 1—which, like the tables that follow, is intended
not as a comprehensive list but as a visual aid.)
Thomas Schelling, in Arms and Influence and his other influential book The




two t y pes of coerc ive
threats, the difference be-
ing that “the threat that
compels rather than deters
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Only compellent threats (i.e., coer-
cion is different from deterrence)
Alexander George, Janice Gross Stein,
Robert Pape
Both compellent and deterrent
threats (deterrence and compellence
are both types of coercion)
Thomas Schelling, Daniel Ellsberg,
Wallace Thies, Lawrence Freedman,
Daniel Byman, and Matthew Waxman
TABLE 1
WHAT TYPES OF THREATS ARE INVOLVED IN COERCION?
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often requires that the punishment be administered until the other acts, rather
than if he acts.”12 Deterrence, the better known of the two, is the threat to use
force in retaliation if the opponent takes a certain action. In the words of Robert
Art, “its purpose is to prevent something undesirable from happening.”13
Compellence is the use of threats to make a target stop an action it has already
undertaken, or to take an action that the coercer wants. Schelling elaborates that
the difference between the two types of threats is the “difference between induc-
ing inaction [deterrence] and making someone perform [compellence].”14 It is
generally assumed that compellence should be more difficult to achieve than de-
terrence.15 Deterrence requires only that target states maintain the status quo,
that they do nothing; they can claim that inaction is their free choice. In con-
trast, compellence involves an obvious change in behavior, acquiescence to the
demands of the coercer, that could be costly in terms of prestige and domestic
and international legitimacy.
Clearly, deterrence and compellence are two types of coercion, or two sides of
the same coin. Both concepts depend on risk, threats, and choice. The coercer,
whether seeking to deter or compel, is exploiting the potential risks the oppo-
nent faces in resisting the coercer’s threats. The coercer bases coercion “on the
exploitation of threats, of latent violence,” what is yet to come unless the target
complies.16 In both deterrence and compellence, the target chooses to comply.
Writers on compellence generally assume that the target chooses rather than is
forced to comply, and deterrence writers sometimes forget that “the deterree has
to agree to be deterred.”17 In both cases, in fact, the choice of action versus inac-
tion thus lies with the target.
Coercion, then, depends on two factors: credibility (whether the target be-
lieves that the coercer will execute its threats) and persuasiveness (whether the
threats will have a great impact on the target).18 Credibility normally depends on
whether the coercer has a reputation for carrying out threats that it makes. Per-
suasiveness comes from the ability to threaten great damage to something the
target considers vital. Threats are not automatically both credible and persua-
sive; they can also be one but not the other. For example, in the context of a trade
dispute a threat of nuclear attack would be very persuasive but not very credible.
Schelling distinguishes compellence from “brute force” in that the coercer
credibly threatens the opponent that if the action in question is not stopped, or a
desired action is not taken, force will be used to induce compliance.19 If the op-
ponent does not comply, force is applied. The coercer then hurts the opponent
but not as much as it might, leaving open the threat of even more pain if the op-
ponent still does not comply. In contrast, “brute force” is simply getting what
one wants by violence, as much as it takes.
B R A T T O N 1 0 1
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What Is the Role of Force?
The second conceptual divide concerns the actual or threatened use of force.
The role of force complicates the coercion/compellence literature. Simply put,
writers on deterrence do not spend much time on force, because the use of force
implies the failure of deterrence.20 Depending on the role assigned to the use of
force, much of the coercion literature can be classified into three schools: coer-
cion through diplomacy separate from the use of force; coercion exercised al-
most entirely through the use of force (normally air power); and coercion
exercised by both diplomacy and force.21 Authors of the first school look at coer-
cion as something that happens before “the first bomb is dropped.” The actual
use of force, except for minor demonstrations of resolve, means that coercion
has failed; the coercer is moving to brute force to take what it wants. These au-
thors focus on the diplomatic techniques and difficulties of sending “signals”
that convey clear coercive threats to the target and of “orchestrating” words and
deeds into coherent messages that the target can clearly receive. For this school,
coercion is an outcome produced by clear signaling and orchestration. The term
“coercive diplomacy” here is intended to accentuate the political-diplomatic na-
ture of this type of coercion, as opposed to the use of force to seize or destroy in
“traditional military strategy.” The goal of coercive diplomacy is to persuade the
opponent to halt what he is doing, not to strike him until his capabilities are so re-
duced that further resistance is futile. “Coercive diplomacy, then, calls for using
just enough force of an appropriate kind—if force is used at all—to demonstrate
one’s resolve to protect well-defined interests as well as the credibility of one’s
determination to use more force if necessary.”22
The second school takes a much more forceful approach, viewing coercion as
a process that happens during the use of force, or during the actual use of other
“sticks,” such as economic sanctions. Coercion is the use of force to get the target
to comply with the demands of the coercer, but without completely destroying
the military forces of, and occupying, the target state. These writers look at the
prospective merits of different coercive strategies, like punishment-versus-
denial strategies or force versus economic sanctions. One prominent exemplar
of this view limits his focus to open conflict or warfare, wherein coercion hap-
pens “after the first bomb has been dropped.” For instance, a successful example
of military coercion for him is the American air and naval Pacific campaign,
which in 1945 caused Japan to surrender without having been invaded and con-
quered. In contrast, the air campaign in Europe failed to coerce Germany, which
refused to surrender and had to be overrun. One problem for this school, as has
been pointed out, is that it is hard to distinguish clearly between coercion and
brute force given the scale and intensity of the conflicts studied.23
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A third school of thought draws no sharp distinction between coercion virtu-
ally without force and that exercised only through force. For these writers, coer-
cion includes both “signals” sent by diplomatic and military means and the
actual use of force. For Schelling the use of force is essentially a continuation or
escalation of a threat first articulated before any resort to force. What distin-
guishes coercion from brute force in this school is that force is used in a mea-
sured and controlled way to “signal” to the target the threat of further
punishment unless it complies. Coercion for the third school subsumes “coer-
cive diplomacy” and also includes forceful (sometimes very forceful) actions:
“Coercion depends more on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage al-
ready done.”24 A classic example is the effort of the Lyndon Johnson administra-
tion to coerce the North Vietnamese government to cease its support of the Viet
Cong insurgents in South Vietnam in the 1960s. In the view of a scholar who has
traced this attempt, there is no sharp
break between, first, coercive diplo-
matic efforts backed by very limited
and covert use of force in 1963–64;
second, limited demonstrative uses of
force in reprisals after the Gulf of
Tonkin incident; and third, the escalating air campaign of ROLLING THUNDER.25
In this view the increasing use of force—in a measured and connected way—is a
means of driving home the coercive threat, not necessarily representing the fail-
ure of coercion.
Threats and Force
The lack of a shared definition of coercion limits the scope of many studies, and
unnecessarily. For example, authors who exclude deterrent threats from their
analyses rule out many potentially fruitful areas of research. Similarly, a study of
compellent threats that includes only economic sanctions or air power and not
deterrent threats automatically excludes many potential cases and insights. It
has been suggested that in practice deterrent and compellent threats “mingle”
depending upon the actions and reactions of the coercer and target:
General demands to Iraq, such as “Don’t invade Kuwait,” appear to fall clearly in the
deterrence camp, whereas calls to withdraw seem like compellence. The in-between
areas are more ambiguous. “Don’t go further” involves both stopping an existing ac-
tion and avoiding a future one—both immediate deterrence and coercion. More-
over, a call to withdraw carries with it an implicit demand not to engage in the
offense again and affects the credibility of the deterrence call to not invade Kuwait in
the future.26
B R A T T O N 1 0 3
Coercion before the use of force George, Gross Stein
Coercion only through force Pape
Coercion through diplomacy and force Schelling, Thies
TABLE 2
WHAT ROLE DOES FORCE PLAY IN COERCION?
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Even more problematic, the absence of a common conceptual framework
means that two authors examining the same cases can come to opposite conclu-
sions. If their criteria and definitions differ, so will their conclusions as to when
coercion is successful or not. A writer using the coercive diplomacy framework
almost excludes the use of force;27 according to coercive military strategy, how-
ever, the use of force is not in itself the failure of coercion.
These differing conceptual frameworks result, for example, in opposite
points of view on the 1990–91 Gulf War. One scholar codes the 1990–91 Gulf
War as a failure of compellence; Iraq’s refusal to withdraw from Kuwait meant
that compellence had failed, since the coalition’s objective was to get Iraq to
leave Kuwait without using force.28 In contrast, another lists the Gulf War as a
success for a coercive air strategy of denial. The U.S.-led coalition was able to use
military force to get Baghdad to retreat from Kuwait without having to invade
and occupy Iraq wholesale.29
NATO’s air war over Kosovo in 1999 may be an even better example. If one
views coercion as the use of force only, Operation ALLIED FORCE looks like a suc-
cess. NATO’s bombing campaign caused the Serbs to withdraw from Kosovo
without a ground war and to allow the presence of NATO peacekeeping troops.30
Many believe that “the prophecies of Giulio Douhet and other air power vision-
aries appear[ed to have been] realized,” that air power can coerce by itself.31
However, if one adopts the perspective that coercion is exercised through both
diplomacy and force, Kosovo seems at best like a limited and belated success, if
not a failure. From March 1998 to March 1999, when Operation ALLIED FORCE
began, the Serbs withstood various attempts at coercive diplomacy, which led
the Serbs to believe that they could depopulate Kosovo and get away with it.32 In
his view, the claim that the air war succeeded because the Serbs eventually capit-
ulated begs the question of why it was necessary to have an air war at all. What
led the Serbs to believe that they could ignore a full year of coercive threats, ap-
parently without fear of force being used against them?33 NATO’s coercion of
Serbia did not begin “once the first bomb was dropped” but a full year before.
Looking for coercion only in the air war and not the deterrence and compellence
failures that preceded it effectively excludes from consideration many of the
most interesting questions about coercion, about how it works and why it suc-
ceeds or fails.
Who Are the Actors?
Coercion writers have for the most part assumed that states involved in coercion
are unitary, rational actors.34 Schelling, an economist by training, often incorpo-
rated into his writings examples drawn from interpersonal relations—such as
mugger and victim, buyer and seller, parent and child—that assume the rational,
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value maximizing actors of classic economic theory. This model takes the costs
of noncompliance (sticks) and of compliance (carrots) as the independent vari-
ables, to be raised and lowered, respectively, against change in the target state’s
policies as the dependent variable.35 The general underlying theory suggests that
if the coercer can make not complying costlier than complying, coercion should
be successful. If not, coercion is likely to fail. Success is conventionally thought
of as achieved when the target complies with the coercer’s demands. This pre-
sumption implies that the coercer does not need to know a great deal about the
target, only to “step into its shoes” and imagine how a rational, calculating actor
would respond to sticks and carrots.
Some more recent authors have slightly modified this assumption, to ac-
knowledge, for instance, that factions within a target state can influence its reac-
tions (Japan in 1945 is an excellent example). One scholar argues that various
types of economic sanctions are more or less effective depending on whether the
target is democratic or an authoritarian regime. Another makes a convincing
point that whether the coercing state has a strong presidential system or a parlia-
mentary one can affect how effectively it sends signals.36
Schelling himself conceded that there is a difference between coercing an in-
dividual and coercing a government, but he did not develop the point exten-
sively.37 It has been subsequently pointed out that the rational actor model
forgets that the coercer and the target of the coercion are actually governments
rather than individuals: “Governments are coalitions of numerous individual
decision-makers, virtually all of whom occupy positions within large, semi-
autonomous, bureaucratic organizations; any government involved in an at-
tempt at coercion is likely to speak with many voices at once.”38
In most, if not all, instances of coercion, groups or individuals in the target
state’s government have staked their positions and reputations on the policies or
actions that cause the coercion in the first place.39 It is likely to be extremely diffi-
cult, if possible at all, to convince them that the costs of pursuing this policy
would be prohibitive, no matter how high those costs become. Moreover, as has
been suggested, it is difficult “to assess the impact of particular coercive pres-
sures” upon the adversary’s decision-making process.40 Different targets will not
respond identically to the same coercive threats.41 A convincing case can be
made that the type of regime targeted for economic coercion has a great effect
on the types of coercive threats that are most effective against it.42 Even in the
same state, individuals or groups might react differently to coercive threats, and
some might be more or less responsive to various types of threats to different
parts of the target. “For officials involved in an attempt at coercion, then, the
problems that they must confront include not only deciding what demands they
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should make of an opponent but also learning who on the other side must do
what if the attempt at coercion is to succeed and how can the coercer’s action be
manipulated, if at all.”43
Diplomatic threats might mean more to people in a foreign ministry than in a
defense ministry, and economic sanctions might have more impact on elected
officials than on nonelected ones. One target might be more vulnerable to
threats to its industrial centers, while another’s military forces might be more
susceptible; yet others are not particularly sensitive to threats to either. It has
been argued that a coercer needs to determine the Clausewitzian “centers of
gravity”—the target’s greatest sources of strength, either material or intangible,
that “if destroyed, would cause the enemy’s resistance to collapse[;] . . . only by
threatening the state’s center of gravity can a coercer compel the greatest conces-
sions from the target state.”44 The record of attempts to coerce Saddam Hussein
shows that he was most sensitive to threats to his relationship with his power
base; that threats to his conventional military power, public sentiment, or the
Iraqi economy were less effective.45
That individuals within a target government react differently to coercive
measures suggests that even if a coercer succeeded in getting demands accepted
in the short term, it would be very difficult to secure complete acquiescence in
the long term, because certain members of the target’s government would at-
tempt to reinstate their objectionable policies, since their political careers (and
in some regimes, their lives) depend on it. Coercers, then, need to know a great
deal about the regime’s composition and internal political struggles, not con-
ceptualize it as a “rational, calculating actor.”The coercer needs to know the “po-
litical realities within the target state’s government and to shape their policies in
a way that maximizes the influence of those in the target state’s government
whose hopes and fears are most compatible with the coercer’s objectives.”46 In
some cases there will be factions that are compatible with the coercer’s desires, in
others not.
To illustrate the effects of internal politics on the responses of targets, it is
useful to compare the successful case of coercion in the Cuban missile crisis in
October 1962 with the failure against North Vietnam from 1963 to 1968. In the
former, Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to deploy the missiles to Cuba was taken
only about six months before the crisis erupted.47 In addition, he made his
choices very quickly and with only a small circle of advisers; there was relatively
little political or bureaucratic struggle over the decision to deploy the missiles.48
The Soviets appeared surprised by the Kennedy administration’s firm reaction
to the missiles and not to have considered the possibility of war—even a limited
one in the Caribbean, let alone a nuclear one—with the United States. Given
their surprise and lack of preparation for a war, it is perhaps understandable that
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they yielded when offered tangible incentives (the pledge not to invade Cuba
and the offer to withdraw missiles from Turkey).49
In contrast, the North Vietnamese decision to aid the Viet Cong and resist
American pressure was the outcome of a bitter intraparty debate—involving fig-
ures, like Le Duan, who had staked their political reputations and careers in the
North Vietnamese government on not yielding to American pressure—over the
course of an entire decade.50 As a result of this debate, the North Vietnamese
government took seriously the threat of conflict with the United States, even a
direct American invasion of North Vietnam, and vigorously prepared for such
an eventuality. Unlike the Soviets in Cuba, the North Vietnamese were unsur-
prised by American pressure, even escalating force. “We can hypothesize that the
longer the bureaucratic battles involved, the more rigid the positions of the par-
ticipants will become and the greater the stake each participant will have in in-
suring that his preferred course of action is adopted.”51
For its part, the coercing state is made up of competing bureaus and organiza-
tions. Orchestrating clear signals can be difficult, because “the leadership itself
speaks with many voices at once, and there is no guarantee that every voice will
convey the same message.”52 Messages sent by governments can thus be contra-
dictory and self-defeating. For example, in June 1998, American threats meant
to induce Serbia to halt its offensive against Kosovo were supposed to be rein-
forced by open planning for a military intervention and by air exercises.53 Unfor-
tunately, these efforts were undermined by public comments of national
security adviser Samuel Berger and Secretary of Defense William Cohen that no
plans for military intervention were “on the table” and that the exercises were
only that, exercises.54
Even given agreement on the use of a coercive strategy, the issues of how,
when, and with what tools that strategy is to be implemented can be contentious
and reduce its effectiveness. Members of various agencies will probably suggest
policies that draw upon their organizations’ expertise—military action for de-
fense ministries, diplomatic action for foreign ministries, etc. For example, in
the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis, as many argue, the People’s Liberation Army
played a key role in a decision to shift the unification strategies of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) from “peaceful coexistence” to coercive diplomacy
through shows of force—missile tests and military exercises—to make
compellent threats to the Republic of China.55 It has been argued that the Army
did so because it saw the diplomatic sanctions of the Chinese Ministry of For-
eign Affairs—the cancellation of visits and the recall of the ambassador to
Washington—as “weak and indecisive.”56 Individuals and organizations within
the same state can find themselves in intense competition for the adoption of
“their” policies over rivals’, or put organizations or services at cross purposes.
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Therefore (see table 3), coercion theorists need to analyze the reactions of the
target as the responses of groups and organizations rather than of a rational in-
dividual. Theorists must also take into consideration the fact that the coercer is
not a unitary rational actor either.
PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES
Much of the literature on coercion (whatever the term used) is devoted to the
practice of coercive strategies rather than the results of coercion. This is particu-
larly true of works that focus on air power and economic sanctions as coercive
instruments.57 This approach, while valuable, risks suggesting that the right
strategy and the right coercive tool will prevail no matter the consequences or
setting. In other words, the right strategy will actually have yielded very little in
the long term if the target continues to take actions like those that caused the co-
ercion in the first place.58
It is often forgotten that coercion is only a tool of foreign policy and that “suc-
cess” in coercion depends not only upon the tactical success of a particular coer-
cive strategy but also upon the benefits accruing to the foreign policies of
coercing states. Coercion does not take place within a vacuum; important politi-
cal, historical, and situational factors influence outcomes.59 “The effectiveness of
coercive strategies will therefore depend on the overall political context in which
they are implemented, and even a potentially promising use of force can be
squandered by an ineffectual diplomacy.”60
It must be remembered that coercion is not a substitute for an effective for-
eign policy.61 A comprehensive study has been made of American political uses
of military forces, including coercive (both deterrent and compellent) threats
and deployments in support of allies, between 1946 and 1975. It found that most
of the time these actions served only to buy time and that the effectiveness de-
clined sharply over time.62 It “should be recognized that these military opera-
tions cannot substitute for more fundamental policies and actions—diplomacy,
close economic and cultural relations, an affinity of mutual interests and
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a few simple parts (government, military, public, etc.)
Pape,* Risa Brooks, Byman and Waxman




WHO ARE THE ACTORS?
* In some cases Pape treats the target as unitary rational actor, but in others he distinguishes between different factions that react differently
to coercive threats (as in the case of Japan and Germany in World War II). See his Bombing to Win, pp. 108–27 and 283–313.
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perceptions—which can form the basis either for sound and successful alliances
or for stable adversary relations.”63 If coercion, then, can produce only a breathing
space, the coercer needs to consider using that time to “reduce the motivation un-
derlying that [aggressive] intention, and/or to provide alternative goals that may be
relatively satisfactory to the deterred [or in this case, the coerced] power.”64
For example, it has been argued that China was successful in its efforts to co-
erce Taiwan during the 1995–96 crisis. At first glance, the PRC does seem to have
achieved some of its goals in the short term, with respect both to Washington
and Taipei. In Washington, President William Clinton gave a public assurance
that the United States did not support “a two-China policy, Taiwan indepen-
dence, or Taiwan membership in the UN.” In Taipei, the pro-independence
Democratic People’s Party made a poor showing in the March 1996 elections,
President Lee Teng-hui scaled back his “independence diplomacy,” and Beijing
found itself taken more seriously in the region, especially regarding its willing-
ness to use military force over Taiwan.65
However, the long-term benefits of that coercion for China are less clear. The
American and Taiwanese defense relationship, which had been left uncertain
under the American policy of “calculated ambiguity,” was now clarified: the
United States was both willing and able to defend Taiwan militarily.66 Beijing’s
actions increased the perception in Washington of the PRC as a threat, particu-
larly among the “anti-China” lobby.67 American and Taiwanese defense coopera-
tion, which had been almost withering away, as some feel, since the 1970s, was
renewed and strengthened by Beijing’s threats.68 President Lee, who won the
election, after a short pause resumed his efforts to increase Taiwan’s interna-
tional recognition, including lobbying for UN membership, high-profile visa
requests, and international trips (his “transit diplomacy”).69 Security arrange-
ments between the United States and other powers in the region, like Japan and
South Korea, were also increased, and if other Asian countries took Beijing more
seriously, it was because they had reassessed the PRC as a possible future security
threat.70 “The international reaction to China’s military coercion surprised
Beijing, which had hoped that most countries would close their eyes to its efforts
to punish Taiwan. . . . In fact, Beijing’s actions quickly internationalized the Tai-
wan issue in a way that had not occurred since 1971. . . . By going too far, Beijing
catalyzed international opinion against itself.”71
Coding Coercive Outcomes
Most authors categorize the outcomes of coercion as either “success” or “fail-
ure.” “Success” is said to occur if the target concedes to a significant part of the
coercer’s demands, and “failure” when it does not. A scholar associated with this
“unidimensional” criterion, analyzing strategic bombing campaigns, codes as
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successes the campaigns against Japan in 1942–45 and North Korea in 1950–53,
the LINEBACKER raids in 1972, and the 1990–91 Gulf War, but as failures the cam-
paign against Nazi Germany in 1942–45 and ROLLING THUNDER in 1965–68.72
Others reject this simple approach.73 One argues, for instance, that a
unidimensional criterion for success—that the target concedes to a “significant
part of the coercer’s demands”—“does not allow for gradations in the degree or
kind of success.”74 Such an analysis, on this view, ignores both the costs for the
coercer of using sanctions and the possibilities of partial success. In other words,
a “multidimensional” approach would acknowledge that sanctions, for instance,
can be useful to policy makers without “working” in and of themselves.75 It is
worth quoting one scholar at length on this point:
What policymakers “most want to know” is not, as [scholar Robert] Pape asserts,
“when the strategy of economic sanctions can change another state’s behavior with-
out resorting to military force,” but rather when economic sanctions are likely to
have more utility than military force. The deductive case for using economic sanc-
tions is not based solely on the comparative effectiveness of military force and eco-
nomic sanctions, as Pape implies; it is based on their comparative utility, which is a
function of both effectiveness and costs. Thus it is quite possible for sanctions to be
more useful than force even in situations in which they are less effective.76
Some demands will be easier for the target to meet than others; “a moderate de-
gree of success in accomplishing a difficult task may seem more important than
a high degree of success in accomplishing an easy task.”77
For one scholar, whatever the form of coercion, the more important question
“is not whether it works, but whether it is useful, and if so, whether it is worth-
while.”78 Another, moreover, criticizes the “simple dichotomy of success/failure”
in the economic sanctions literature. The idea that success is a return to the sta-
tus quo ante and failure anything else is an unfair test. On this view, outcomes
need to include the possibilities of compromise between the actors and to take
into consideration what is demanded of the target.79
Other “multidimensionalists” look not for either success or failure but for
marginal changes in the probability of behavior.80 It is not an “either-or” contest.
Further, different coercive tools can work together to produce results; “eco-
nomic and military pressure can act together synergistically—just as naval and
infantry forces usually work with air power.”81 Coercion, it is argued, is a dy-
namic process; because the target is not static, it can attempt both to neutralize
coercive pressures and coerce the coercer in return.82 This interaction can lead to
unpredictable results that do not fit neatly into complete successes or failures.83
As has been argued, it is misleading to code cases of coercion in absolute bi-
nary metrics, with “success” and “failure” the only possible outcomes. An attempt
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at coercion that “fails” does not necessarily return the situation to that which
previously existed; the new situation could be much worse for the coercer. In any
case the coercer must pay enforcement or implementation costs, and these can
outweigh the benefits of even successful coercion, making it Pyrrhic.84 A com-
parison between the international position of the United States in 1963, before
the expansion of the coercive conflict against Hanoi, and in 1973, at the time of
the withdrawal from Vietnam, shows that “failure” does not simply mean re-
turning to the previous status quo.
Authors (see table 4) then need to expand the framework on coercion to in-
clude results that cannot neatly fit into either success or failure. All too often, co-
ercion and coercive tools are viewed “in a vacuum” and are judged on their
ability to coerce in and of themselves.85 The focus of much of the literature on
coercive tools reinforces a belief that success in a particular coercive strategy will
translate into the achievement of some policy goal.86
Coercion and the Great Air Power Debate
The tendency to study coercive methods at the expense of their long-term con-
sequences is perhaps most marked among writers who focus on the role of air
power as a coercive tool. The failure of air power in the Vietnam War and its ap-
parent recent success in the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq have both
rekindled the “great air power debate”—Can air power win wars by itself?—and
have tied that debate to coercion.87 Like coercion theorists, air power proponents
have sought to show that it can force a target to capitulate with its military forces
undefeated, while air power pessimists have doubted the ability of air power to
“do it alone.”88
In an attempt to resolve the air power debate by combining it with the coer-
cion literature, a distinction was drawn between denial strategies, which target
and disrupt the enemy’s military strategy through the combined pressure of the-
ater air and ground forces, and punishment strategies, in which strategic air
power targets civilian centers. The conclusion from the case studies adduced
is that denial strategies can produce successful coercion while punishment
strategies are rarely successful. In that case, the best (if not only) way to coerce
B R A T T O N 1 1 1
Full compliance with coercer’s demands, independent
of any other factors
Pape
Need to distinguish degrees of success. Possible to have
partial success or secure secondary objectives without
securing primary objectives
Kimberly Elliot, Drezner, Karl Mueller,
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TABLE 4
HOW IS SUCCESS DEFINED?
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successfully is to “undermine the target state’s confidence in its own military
strategy.”89 Once the costs of resisting are higher than the costs of surrendering,
coercion can succeed; hence, the successful coercer manipulates effectively “the
costs and benefits” of continuing the action in question. However, denial is not a
silver bullet; it is not guaranteed to work in all situations. It is most effective
against an opponent who uses a conventional military strategy that depends on
massive logistical support and communications and offers lucrative targets for
air strikes. On the contrary, if the opponent relies on a guerrilla strategy that de-
pends on local support and slight logistical “tail,” denial is likely to fail.
An illustration of the superiority of denial strategies might be the Johnson
administration’s failure to coerce Hanoi by means of a combination of punish-
ment and denial strategies from 1965 to 1968 (ROLLING THUNDER), as com-
pared to the success of the Richard Nixon administration’s denial strategy in
1972 (LINEBACKER I and II).90 Conventional punishment failed, as some argue it
almost always will, and conventional denial failed as well, because bombing
could not easily disrupt Hanoi’s guerrilla strategy of the earlier period, which re-
quired no elaborate logistical network. However, when Hanoi switched to a con-
ventional strategy in its 1972 offensive against South Vietnam, it became
vulnerable to the denial bombing campaigns of LINEBACKER I and II. These
campaigns, it is argued, halted the North Vietnamese offensive and brought Ha-
noi to agree to U.S. demands at the negotiating table: “The bombing was a coer-
cive success, forcing the North to cease its ground offensive and accept a
cease-fire, even though it retained the capacity to continue organized military
action.”91
Such conclusions about the LINEBACKER strikes are an excellent example of
the dangers of concentrating on coercive tools but losing sight of the actual
long-term effects of coercion. It is true that in the short term the LINEBACKER
strikes disrupted the North Vietnamese offensive and guaranteed the indepen-
dence of South Vietnam during the American withdrawal. However, what the
North could not accomplish in 1973 it accomplished in 1975, when Saigon fell. It
seems a stretch to list the LINEBACKER campaign with the surrender of Japan in
1945 or the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 as a successful example of coercion. To
do so would lower the standards to endorse policies that at best only buy time or
save face, rather than secure desired outcomes.
Coercion and the Sanctions Debate
In contrast to the air power debate, the economic sanctions debate largely con-
cerns the merits of sanctions themselves rather than the relative merits of differ-
ent types. Some authors attempt to judge sanctions on their ability to coerce
targets by themselves; for these authors, success is when the target complies with
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the coercer’s demands, failure is when they do not. Judged by this standard sanc-
tions appear to be a “notoriously poor tool of statecraft,” with a very low success
rate.92 At first glance this seems to be a logical and rigorous standard; in fact,
however, it is an unrealistic and unfair test for economic sanctions.93
As has been pointed out, economic sanctions cannot be evaluated only by
their ability to coerce targets by themselves.94 The costs and benefits of economic
sanctions must be evaluated within the context of other instruments that policy
makers have at their disposal, such as military force or diplomacy. Moreover, de-
pending on that context, “ineffective” economic sanctions might be the best, or
the only, option available.95 There are always costs to using coercion, and the
most “effective” tools are not always the most useful.96 In certain circumstances,
for instance, the use of military force is unthinkable. For example, during the
1956 Suez crisis, President Dwight Eisenhower wanted to coerce two allies, Brit-
ain and France, but military force could hardly be used against liberal demo-
cratic allies, however “effective” it might be in theory. The president instead
threatened an economic sanction—refusal to let the International Monetary
Fund provide a backup loan to Britain (the currency of which was under in-
creasing pressure) or to give access to dollar credits to pay for oil imports from
dollar zones in North and South America.97 If economic sanctions are “notori-
ously poor tools of statecraft,” are there any better tools that are low cost, always
available, and highly likely to succeed? The answer, once again (see table 5), de-
pends on the definition of success.98
WHERE DOES THE FIELD GO FROM HERE?
This controversy over success and outcomes does more than complicate aca-
demic arguments; it has consequences for policy. States have used coercion at
least since the time of Thucydides, and all indications from recent events—the
1999 war over Kosovo, Indo-Pakistani standoffs, Russian pressure on Georgia,
and the American pressure against Iraq—imply that states will continue to use
coercion as a foreign policy tool.99 Yet for all the rich history of coercion and
manifest willingness of many states to use it, coercion lacks a commonly ac-
cepted conceptual framework. Should policy makers think of deterrence and co-
ercion as separate strategies having nothing to do with one another, or of
deterrent and compellent threats as two types of coercion that may overlap in
B R A T T O N 1 1 3
Whether or not certain coercive tools (air power
strategies, economic sanctions, etc.) can coerce by
themselves
Pape
How coercive tools can help meet the greater foreign
policy goals for statesmen
David Baldwin, Mueller, Elliot, and Byman and Waxman
TABLE 5
WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF COERCION?
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practice? Can a coercer simply reason deductively, on the basis of how rational
individuals would respond to threats and pressure? Or does a coercer need to have
accurate intelligence on the composition and politics of the target’s decision-
making system? How can policy makers know the difference between conditions
and techniques that are conducive to success and those that are not, when the
very meaning of “success” is contested? Do air power and economic sanctions
need to be effective by themselves to be useful?
Three things could be done to increase the understanding of when coercion
“works” and when it does not. First, coercive theorists should concentrate on
building a solid, shared definition of coercion, rather than each one designing
his or her own topic with its own qualifications. A third school, one that consid-
ers both the threat and the use of force, should provide an adequate compromise
on the role force should play in coercion, since it acknowledges that the answer
depends on the case in question. At times threats are all that might be required,
at other times only force might work, and many cases will fall somewhere in
between.
Indeed, the answers to some of the questions listed above as left open by the
literature are in fact clear enough. The reasons, after all, that effective coercion is
rare are, first, that states sending and receiving signals do not behave as unified
actors, and second, that coercion is best viewed as a process rather than an out-
come, being the product of a wide array of interactions among distinctive inter-
national actors.100 Neither the coercing government nor a target government is a
unitary, rational actor. Further, coercers do need to know a great deal about the
nature of the target to determine whether it is likely to be coercible, and if so,
what kinds of threats will be most effective. Because they are not unitary actors,
coercers can rarely send clear “signals” or “orchestrate” coherent messages, and
targets can rarely be relied upon to listen to the correct messages or draw the
right conclusions.101
Second, concerning the outcomes of coercion, it would be useful to analyze
coercion in terms of positive and negative outcomes rather than successes or
failures. It has been argued that studies should focus on the “outcomes related to
the principal behavior desired by [the coercer and the target].”102 As suggested
earlier, the dependent variable should be defined as a marginal change in the be-
havior of the target rather than in absolute terms—complete compliance with
the coercer’s demands versus no compliance at all. The more the outcome suits
the desires of the coercer, the more positively the outcome can be rated. If the
target does not change its behavior to suit the coercer’s demands—by maintain-
ing its current behavior or intensifying its activities—the outcome can be judged
as negative. Outcomes achieved in the short term can differ from what emerges in
the long term, as the examples of the LINEBACKER raids and the 1995–96 Taiwan
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Strait crisis illustrate. Moreover, the outcomes can be positive for both the coercer
and the target if a compromise can be found that is acceptable for both; in truly di-
sastrous cases, one can conceive negative outcomes for both.103
Third, writers need to place coercion in the perspective of the greater foreign
policies of states rather than concentrate on “how-to” approaches, and they
should not assume that the success of a particular coercive strategy will meet the
needs and concerns, and fit the options, of policy makers. It would be useful to
consider not only how examples of coercion play out but also their long-term
impacts (positive or negative) on the triggering events, the internal politics of
both coercers and targets, and the relations between the actors in the years fol-
lowing the coercive acts.104 What is needed is a comparative study that goes be-
yond the incidents of coercion themselves to examine the contexts in which the
selected cases occurred and their aftermaths, in order to see when coercion in
combination with an effective foreign policy can yield long-term benefits.105 As
is often said, “It is possible to win the war but lose the peace.” The political inter-
actions at the end of a crisis, or just following a conflict, can be just as vital as the
ones just before.106 What Colin Gray has said of competent strategists could be
applied to competent coercive strategies: “A competent strategist . . . balances
means with ends and understands that lasting success requires the definition of
the international order which erstwhile foes find tolerable. An incompetent
strategist . . . fails to define and settle for such an order.”107
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
HAS THE RED CROSS–ADORNED HOSPITAL SHIP BECOME OBSOLETE?
Arthur M. Smith
Those responsible for casualty management in littoral conflicts must weigh
multiple variables such as: the enemy’s war-fighting strategies and tactics; the
types of weapons systems used by the enemy; the complexity of the kinds of
wounds and diseases commonly encountered during armed conflict; and the
availability of resources to effectively treat those conditions.
Despite Richard Grunawalt’s plea (see “Hospital
Ships in the War on Terror: Sanctuaries or Targets?”
Naval War College Review, Winter 2005, pp. 89–119)
to arm “protected” hospital ships during littoral war-
fare with encrypted communications, machine guns,
defensive chaff, and Phalanx missiles, the reality re-
mains that air-, sea-, and ground-launched missiles, as
well as mines and other weapons, will create a future
tactical environment of unparalleled complexity inso-
far as land, sea, and air interaction is concerned, which
eventually may impede the timely evacuation and
medical management of the wounded. Irrespective of
Grunawalt’s suggestions, therefore, during future mili-
tary contingencies an operational commander may
well determine that traditional medical treatment
and evacuation ships will no longer benefit from the
mantle of “privileged immunity” and for purposes of
protection mandate them to assume unmarked ano-
nymity; their only other option—geographic separa-
tion—would be counterproductive to the principal
Dr. Arthur M. Smith served with the U.S. Navy be-
tween 1965 and 1967 aboard the antisubmarine air-
craft carrier USS Randolph (CVS 15) as assistant
medical officer (surgical), followed by a tour as ward
medical officer of the MEDEVAC (contaminated sur-
gery) receiving service at the U.S. Naval Hospital,
Memphis, Tennessee. Dr. Smith was honorably dis-
charged in 1979, then subsequently recommissioned
and promoted to captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve. His
following service has included multiple assignments
aboard ships ranging from guided-missile frigates to
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. He has also testified
before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee con-
cerning the future of the Uniformed Services University
of the Health Sciences. Dr. Smith retired from the Naval
Reserve in 1998 but continues to serve as adjunct clini-
cal professor of surgery and military emergency medi-
cine at the Uniformed Services University. Since 1976
he has been professor of surgery (urology) at the Medical
College of Georgia. Dr. Smith is an accomplished lec-
turer and has published more than fifty articles on oper-
ational medical support. In 1989, he received the
Distinguished Author of the Year award from the U.S.
Naval Institute.
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mission of forward casualty support. Consequently, we should not necessarily
expect dedicated “protected” hospital ships, as we now know them, to be readily
available to every task force entering dangerous littoral waters.
“OVER THE HORIZON”: IN THE LITTORALS
If lives are to be sustained during future “over the horizon” and “ship to objec-
tive” amphibious operations, those who emphasize direct insertion of forces
from an afloat sea base to an objective hundreds of miles inland without the estab-
lishment of a lodgment ashore must ensure that unique and effective scenario-
dependent medical support is available at the tactical level. In addition, if the
wounded are to survive, there should be innovative capabilities for their move-
ment within the combat and communications zones, intratheater, that will ac-
commodate the reality that medical treatment must be sustained while in
transit. Tactical analysis suggests that medical support at the tactical level will be
implemented predominantly using aviation-based evacuation assets. Further-
more, what is needed to satisfy the medical requirements in any littoral conflict
is equally dependent upon the availability of a safe and effective strategic medi-
cal evacuation plan to medical facilities outside the zone of conflict. Recent ex-
periences in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the revelation of uncertain security
at terrorist-prone littoral anchorages and berthing facilities, again suggest that
evacuation by air will be the preferred mode of casualty transport. These consid-
erations may render obsolete the entire discussion of the Geneva Convention
that formally protected hospital ships.
VARIABLE UTILIZATION OF AFLOAT MEDICAL ASSETS
Historically, varying forms of medical care facilities, in addition to an array of
casualty transportation assets, have been utilized within both tactical and strate-
gic phases of combat operations. Grunawalt’s detailed exposition clearly articu-
lates the history of the many treaties, conventions, and protocols that apply to
international armed conflicts, some of which are dedicated to respecting and
protecting the immunity of hospital ships.
Yet history provides many examples of innovative medical adaptations to
changing tactical and strategic requirements, only some of which were specifi-
cally dependent upon “protected neutrality.” Not only was the decision to con-
vert some but not all of these casualty-care adaptations to a status of “neutral,”as
defined by international conventions, clothed in the context of the prevailing
war-fighting strategy, but operational commanders had duly recognized the
perceived intent of the enemy either to recognize or disregard the same criteria.
A familiarity with selected elements of medical support carried out during
twentieth-century conflicts will provide a background for better understanding
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the range of support options operational commanders might select during fu-
ture conflicts.
TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC MEDICAL EVACUATION BY SEA
DURING WORLD WAR II: SELECTIVE UTILIZATION OF ASSETS
During World War II amphibious operations, and in subsequent landings at
Inchon, Korea, “grey hull” tank landing ships (LST) were converted into an impor-
tant component of the medical care system—the LST(H). Modified for surgical
support of limited scope, these ships were primarily used by forward surgical
teams to stabilize the wounded. Given the intensity of the warfare and the short-
age of true hospital ships, LST(H)s became essential in providing quick, early,
lifesaving treatment for the combat wounded in forward locations. In opera-
tional settings where larger hospital transports were available, the transports
were often withdrawn at nightfall due to lack of air cover. The battle of Leyte
Gulf in 1944 demonstrates the benefit of beaching these “unprotected” surgical
LSTs after unloading. Planners saw the value of holding one or two in reserve, to
commit to beaches that were overwhelmed with casualties or without medical
facilities. During the operations at Lingayen Gulf in 1945, six LST(H)s with em-
barked surgical teams were beached to provide casualty care. At Normandy, all
LSTs were furnished to handle returning casualties; fifty-four were outfitted to
perform surgery. Others were subsequently equipped to serve as casualty-
control ships, regulating the backflow of the wounded to rear facilities afloat and
ashore. One was even made a floating blood bank. Such hospital LSTs were able
to provide sophisticated surgical care in a relatively safe environment close to
shore. Operating without Geneva Convention protection, they performed effec-
tively, even under fire at Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
Another scenario-driven innovation of World War II included the utilization
of three grey-hull medically modified personnel transport vessels (APH). The
attack personnel transport (APA), although not designed or properly equipped
for handling casualties, often bore the brunt of the initial load from beach
assaults—for example, at Iwo Jima. The use of APHs was considered desirable in
an amphibious attack, because this type of ship could carry assault forces in-
bound, had a complete staff of specialists, and had a large sick bay so that spe-
cialized treatment could be provided. The APH had about eight medical officers
and a bed capacity of over a thousand. These ships were held in the “transporta-
tion area” of the assault force as evacuation ships. When bed capacity was
reached, the ship sailed, to prevent exposure to air attacks. As a general rule, the
ships withdrew out to sea at night, but on occasion they remained anchored a
thousand yards offshore, protected by a smoke screen.
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Responding to command requirements, as defined by Admirals William F.
Halsey, Jr., and Chester Nimitz, yet another innovation, near the end of the war,
was the development of twenty-plus protected U.S. Army–staffed hospital ships
on tanker and freighter hulls, as well as the construction of a smaller number of
rapidly produced Navy hospital ships.
At Leyte Gulf, it became apparent that floating hospitals were urgently
needed at the objective, especially during the night, when they were under orders
to retire. When two APAs arrived, they were summarily designated as casualty-
receiving ships and stationed offshore to provide hospitalization at night. Small
escort patrol craft (PCE[R]) were also utilized, ad hoc, as rescue transport vehi-
cles for casualty evacuation.
The large number of wounded at Iwo Jima emphasized the need for many
medical support ships, two of which were USS Samaritan (AH 10) and Solace
(AH 5), augmented by Pinckney (APH 5), Bountiful (AH 5), and a “reserve hos-
pital ship,” the vehicle landing ship Ozark (LSV 2). Their only assigned function
was transportation and en-route care of the sick and wounded. While the use of
AHs was highly desirable, they could not go into the transport area until D-day
plus-1 or later, and it was seldom possible for them to receive casualties directly
from the beaches. Their main function was to relieve overloaded transports of
casualties and evacuate them to base hospitals.
In April 1945 the invasion of Okinawa began. Enemy planes attacked three
hospital ships. The USS Relief was attacked on 2 April, as was Solace on 20 April,
but no damage was done. The only ship to suffer major damage and casualties
was USS Comfort. On 28 April, while steaming away from the scene of combat,
fully lighted in accordance with Geneva Convention protections, Comfort was
hit amidships by a kamikaze, resulting in twenty-two killed, eleven wounded,
and nineteen missing. The other ships, lying in close support, just off the landing
beaches and within the protected ring of picket ships and transport area de-
fenses, suffered no significant damage. Nevertheless, hospital ships continued to
perform regular shuttle trips to hospitals in the Marianas.
UNIQUE UTILIZATION OF HOSPITAL SHIPS
From the earliest days of the Korean fighting, U.S. Navy hospital ships served as
seaborne ambulances, and later as mobile hospitals. After the early service of the
British vessel HMHS Maine, and the later arrival of the Danish Jutlandia, five
such ships provided an unusual and successful addition to rear-area medical re-
sources. While their original mission was to transport patients, giving care en
route, Korean conditions made them far more valuable as floating hospitals. Pa-
tients were loaded aboard either by winching up litters directly from the docks
or from lighters at sea, or from helicopters landing on the ships’ decks. (This was
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preceded by the lashing of helicopter landing floats on the sides of hospital ship
USS Haven in Inchon harbor, to facilitate direct rotary-wing air transport of ca-
sualties to hospital ships without flight decks.)
Since strategic evacuation routes were primarily directed toward Japan,
movement by air was considered preferable, because of the inconvenience to pa-
tients caused by a sea voyage. The result was the unique decision to leave hospital
ships in Korean ports for considerable lengths of time. The ships became a new
form of mobile hospital in Korean waters, shifting about the Korean coast as
needed: sometimes supporting the Inchon invasion—for example, USS Conso-
lation; occasionally doing service in Japan; or by aiding the Hungnam, North
Korea, evacuation. By the end of September 1952, admissions to the three Navy
hospital ships nearly totaled 40,662, about 35 percent wounded in battle. In
addition, while in port, these ships could conduct a clinic just as capably as a
land-based conventional hospital. A large number of outpatients were treated
aboard hospital ships, possibly equal to the total number of inpatients cared for
aboard ship.
VIETNAM
The Vietnam War provided an ideal geographic setting and combat scenario for
hospital ships—intermittent low-level warfare with the combat zone adjacent to
the sea, in a long, narrow country with a substantial length of coastline. In addi-
tion, because of the air superiority enjoyed by U.S. forces, the helicopter was
used extensively—the ideal medical evacuation system for hospital ships. The
enemy lacked, or refrained from using, artillery or rockets to interdict the two
red cross–marked U.S. hospital ships Sanctuary and Repose. They sailed freely,
immediately offshore, seemingly immune from hostile activity.
FALKLANDS: THE UNIQUE TRUE TEST OF
PROTECTED NEUTRALITY
The Falklands campaign afforded an opportunity to analyze both the benefits
and disadvantages of protected neutrality established between both adversaries
while concurring with international agreements.
Immediately prior to the British Falklands invasion, the Royal Navy requisi-
tioned the luxury liner SS Canberra and rapidly converted it into a troop carrier,
equipped with a major surgical facility. Plans called for it to receive casualties
after unloading, even though Canberra did not qualify for neutrality by virtue
of having traveled with combatant-ship escorts and transported both troops and
combat equipment to the theater (similar to the APH concept in World War
II). However, the lack of protected neutrality was felt to be an advantage,
since troops could be successfully treated and returned to the field directly—
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something prohibited from protected hospital ships. Unfortunately, as a result of
fierce Argentine aerial attacks upon the fleet supporting the landing force, it was
necessary to remove the unarmed Canberra from the San Carlos operational area.
Concurrently, in 1982 the Royal Navy secured the rapid modification of the
commercial P&O cruise ship SS Uganda into a capable hospital ship. It sailed to
the Falklands operating area unescorted by combatants, with sustained appro-
priate identification in accordance with international conventions. At Britain’s
suggestion, but with no special written agreement, the opposing parties estab-
lished a neutral zone on the high seas, to the north of the islands, known as the
“Red Cross Box.” Uganda subsequently operated within this zone, twenty nauti-
cal miles on a side, along with Argentine casualty assistance vessels, and periodi-
cally implemented casualty transfers among them. Uganda was assisted by three
Royal Navy ocean survey ships converted to protected ambulance vessels. These
ships carried 593 stabilized casualties to a neutral aeromedical transfer point in
Montevideo, Uruguay, 420 miles away, clearing room onboard the hospital ship
for new wounded.
THE PERSIAN GULF
Helicopter access to the two U.S. hospital ships during the 1991 Gulf war
proved problematic. The helicopters’ carrying capacity and flying time were
limited, and because of missile threats the ships were kept too far from the
combat scene to serve as a critical resource. Concurrently, the Royal Navy initi-
ated the innovative construction of an internal airtight citadel, housing a casualty-
receiving hospital, in a portion of its grey-hull helicopter-training ship RFA
Argus, recognizing that this arrangement best suited the needs of the combat-
ant command.
Because of political and military considerations during Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, in 2003 the medical system was constrained by an inability to evacu-
ate Iraqi casualties (both civilians and prisoners of war) to neighboring coun-
tries; amphibious task force ships with concurrent military obligations were
prohibited from carrying human cargo. Accordingly, the principal activity
aboard hospital ship Comfort was directed toward the treatment of prisoners of
war and displaced Iraqi nationals, while strategic airlift was provided for coali-
tion wounded to Kuwait and Germany.
PROTECTED NEUTRALITY REQUIRES RECIPROCAL
ACCEPTABILITY!
The Falklands campaign demonstrated the benefits of reciprocal recognition of
internationally recognized principles of the protected neutrality of hospital
ships. Grunawalt’s suggestions for improving the safety of such vessels, as mentioned
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earlier, without invalidating the designation of neutrality, are ultimately contin-
gent upon reciprocal acceptability of those capabilities by the opposing parties.
Regardless, the most appropriate remedy for protection in each setting is, and
historically has always been, the responsibility of the operational commanders.
ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATIONS: ARE THEY NECESSARY?
During the Falklands conflict, six hospital ships of both warring parties ex-
changed radio communications on 2182-KHz in the clear. As described by
Grunawalt, it was not possible for the hospital ships to communicate directly with
the warships without revealing their position, no doubt an awkward and ineffi-
cient arrangement but wholly within the province of treaty-assured neutrality.
To maintain long-distance contact with their bases, the three British ambu-
lance ships and Uganda used radio telex via the InMarSat (International Mari-
time System Satellite) system. Telex messages were also exchanged in the clear,
meaning that hospital ships could not be informed in detail about incoming
medical evacuations. The British naval command, from which Uganda re-
ceived its orders, likewise could not use coded radio communications to in-
form the ship directly about the military dangers in the area. Neither could it
safely broadcast information about the number of casualties to be evacuated,
the wounds sustained, or any unresolved emergencies en route to the ship, ob-
viously preventing the hospital ship from making proper preparations. Under
the system used, it was easier for warships to communicate with hospital ships
by way of naval bases, with the messages deciphered onshore and then
retransmitted in the clear. This caused considerable delay, since combat
communications generally had priority. Without an operative satellite link, com-
munications with hospital ships were also interrupted by problems inherent in
radio electric-wave propagation within the electronically complex combat en-
vironment. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that despite the impedi-
ments of an imperfect but neutral policy and communications agreement to
operate in the clear, which was accepted and implemented by both belligerents,
Uganda itself was still able to receive 730 combat patients, perform five hun-
dred surgical procedures, and safely evacuate 593 patients by sea transfer to
Montevideo, including a number of others to the Argentine medical carrier
Bahia Paraiso.
ISSUES OF IDENTIFICATION: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY
REALITIES OF IDENTIFICATION FAILURE
Grunawalt and others have written extensively about visual and electronic
means of identification for ensuring the protected neutrality of ships. However,
does vessel identification always provide a mantle of protection? History has
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demonstrated clearly that some are indifferent to the Western etiquette of war.
In 1917, for example, in disregard of international law, the Central Powers of
World War I declared that hospital ships, no matter how prominently marked in
compliance with the Geneva and Hague Convention accords, were no longer
protected as neutral vessels. Such ships were denied immunity from attack in the
English Channel, parts of the North Sea, and the Mediterranean, even if
attackers knew their identities. Between 1917 and 1918 alone, eight hospital
ships were torpedoed. Overall, the British lost fifteen hospital ships, most from
mines and torpedo attacks. Similarly, during World War II, Germany and later
Italy showed complete disregard for the Hague Convention accords. By the mid-
dle of 1941, although all Allied hospital ships were clearly marked, no fewer than
thirteen had been sunk.
It has been reported that five thousand U.S. prisoners of war perished aboard
Japanese “hell ships,” at the hands of the United States. However, would specific
preannounced identification of the track of the Japanese prison transport Asian
Maru, which held 1,800 U.S. prisoners of war, have convinced the commander of
the submarine USS Snook not to launch the torpedo that destroyed it, killing all
but five? Would the prison ship Shinyo Maru (lost with all but eighty-two of the
750 U.S. prisoners of war aboard) have likewise been saved from the USS Paddle?
We will never know; in any case, such track information might have been ig-
nored, given the prevailing perception that the Japanese abused such agreed
identification methods.
During UN operations in Korea in the early 1950s, attacks upon medical per-
sonnel, vehicles, and tents became the rule, not the exception. The aid station
was the first target of North Korean artillery—Korean riflemen used the red
cross on regimental ambulances as a convenient bull’s-eye.
A historical review of nonsupport for medical aid in Korea reveals a famous
photograph of a soldier smearing mud over the red cross on the side of his am-
bulance.1 Likewise, one marked hospital train was hit while leaving Taegu at
night for Pusan and then hit again as it emerged from a tunnel. As a result, hospi-
tal trains were required to run only during daylight hours; emergency night runs
were guarded by military policemen, who rode on sandbagged flatcars.
The modern naval warfare environment has grown ever more dangerous and
unpredictable; unbridled offensive weaponry now threatens any noncombatant
ship that strays within target range. Although mine warfare has become increas-
ingly sophisticated, it is doubtful that any sensor other than the human eye will
be capable of discriminating between Geneva-protected and nonprotected vehi-
cles. This can be illustrated by the fate of the non-Geneva-protected transport
Atlantic Conveyor, which suffered an attack by a nondirected missile during the
Falklands conflict.
1 2 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2005\NWCRSU05\NWC Review Summer 2005.vp
Wednesday, June 01, 2005 3:58:35 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
132
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/22
On 25 May 1982, two Super Etendards of the Argentine air force appeared at
a point seventy miles east of the Falkland Islands. The British were still more
than thirty miles to the north when the frigate HMS Ambuscade detected an air
attack and immediately alerted the fleet. While the fate of one Exocet missile was
never determined, several of the crew on Ambuscade’s bridge saw the smoke trail
of a second Exocet boring in, the red glow of its exhaust clearly visible. The ship
opened fire with its 4.5-inch gun, antiaircraft guns, and machine guns. Above
all, every British warship in the battle group fired chaff radar decoys. A Lynx he-
licopter is also believed to have been operating an active decoy. Unfortunately,
the thirteen-thousand-ton container ship Atlantic Conveyor, perhaps two miles
to starboard of Ambuscade, possessed no chaff. The missile veered sharply in
midair away from the warships (including the carrier HMS Invincible) and
struck Conveyor below the superstructure on the port side. A huge fire quickly
took hold, eventually sinking the ship.
The harsh and unpredictable nature of missile-based warfare is further exem-
plified by the mistaken attack on an Iranian passenger jet by the Aegis cruiser
USS Vincennes (CG 49). That tragedy brought into question the safety, effective-
ness, and survivability of any unarmed craft—aircraft or ship—dedicated exclu-
sively to the care of the combat wounded. The mishap occurred despite
sophisticated electronic warfare systems. In reality, merely detecting a radar or
transponder signal requires less technological sophistication than does inter-
preting it. Thus an adversary who is less technologically advanced but deter-
mined to win a conflict can use a raw signal from a craft to guide a missile
without ever appreciating or acknowledging the target’s noncombatant role.
Would possession of chaff and Phalanx missiles prevent similar catastrophes?
Perhaps so, as long as they did not compromise an adversary’s definition of neu-
trality. Clearly, such capabilities did not deter the disaster that befell USS Stark
(FFG 31) when attacked in 1987 by Iraqi air-launched missiles.
TERRORISM AND PORT SECURITY
Attacks against maritime targets have historically been infrequent forms of in-
ternational terrorism. Although the hijacking of Achille Lauro in 1985 and the
bombings of USS Cole (DDG 67) in 2000 and MT Limburg in 2001 are notable
exceptions, few terrorist incidents have taken place at sea. The general vulnera-
bility of the ocean environment, however, has become more apparent, attributed
in part to lax security at many world ports, as well as ineffective coastal surveil-
lance by littoral states that are now confronting serious campaigns of political
violence and latent extremist transnational challenges. This is especially true in
Indonesia, the Philippines, Colombia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and the
countries around the Horn of Africa.2
S M I T H 1 2 9
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2005\NWCRSU05\NWC Review Summer 2005.vp
Wednesday, June 01, 2005 3:58:35 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
133
War College: Summer 2005 Full issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
Likewise, al-Qa‘ida has maintained an interest in maritime terrorism. Al-
though the 1999 attack on USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) failed, the 2000 attack
on the USS Cole, one of the most advanced U.S. naval ships, possessing both
Phalanx missiles and defensive machine guns, succeeded, leaving seventeen sail-
ors dead. The ship almost sank.
It was discovered that the architect of the attacks on both the Cole and MT
Limburg also dispatched maritime terror squads to Morocco to target U.S. Navy
ships passing through the Straits of Gibraltar. Similar plots in Southeast Asia
were evidenced by charts in the possession of suspected terrorists marked with
the location of Sembawang Wharf and Changi Port, Singapore, as well as the
crowded port of Surabaya in eastern Java, Indonesia.3 The 120 annual port visits
by U.S. Navy vessels to the region are expected to increase, following the con-
struction of an aircraft carrier docking facility at Singapore’s Changi Naval Base.
Future national budgetary priorities will significantly reduce expenditures
for military hardware and defense personnel, prompting combatant command-
ers to alter war-fighting strategies. The Navy’s sea basing concept, as originally
conceived, will be drastically revised, and plans for afloat casualty care and stra-
tegic evacuation may be dramatically altered. Hospital ships, as we have come to
know them, may no longer play a role in a military structured for rapid flexible
response in asymmetric warfare. (Such is the glaring deficiency in the current
debate over the futuristic sea base, in which the two current mammoth hospital
ships—relics of a strategy for evacuating the sick and wounded from Europe
during the Cold War—may never efficiently satisfy future casualty care
requirements.)
How, then, will casualties be supported? Will commercially chartered cruise
ships such as SS Uganda, already containing hotel, laundry, and other facilities
required by a hospital, be available? Perhaps there will only be logistics-support
ships, such as vessels of the Military Sealift Command; those vessels previously
utilized for delivery of prepositioned military equipment; the surge and sustain-
ment cargo vessels, otherwise known as medium-speed-roll-on/roll-off
(LMSRs), of our strategic sealift forces; or ships of the Ready Reserve Force, in-
cluding break-bulk and barge-carrying ships, or lighter-aboard-ship vessels?
None of these would be eligible for protected neutrality, however, if first utilized
for transport of war-fighting materiel.
It may be that no specific form of a current hospital ship or converted logis-
tics ship will be sufficiently secure for use by combatant commanders. Perhaps as
a result of uncertainties regarding the safety of traditional ships’ berthing venues
in the new environment of worldwide terror, will aeromedical evacuation surpass
any practical approach to primary medical evacuation by surface ships? There is
no guarantee, even if a new form of surface medical evacuation vehicle is
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developed and outfitted with sophisticated cryptographic communications and
modern defensive armaments and electronic countermeasures, that a white-
painted hull with large red stripes will provide effective defense.
Ultimately, casualty care and evacuation requirements will continue to ema-
nate from the province of combatant commanders, who will define scenario-
specific needs in the twenty-first century. As such, Grunawalt’s plea for greater
protections within the context of protected neutrality will be rendered moot.
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THE SUBMARINE AS A CASE STUDY IN TRANSFORMATION
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE INVESTMENT
James H. Patton, Jr.
It’s not the strongest that survive, but the ones most responsive to change.
CHARLES DARWIN
The Department of Defense is sometimes guilty of glomming onto a buzzword or
catchy phrase and wearing it thin. “Revolution in Military Affairs,” or RMA (a
term derived, incidentally, from Soviet military writings concerning a “military-
technical revolution”) certainly came close to crossing that threshold. Today, the
word “transformation”—a marvelously useful and intellectually descriptive
word—could similarly be at risk of exhaustion.
When such a phrase represents an apparently desirable property, there exists
a tendency to attach that phrase to every conceivable defense system, thereby en-
hancing the program’s attractiveness to senior decision makers. “Transforma-
tion,” defined by the Department of Defense as a process shaping the way future
wars are fought, including elements of concepts, technology, and organizations,
clearly also includes the contemporary adoption of the Global Positioning Sys-
tem, precision weapons, and the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) to guided
missile submarine (SSGN) conversions—just as naval aviation and the Blitz-
krieg were transformational when they were first introduced.
Though these programs may not be so abrupt or dramatic as to warrant the
term “revolutionary,” it is important to note that there is also a significant evolu-
tion in military affairs under way, in that certain platforms and systems are
adapting to changing conditions. Throughout the twentieth century and to the
present, the submarine has been a prime example of
evolution, largely owing to its inherent flexibility and
sometimes unintentional nonmission specificity. For
example, many who were not submariners thought
that the U.S. submarine force had lost its raison d’être
when the Cold War ended, which was not the case.
The following will show, therefore, that there has al-
ways been a next “most important mission” for these
warships.
THE SUBMARINE AS A CASE STUDY
The U.S. submarine has a history of adaptation since
its incorporation into the fleet in 1900. In a macro-
scopic sense, the figure below graphically depicts how
Captain James H. Patton, Jr. (Retired), a 1960 graduate
of the Naval Academy, has served on seven nuclear sub-
marines, commanding USS Pargo (SSN 650), with sev-
eral associated shore tours. Upon retiring from the War
Gaming Department of the Naval War College in 1985,
Captain Patton founded Submarine Tactics and Tech-
nology, Inc., serving as its president. He has been a con-
sultant to more than thirty major corporations and
government agencies on matters of submarine stealth
warfare, which included three years as technical consul-
tant to Paramount Pictures for the script and produc-
tion of the film The Hunt for Red October. Captain
Patton has also served as the undersea/stealth warfare
editor for Defense Science magazine, lectured exten-
sively on defense, and written for many professional
journals.
Naval War College Review, Summer 2005, Vol. 58, No. 3
T:\Academic\NWC Review\NWC Review Summer 2005\NWCRSU05\NWC Review Summer 2005.vp
Wednesday, June 01, 2005 3:58:36 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
136
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 3, Art. 22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/22
the submarine’s most important missions have continually changed in a hun-
dred years. It is significant that it also alludes to how, at any one time, the subma-
rine was likely to have current missions of high priority, missions of waning
importance, and missions of increasing gravity. In almost every case, the time
constants of these changes were shorter than the life cycle of the existing plat-
form. To avoid obsolescence, it was sometimes necessary for extreme variant re-
quirements to be made technically (and tactically) during a ship’s (and crew’s)
lifetime. As a result it can be safely said that no U.S. submarine has ever been em-
ployed for its designed purpose, and no commanding officer ever performed
that for which he was trained.
A partial list of examples for platform employment:
• S-Boats designed in the 1920s for coastal defense and fleet boats designed
in the 1930s as battle-fleet scouts found themselves in 1942 as distantly
deployed commerce raiders.
• The Skipjack class, designed to provide terminal guidance for nuclear-tipped
Regulus cruise missiles fired from a large fleet of Halibut-class SSGNs,
never materialized because of the advent of the Polaris ballistic missile.
• The Thresher/Permit-class SSNs, designed to operate in pairs while firing
rocket-propelled nuclear depth charges at distant Soviet subs, never carried out
that mission, due to the failure of Sesco, a secure acoustic communications
system needed for information exchange and the triangulation of sonar
bearings for target localization.
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• Escorting carrier battle groups was the justification for the high speed of
the Los Angeles class in the late 1960s. Even though submarines were used
in direct support of battle groups in a 1977 Pacific Fleet exercise (RIMPAC),
and a Navy warfare publication was published in 1980 based on further
experimentation in RIMPACs 1978 and 1979, this mission was not routinely
assigned until after the Cold War ended, when many of the class were being
decommissioned.
With this sort of historical precedent, one can appreciate the wisdom behind
the decision to widen the mission range of the Virginia class so that it could be
somewhat better acclimated to joint operations in shallow coastal waters rather
than, as some had insisted, optimized as specifically a “littoral combat sub-
marine.” There have been few failures in U.S. submarine design, but the designs
that did fail were those that were overoptimized for a narrow mission set,
thereby losing their intrinsic adaptability.
A traditional approach to the kind of anti-access (AA) and area-denial (AD)
scenario likely to be encountered by U.S. naval forces in the littorals would be an
“outside-in rollback” of these maritime AA/AD networks.1 However, when a key
element of the forces is entirely capable of passing directly through (over/under)
these networks, much as F-117s and B-2s have routinely gone “right downtown”
before air defenses have been degraded, it makes enormous sense to do just that.
Stealthy aircraft were and are technologically transformational, but it is tactically
transformational to employ a characteristic of an existing system (i.e., a sub-
marine’s intrinsic ability to covertly penetrate AA/AD defenses) for a different
reason. In a previous life, submarines penetrated AA/AD defenses to collect in-
telligence or engage “bastioned” Soviet SSBNs. They can now do it actively, to
take down AA/AD measures from the inside out, enabling other forces to enter
the contested area. Here once again, the submarine has adapted to a different set
of tasks than those for which it was originally created.
There are many factors that go into creating a long-lived weapon system ca-
pable of such unexpected adaptations. There is certainly the importance of se-
lecting flexible, intelligent, and innovative personnel to man it, and there is the
indispensable requirement to instill early in its crew a solid baseline of training
that includes a “common culture” and provide continuous training as newer
employments and missions evolve. Internal hardware, electronics, and software
can, of course, be upgraded, facilitated by incorporating into the initial design
considerable “space and weight reserved,” but there is a limit to just how much
something like a nuclear submarine (built now with fuel to last more than thirty
years) can be “reinvented” during its lifetime. Certain attributes, stealth being a
primary example, must be engineered in at the beginning and therefore have
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historically appeared initially to be far in excess of that which was considered ad-
equate. However, continual component improvement and evolution of superior
maintenance procedures can not only maintain “as-built” levels of emissions
controls but actually improve upon them. For example, submarines decommis-
sioned over the last decade or so left service significantly quieter than when they
first sailed a quarter-century earlier.
Sometimes pure serendipity has enabled submarine platforms to age and
adapt gracefully. When, in the 1930s, it was desired to design a submarine to op-
erate with and scout for the main battle fleet, it had to make economically at least
eighteen knots on the surface. Since maximum surface speed ultimately dictates
the length of a ship’s hull, by the laws of hydrodynamics, this resulted in a nearly
three-hundred-foot behemoth (for its time) displacing 1,800 tons. By compari-
son, the then-existing “gold standard” of submarines—the German Type VIIC,
which did so much damage early in World War II—displaced only about seven
hundred tons. The U.S. Gato-class fleet boat was able easily to carry enough diesel
fuel to traverse the Pacific and have significant time on station, while the Type
VIIC literally had to carry fuel in its bilges and conduct hazardous at-sea
refuelings if it was to operate in the western Atlantic. Perhaps even more impor-
tantly, the fleet boat had room onboard to incorporate equipment developments
and improvements in radar, sonar, and electronic intercept equipment while the
small U-boat did not, significantly contributing to its rapid obsolescence and
high loss rates. It was not until 1943 that Germany rectified the U-boat’s short-
comings and began design and construction of the Type XXI—a marvelous sub-
marine that set the standard for postwar U.S. and Soviet designs. However, it did
not arrive in numbers soon enough to have an appreciable effect on the war.
Similar design imbalances were seen between U.S. and Soviet submarines.
Greater concern about radiation and other safety issues made American nuclear
submarines far more reliable than their Soviet counterparts, with less radiation
exposure. Marginal thermodynamic considerations and assumptions that these
subs would always be operated in cold arctic waters made Soviet Type 2 nuclear
submarines (e.g., Charlies, Victors) virtually inoperable in areas such as the Ara-
bian Sea or Persian Gulf, while the engineering plants of all classes of U.S. SSNs
operated superbly in waters of very high temperatures as well as in cold climates.
Clearly, the margin of superiority demonstrated by U.S. submarines over
their Soviet counterparts played a key role in the winning of the Cold War. As re-
cently as the late 1990s the Defense Science Board called the SSN the “crown
jewel” of the U.S. armed forces. This prompted a two-year “Submarine Payload
and Sensors” program by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to in-
vestigate what adaptations would be necessary to maintain that prestigious title
through the next two decades. A finding of this program was that the new Virginia
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class currently being built would need to be “modular” in its payload options
and that the magnitude of such payloads would probably increase by a factor of
ten. In this sense, the soon-to-be Ohio-class SSGNs (converted from SSBNs in
excess of Cold War requirements) can be viewed as “bridges” to what fully devel-
oped Virginias will become.
Now that the largest class of U.S. nuclear submarines (the Los Angeles and its
sisters) is drawing toward its end, it is instructional to review some of the good
and not so good elements of their initial design. Built to accompany carrier battle
groups, they needed to be fast, and they were, through a doubling of the shaft
horsepower of their predecessors. Each successive class (after the first multiple-
ship class [Skate]) improved access and habitability over its predecessor with re-
sulting improvements in morale and reliability not easily measured in the initial
investment. The engineering spaces of the Los Angeles class were well designed
for easy access to equipment. Significant free-flooding volume forward of the
pressure hull permitted installation in later units of the dramatically successful
twelve-tube Tomahawk vertical launch system. However, to enhance speed by re-
ducing hydrodynamic drag, the sail of the ship was made relatively small. As a
result, it had fewer masts and antennas and was not “ice hardened,” reducing its
value as an information systems research (ISR) collection platform and sacrific-
ing ability to perform some arctic missions. Because of the much larger engi-
neering spaces, the “front end” of the ship was actually smaller than that of the
class it replaced, to keep overall length reasonable, reducing habitability and
somewhat constraining systems growth potential (although this was fortunately
counterbalanced by dramatic improvements in computer capacity per unit vol-
ume). Also, the hydrodynamics of the ship are such that the ship is not easy to
control at speeds of one to three knots, making it difficult to deploy and recover
special operation forces (SOF)—which has become an increasingly important
mission.2 All shortcomings have been addressed in the Virginia design.
While a brighter future is foreseen for better and even more flexible
multimission submarines, the reality of force structure is out of phase with this
vision by 180 degrees. From a Cold War level of one hundred or so attack sub-
marines, the present level is about fifty and is falling—in spite of the fact that
SSN taskings by fleet and national commanders have essentially doubled. Be-
cause of this submarine shortage, existing ships must now transit at much
higher sustained speeds than originally planned, which threatens the life span of
their reactors. During the last decade, the SSN has become the Tomahawk land-
attack cruise-missile launch platform of choice. In Operation DESERT STORM,
SSNs launched 5 percent of the missiles, while during IRAQI FREEDOM the num-
ber was more than 30 percent. This is not to argue that the sheer number of plat-
forms is the critical variable. As Rear Admiral Jerry Holland, USN (Retired),
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(Holland served on CNO staff as director for Strategic and Theater Nuclear
Weapons, as Deputy Director for Space Command and Control, and as Deputy
Director for Operations, Joint Staff) pointed out regarding the Skate-class SSN
of the late 1950s, an “economy-sized” Nautilus follow-on was operationally dis-
appointing and difficult to maintain.3 It is true that “quantity does have a quality
all its own,” but in order to adapt and to transform there must be a nontrivial
level of quality, robust design, and architectural flexibility resident in the initial
version of a major weapons system.
By virtue of what history may note as remarkable speed and adroitness, the
submarine and its crew once again have adapted to a different set of operational
requirements. From essentially a “lone wolf ” a decade ago, the submarine is now
nearly universally accepted as a key node within network-centric warfare, the
purveyor of “undersea dominance,” and an essential element of Sea Power 21.
Disbelievers need only review the capabilities tested and demonstrated in exer-
cise GIANT SHADOW of early 2003, where an operational SSBN, USS Florida
(SSBN 728), simulating an SSGN on counterterrorist and counter–weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) operations, launched a large autonomous undersea
vehicle (AUV) to plot a minefield, landed and supported special operation
forces, exploited ISR from a small unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), analyzed soil
samples returned by SOF on the AUV, and launched two Tomahawk missiles to
simulate the destruction of a terrorist WMD facility. An additional exercise,
SILENT HAMMER, more fully developed and demonstrated SSGN potential by
employing USS Georgia (SSBN 729).
One of the less publicized capabilities of the SSGN will exploit the virtually
unlimited electrical power and air conditioning capability of all nuclear sub-
marines, coupled with extensive space and manpower, to provide an extensive
capability to absorb and process huge amounts of data from on- and off-board
sensors and ISR platforms (such as Global Hawk, HAIRY BUFFALO, joint surveil-
lance and target attack radar system, etc.). This data will be processed and fused
within the ship to produce manageable quantities of information, analyzed
onboard by humans, then distilled into knowledge. This grapes-to-wine-to-
brandy process will permit an SSGN with the proper interfaces, such as the Dis-
tributed Common Ground System–Navy (DCGS-N), to become a vital theater
node, transforming vast quantities of downloaded data from multiple sources
into small nuggets of knowledge that are easily distributed (through a vastly
smaller diameter “pipe”) via Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNET) to other users globally. It should also be clear, to those who think
deeply about such matters, that the SSGN program is far more than just a way to
extend the operational viability of declining SSBNs; it is a pilot program to
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investigate just what the Virginia class should become when it has fully evolved
in ten years.
However, with the world situation becoming increasingly unstable, there are
more than one or two places where a credible, actual, or virtual U.S. presence
must be claimed or maintained. Therefore, to sustain persistently unseen assets
around the world, there is a force-level number that must be maintained. This
number is significantly more than thirty, the level resulting from a one-per-year
build rate of thirty three-year-design-life hulls, when operating tempos, mainte-
nance, and transits are factored in. All post–Cold War submarine force level
studies by several agencies indicate an enduring need for numbers of SSNs far in
excess of what can be sustained by a one-per-year build rate.
IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTMENT
An SSN is unique. Not only does just one submarine represent a credible mili-
tary force, but it is also capable of surviving and operating independently any-
where in the world, including ocean areas as shallow as twenty fathoms, to which
access has been restricted or denied to other platforms. Two or so weeks out of
home port and an SSN can be anywhere in the world. These operational traits
truly make it a desirable asset for multimission tasking, but even more impor-
tant are the top-level characteristics and design specifications that have allowed
it to demonstrate repeatedly that degree of adaptability. These specifications
have included reserving space and weight that permits yet-unenvisioned equip-
ment to be installed to counter now unimagined situations, and an insistence
that core enabling characteristics such as stealth never be compromised.4 Other
essential steps being taken to enhance flexibility are an expansion into other
combat system areas of the extremely successful Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion
(ARCI) program, in which dramatic improvements are routinely and affordably
incorporated into sonar systems, and a push toward weapon system modularity
for the Virginia class, the SSGN, and subsequent classes.
Similarly, since reduced levels of detection, tracking, and weapons homing
resulting from incorporation of low observable or very low observable technol-
ogies and techniques have shown to enhance dramatically the survivability of
aircraft and surface ships, a reduction in design requirements of subsequent
platforms should be imposed only with the greatest trepidation. Whatever
new mission or tasking received will certainly be better accomplished, and the
platform will be more survivable, with improved mitigation or control of its
signatures.
Other mentioned submarine traits should also be objectively examined for
possible applicability and incorporation into what one would wish to be inher-
ently adaptable in the future. Are margins to grow, ability to gain access, and
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persistent presence desirable attributes of the CVN-21 carrier, the DDX
destroyer, Global Hawk, joint unarmed combat air system, and various space ve-
hicles and other intelligence systems? The question should certainly be asked.
Platforms, procedures, or even people do not have to be revolutionary to be
transformational. Perhaps a different word using the same semantic root better
captures the intent—that these things be transformationable—designed, built,
and maintained so as to be readily adaptable to inevitable changes. If this is
properly done, survival will be enhanced not only in present and future budget
wars but in present and future shooting wars.
N O T E S
1. Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert
Work, Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-
Denial Challenge (Washington, D.C.: Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments,
2003), p. 60.
2. See J. H. Patton, Jr., “Slow Speed Controlla-
bility,” Submarine Review (January 2004), pp.
68–72.
3. W. J. Holland, “Really New SSNs,” Submarine
Review (January 2004), pp. 60–62.
4. For example, when it became clear that the
superb, Cold War–inspired Seawolf class was
too expensive and in some regards overquali-
fied for post–Cold War needs, the cheaper
Virginia class traded off speed, depth, and
magazine size, but not one decibel of the ex-
traordinarily quiet levels of radiated noise
achieved by the Seawolf design effort.
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BOOK REVIEWS
IS BALANCE OF POWER RELEVANT IN CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL POLITICS?
Paul, E. V., James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann, eds. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st
Century. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2004. 384pp. $27.95
Although this book features a number
of excellent essays, it is hard to under-
stand why it was ever written. One
would have profited more from reread-
ing Ernst Haas’s brilliant 1953 essay on
the topic (“The Balance of Power: Pre-
scription, Concept, or Propaganda,”
World Politics 5, no. 4 [July 1953], pp.
442–77).
In his introductory essay, E. V. Paul
poses several theoretical and empirical
questions about the balance of power.
However, the real issue is whether the
concept is relevant in contemporary
global politics. Frankly, I did not think
that anyone (except, perhaps, John
Mearsheimer) seriously believed that
balance of power exhibits anything
much about the real world.
Happily, the contributors to this vol-
ume reach a similar conclusion. Jack
Levy sets the tone with a rigorous and
well reasoned historical analysis. He
concludes that “the tendency to treat
the theory . . . as universal is mislead-
ing,” because of the limited “scope
conditions” in which the theory was
applied. Douglas Lemke focuses on the
utility of balance of power as defined by
Mearsheimer’s version of “offensive re-
alism” and determines that the concept
is so “vaguely stated” that he finds it
“impossible to imagine a scenario that
would be inconsistent” with it. In his
imaginative effort to add an economic
dimension to balance-of-power theory,
Mark Brawley suggests that it “is typi-
cally too parsimonious to be of great
use,” and James Wirtz concludes that
the theory cannot predict outcomes in
the post–Cold War world. Edward
Rhodes continues to flog this dead
horse, concluding that “liberalism and
nuclear weapons mean that states will
not seek to balance power.”
The regional analyses change little.
Europeans, Robert Art concludes, want
more influence on U.S. policy but are
not doing much about it; balance-
of-power theory, declares William
Wohlforth, “does not apply” to Russia
or its neighbors; Benjamin Miller can
find “no countervailing coalition . . .
against U.S. hegemony” in the Middle
East; and, according to Michael Barletta
and Harold Trinkunas, there is no
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“evidence of balance of power behavior
in Latin America in the post–Cold War
period.” Get the point?
The editors try to salvage something
from this muddle by some fanciful ad
hoc theorizing, in particular pressing us
to accept the notion of “soft balancing,”
which basically translates into arguing
that almost any opposition to a coun-
try’s policies or actions constitutes bal-
ancing behavior. The most vigorous
effort to salvage balance-of-power theory
from history’s dustbin is Christopher
Layne’s unapologetic realism, which,
while finding little empirical evidence
for balancing, nevertheless boldly pre-
dicts that it is “a pretty safe bet” that
the United States “will not be able to es-
cape the fates of previous contenders
for hegemony.” This is a bet based on
faith, not fact. The other believer is
Robert Ross, who contends that “bal-
ance of power politics has been espe-
cially pronounced in East Asia.” What
is extraordinary about Ross’s essay is
that it ignores the implications of
China’s economic growth, its integra-
tion into the world economic system,
and its escalating interdependence with
those against whom it is presumably
balancing.
Overall, this is a book of missed oppor-
tunities. Perhaps the most important is
its failure to come to grips with the sub-
jective dimension of global politics. Au-
thors repeatedly and positively invoke
Stephen Walt’s modification of balance-
of-power theory with the addition of
threat perception but fail to recognize
its importance in directing our atten-
tion to the centrality of ideas and per-
ceptions. There are hints, however, as
when Lemke discusses the key role of
the “distribution of attitudes” and
Wirtz alludes to “divergence in
perception.” Only Rhodes captures the
critical role played by the social con-
struction and reconstruction of ideas in
the declining relevance of balance of
power. In an essay that deserves greater
attention than it will receive in this vol-
ume, Rhodes succinctly captures the
degree to which balance of power has
been made obsolete by the disappear-
ance of trinitarian warfare. In the end,
we conclude with him that it “is simply
ludicrous” to assume that “every state
lives in fear of the imperial ambitions of
every other state in the present age.”
RICHARD MANSBACH
Department of Political Science
Iowa State University
Haldi, Stacy Bergstrom. Why Wars Widen: A The-
ory of Predation and Balancing. London: Frank
Cass, 2003. 198pp. $114.95
Why Wars Widen is a theoretical and
empirical analysis of why neutral states
choose to enter an ongoing great-power
war. Most international-relations schol-
arship neglects this question, choosing
instead to explain the origins of war.
Haldi, of both the Naval War College
and Gettysburg College, opens her book
with the observation that states entering
an ongoing conflict “may have interests
and policies entirely distinct from those
of the initial combatants.” The book
seeks to reveal these interests. Chapters
1 and 2 introduce the argument that
neutrals are most likely to widen great-
power wars in eras of low political cost,
when war is limited and less threaten-
ing to state survival. Moreover, when
political cost is low, widening a war is
likely to occur for predatory reasons or
to acquire strategic assets that will
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enhance national power. In contrast,
neutrals are less likely to widen wars
when the political cost of war is high. In
these eras, when wars threaten a state’s
survival, neutrals will tend to use ongo-
ing wars to balance against an adverse
shift in the distribution of power, but
only after all other balancing options
have been exhausted. The remaining
chapters test this argument against al-
ternative explanations, alliances and of-
fense dominance, and offer predictions
for the likelihood of war widening in
the contemporary international system.
Haldi’s study encompasses great-power
wars between 1700 and 1973, with a fo-
cus on the Seven Years’ War, the French
Revolutionary War, the Napoleonic
Wars, the Crimean War, and World
War I. Additional cases of great-power
wars susceptible to widening are in-
cluded in an appendix. Prior to the Na-
poleonic Wars, the political cost of war
was low, Haldi argues, because armies
were costly to maintain and soldiers
were not expendable. Thus predatory-
war widening became more frequent in
this era. However, political and social
changes that occurred alongside the
French Revolutionary War and the Na-
poleonic Wars reduced these costs, al-
lowing France to introduce an era of
unlimited wars that sought the enemy’s
total destruction. From that point for-
ward, Haldi maintains, the political cost
of war was high and balancing-war wid-
ening tended to be more prevalent. Per-
haps the greatest strength of this
analysis is that each case study exam-
ines the motivations of states that en-
tered ongoing wars, as well as those that
could have but did not. The author
concludes that the war-widening theory
explains each incidence of widening
much better than the competing
theories can and may even lend insight
into the likelihood of contemporary
war widening.
The greatest appeal of this work is its
attempt to delve into the largely ne-
glected area of international-relations
theory. However, it suffers from two se-
rious flaws. First, it attempts to cover a
lot of material succinctly, resulting in
insufficiently explained references to
history and theory, including the con-
cept of great-power war, which is cen-
tral to the author’s argument. A deeper
analysis of the alternative theories of
alliances and offense dominance would
also have been more satisfying. This
deficiency makes the work most appro-
priate for graduate students and re-
searchers already familiar with the
terrain. The subject matter is interest-
ing, but the author could have attracted
a broader audience if she had analyzed
her work in greater depth. Second, the
contemporary relevance of Haldi’s pol-
icy implications is unconvincing. Her
conclusions drawn from European
great-power wars are not clearly appli-
cable to the contemporary international
system, simply because the threat of
such wars, let alone war widening, is
negligible. Moreover, because future
occurrences of great-power war widen-
ing will probably include at least one
nuclear power, nuclear weapons should
definitely be considered more systemat-
ically if Haldi’s predictions are to carry
any weight. These concerns might have
possibly been overcome by including an
analysis of the Korean or Vietnam
wars—two cases found in the appendix—
or perhaps an even more contemporary
conflict like the 1991 Persian Gulf war.
Despite these limitations, serious stu-
dents of interstate warfare will find this
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work a useful entry into the question of
why wars widen.
KIRSTEN RAFFERTY
Department of Government and International
Studies
Berry College
Roberts, Paul. The End of Oil: On the Edge of a
Perilous New World. New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 2004. 386pp. $26
By 2025 world energy demand is ex-
pected to increase by 54 percent. Oil
and natural gas consumption is ex-
pected to increase 57 and 68 percent,
respectively, by then. Total energy con-
sumption in 2025 for China, India, and
South Korea is predicted to equal that
of the United States. What do these fig-
ures really tell us about today’s energy
economy? The answers can be found in
The End of Oil, in which Paul Roberts
superbly navigates the complex topic of
energy and explains how energy has
become the currency of political and
economic power. Roberts’s argument
centers on three key points: “that en-
ergy is the single most important re-
source, that our current energy
economy is failing, and that the shape
of the next energy economy is being de-
cided right now—with or without our
input.” The author’s hope is that The
End of Oil will provide nonexperts with
a way to begin to think about energy.
The End of Oil is broken down into
three parts. Part 1 explains how and
why energy has become central to hu-
man existence. Part 2 examines the
mechanics of the energy order. This
section contains excellent discussions
on consumption, the current
transformation of the oil and natural
gas industries, alternate fuels, and con-
servation. Part 3 looks at the promise
and peril of the world’s energy future; it
includes a valuable discussion on en-
ergy security. Roberts concludes with a
look at how the world could transition
to a new energy economy based on cur-
rent trends.
Several important implications emerge
from Roberts’s analysis. First, the cur-
rent energy system is failing to keep up
with current demand. As the develop-
ing world tries to catch up with the de-
veloped world, the demand for energy
will continue to increase regardless of
what happens with population and en-
ergy technology. In the future, the issue
may not be whether the world is pro-
ducing the right type of energy but
whether it can produce enough. Sec-
ond, there may be real limits to our
ability to produce ever-increasing vol-
umes of energy. If this is true, then we
will need to radically rethink how we
consume and produce energy. Third,
the sooner we start to transform the
current energy economy, the more time
there will be to assess options and tech-
nologies. Fourth, the world cannot po-
litically or economically shift from a
hydrocarbon-based energy economy to
a new energy economy overnight. Dur-
ing the transition, the world will need
to develop a transition, or “bridge,” en-
ergy economy. A bridge economy will
give markets and society the flexibility
and opportunity to phase out the worst
of current trends while creating a new
energy system. According to Roberts,
such an economy will likely require sig-
nificant improvements in energy effi-
ciency, and an increased reliance on
natural gas. Fifth, America’s energy
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policy can no longer afford to focus
solely on defending the supply of oil. As
time goes by, less oil will remain out-
side OPEC countries; proportionally
more will be in areas where its extrac-
tion is more difficult and costly. Over
time, this trend will make access prob-
lematic and uncertain. Lastly, energy is
political. Because energy is centrally
connected to everything else of impor-
tance, overhauling the current system
is going to be one of the most politi-
cally difficult challenges facing the
world in the twenty-first century. This
process will entail considerable political
and economic risk.
Overall, Roberts’s coverage is balanced,
providing significant insights into all
aspects of the energy economy. One of
the strengths of The End of Oil is that it
offers the big picture without bogging
down the reader in endless technical
details or facts. Another of its strengths
is that although the author is somewhat
pessimistic about the world’s ability to
transition effectively and peacefully to
the next energy economy, he is able to be
optimistic as well.
In summary, The End of Oil is an effec-
tive argument for the need to take a
proactive role in building America’s en-
ergy future. We can either construct the
kind of energy future we desire or wait
and hope that the transition to the next
energy economy will work out on its
own. Hope, as any good strategist will
tell you, is not a strategy. The End of Oil
is therefore a must read for strategists,
political and business leaders, and any-




Fukuyama, Francis. State Building: Governance
and World Order in the 21st Century. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press, 2004. 132pp. $21
This is an important policy analysis.
Francis Fukuyama, an expert on politi-
cal and economic development, has
served on the State Department’s policy
planning staff and is now professor of
international political economy at
Johns Hopkins University.
In his book State Building, Fukuyama
argues here that the international com-
munity must do a better job of “state-
building . . . because weak or failed
states are the sources of many of the
world’s most serious problems.” We
know a lot about public administration,
he says, but much less about how to
“transfer strong institutions to develop-
ing countries.”
Fukuyama coins the term “stateness,”
referring to a regime’s ability to per-
form. He distinguishes two dimensions
of stateness: state strength, which de-
notes that a government can “enforce
laws cleanly and transparently,” and
state scope, which embraces the range of
the functions that a government tries to
accomplish.
To understand what Fukuyama means
by scope, imagine a government that
seeks only to maintain public order, en-
force contracts, provide national de-
fense, and manage its money supply.
Fukuyama would describe that state as
having modest scope. Next, imagine a
government that, in addition to what
was just mentioned, owns and runs
steel mills and hospitals, tries to pro-
vide free education through the univer-
sity level, and promises its people
pensions. Such a government would
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have considerable scope. However,
whether it could carry out any or all of
these functions well is an entirely sepa-
rate matter of state strength.
What do poor countries need to de-
velop economically? According to
Fukuyama, “conventional wisdom’s”
answer to this question has changed in
recent years. During the Ronald Reagan
and the Margaret Thatcher years, devel-
opment experts focused on state scope,
arguing that less-developed countries
(LDCs) needed smaller governments;
accordingly, they urged states to dis-
continue activities that other parties
could handle better. Unfortunately,
they did not recognize the importance
of institutions like courts that work and
legal regimes that defend property
rights. As a result, international bodies
like the World Bank demanded that
states get smaller without distinguish-
ing between scope (which should have
been reduced) and strength (which
should have been enhanced).
Fukuyama lists the causes for LDC state
weakness. Sometimes local elites benefit
from the status quo, which in many in-
stances is, for them, a life-or-death is-
sue. In other cases, society may not
understand how much better off it
would be given better institutions—
foreign donors’ efforts to develop
stronger state institutions via “condi-
tionality” often fail. (Donors find it
hard to show “tough love” by cutting
off states that fail to meet their condi-
tions. Even if one does so, moreover,
often another steps in.) In addition, do-
nors often give higher priority to first-
rate service delivery than to building
the capacity of the LDC’s fledgling
state bureaucracy. So they hire away
the best locals, often leaving the LDC
even weaker.
The book examines the “international
dimension of state weakness,” stating
that instability is in fact driven by state
weakness. Since the Berlin Wall came
down, the author notes, most interna-
tional crises have had to do with weak
or failing states. Sovereignty has been
eroded because of this weakness. No
one, says Fukuyama, in the interna-
tional community believes in a “pure”
sovereignty any more. The humanitar-
ian interventions of the 1990s eroded
what force that idea may once have had.
What should national security profes-
sionals learn from Fukuyama’s argument?
Here are three lessons. First, do not as-
sume that postwar stabilization opera-
tions always involve state building. For
example, some people have expressed op-
timism about U.S. chances for making
Iraq and Afghanistan into democracies,
on grounds that the United States de-
feated tyrannical regimes in Germany and
Japan and successfully made democracies
of them. Fukuyama points out that those
latter occupations did not involve state
building. Germany and Japan were hard
to beat because they were already strong
states. U.S. victory and occupation
changed those states’ bases of legitimacy;
doing so was easier than creating a strong
state from a weak one. Second, the United
States should have modest expectations
for building democratic states and grow-
ing economies in countries with weak
states. The United States has “intervened
and/or acted as an occupation authority
. . . [and] . . . pursued . . . nation-building
activities in . . . Cuba, the Philippines,
Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico,
Panama, Nicaragua, South Korea, and
South Vietnam.” Despite U.S. efforts,
“South Korea was the only country to
achieve long-term economic growth.”
Third, given America’s poor track record
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at creating strong states via occupation, it
should be thinking about fall-back posi-
tions if it fails at creating democracy
overseas.
The United States needs to get better at
state building. The U.S. military cannot
avoid bearing much of the implied bur-
den, like it or not. Read State Building




Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the
CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Pen-
guin, 2004. 695pp. $29.95
The events of 9/11 led many in the
United States to wonder what had actu-
ally led up to that fateful day. Who was
to blame? How could the United States,
with its multibillion-dollar intelligence
and defense budgets, have allowed such
a thing to happen? In Ghost Wars, Steve
Coll provides a useful, if overly long,
chronology and analysis of pivotal
events, missteps, indecision, apathy,
and ultimately tragedy up to the day be-
fore the attacks.
Coll, who served as the managing editor
for the Washington Post until 2004, was
the paper’s South Asia bureau chief
from 1989 to 1992. He won a Pulitzer
Prize in 1990 for his reporting on South
Asia, and he has been a keen observer of
events in the region. He begins his story
with the burning of the U.S. embassy in
Islamabad, Pakistan, in November 1979
and traces the long road of events to 11
September. It was shortly after the riots
in Islamabad that the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan, in December 1979.
As he weaves his narrative, Coll meticu-
lously documents every player and
agenda in this drama. Coll divides the
book into three parts. In the first he
discusses the Soviet occupation from
December 1979 to February 1989. It is
here that we are introduced to mujahe-
deen leaders Ahmed Shah Massoud,
Hamid Karzai, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,
and Osama Bin Laden. One also be-
comes acquainted with key players in
the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence
Directorate (ISI-D) and in the Saudi
monarchy who played key roles in
bankrolling the resistance. The author
also provides valuable insights into the
U.S. policy-making process. During this
period, the United States was consumed
with battling the Soviet occupation, and
most policy makers did not give serious
thought to the repercussions of the
Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate’s
growing control over aid distribution or
the increasing anti-American attitudes of
such rebel commanders as Hekmatyar.
Coll continues to trace events in Af-
ghanistan after the Soviet pullout in
1989. Once the Soviets were gone, in-
terest in a stable Afghanistan rapidly
waned as other crises in the immediate
post–Cold War era monopolized U.S.
attention. As a result, Afghanistan fell
into chaos as warlords fought each other
for control of Kabul. The lack of Ameri-
can involvement after the Soviets with-
drew left Pakistan as the primary force to
manage the post-Soviet environment.
The author captures the rivalries within
Afghanistan, the manipulation of events
by the Pakistani government, and the
apathy of U.S. policy makers throughout
this period.
One of the major strengths of Ghost
Wars is how it skillfully captures the in-
teragency debates within the U.S.
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government on Afghanistan—specifi-
cally, the discussion on various debates
among the CIA, the State Department,
and the National Security Council—
which were wide-ranging and often
contentious. After reading these ac-
counts one is left with the distinct
impression that there was no over-
arching policy or strategy to attack
al-Qa‘ida. Instead, U.S. government
policy comes across as ad hoc, driven
by current contingencies or spurious
information about Osama Bin Laden’s
whereabouts.
In the final section, Coll documents the
often frantic and uncoordinated inter-
agency campaign to find Bin Laden.
Despite George Tenet’s declaration in
December 1998 that the CIA was at war
with al-Qa‘ida, the U.S. government as
a whole never fully came to grips with
the threat posed by terrorism. For many
in Washington, terrorism represented
only one threat among many facing the
United States in the post–Cold War era.
Although terrorism did elicit concern
among top U.S. policy makers, it rarely
moved into a sustained, interagency
strategy to combat the threat.
Prospective readers of this book should
be aware that it is lengthy and requires
close attention. Characters and events
discussed in part 1 are revisited. Coll
helps the reader along with a list of
principal characters at the front of the
book. Despite its length, however,
Ghost Wars will provide valuable in-
sights for anyone working within the
interagency process, as well as scholars
and regional observers interested in
how the United States got Afghanistan
and Bin Laden so tragically wrong.
AMER LATIF
Joint Warfare Analysis Center
Dahlgren, Virginia
Maurer, John H., ed. Churchill and Strategic Di-
lemmas before the World Wars: Essays in Honor
of Michael I. Handel. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
164pp. $79.95
One of three volumes of essays (two fo-
cus on different aspects of strategy) pub-
lished in Handel’s memory, this work is
based on a conference held in Newport,
Rhode Island. It offers four scholarly pa-
pers on Churchill’s assessment of the
German naval challenge before the First
World War, Pacific security and the lim-
its of British power between the wars,
Churchill and the German threat in the
late 1930s, and Churchill’s views of tech-
nology. Each assesses a different aspect
of Churchill’s changing role.
Editor Maurer focuses on the early
1900s’ battleship naval race with Ger-
many. Brought in as First Lord of the
Admiralty after the Agadir crisis of
1911, Winston Churchill is seen here as
fully aware of the danger to Britain if its
fleet were to be seriously disabled. The
Admiralty tried to maintain at least a 60
percent advantage in dreadnought con-
struction against Germany. Churchill
sought to impress the Germans with the
futility of trying to catch up with, let
alone outbuild, Britain. Cognizant of
the costs of this race, however, in 1913
he proposed a naval “holiday” to
stretch out the construction of pro-
jected new ships over more time, hop-
ing to reduce the pace. Maurer reviews
the important domestic political battles
that underlay this naval arms race.
Christopher Bell, who teaches history at
Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova
Scotia, assesses Churchill’s concern
over the growing threat posed by Japan
in the interwar years. He notes a 1928
Churchill comment that “of all the wars
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in the world, [war with Japan] was the
least likely to happen.” After all, the two
countries shared an alliance that dated
to the beginning of the century. Exten-
sion of the “ten-year rule,” first pro-
mulgated in 1919, saw war in the Far
East as highly unlikely for at least an-
other decade. As Bell makes clear, this
rule underlay a compromise between
the Treasury, concerned about costs,
and the Admiralty, which sought com-
pletion of its Singapore naval base and
more ships. By the mid-1930s, an out-
of-office Churchill began to change his
position, now expressing (as were
Whitehall ministries) growing concern
about Japan’s intentions. However, his
greater worry about a rearming Ger-
many dominated naval needs in the Far
East. Even in 1939 he argued the un-
likelihood of a Japanese attack on far-
off Singapore, just as he (and others)
felt naval power alone could hold off
aggression. Events, of course, proved
this to be wishful thinking.
B. J. C. McKercher, the sole revisionist
here, teaches history at the Royal Military
College of Canada. He sees Churchill’s
famous speeches against Hitler’s Ger-
many in the late 1930s as revealing a
politician on the make: “Quite simply,
he sought the premiership above all
else; thus, his criticisms of British for-
eign and defense policy were less selfless
than either he or his disciples later
claimed.” McKercher’s arguments help
balance excessive praise (years later) of
Churchill’s stance in this period. He
strongly defends prime ministers Stanley
Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain as
working to rebuild British defenses just
as Churchill was attacking their seem-
ing inaction. Munich is seen here—as
by other revisionists—as a vital play for
time to allow rearmament to reach full
effect. Churchill’s years in the political
wilderness “resulted from his own fol-
lies, primarily his antipathy to Baldwin
and Chamberlain,” during which, he
argues, “Churchill consistently exagger-
ated threats.”
David Jablonsky teaches at the Army War
College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and
makes clear Churchill’s fascination with
what technology offered to overcome po-
tential enemies. There are a host of inter-
esting Churchill quotes on the impact
(sometimes literally) of newly developed
dum-dum bullets, improved pistols, and
later the tank and the airplane. At the same
time, Churchill was often concerned
about possible unintended effects of tech-
nological choice, as well as the ethics of
applying certain approaches. As the au-
thor notes, “The basic problem, Churchill
came to realize, was that technology had
changed the scale of warfare.” Before and
during the war, he was fascinated with
technical options, not all of them work-
able. Those that did work—such as sig-
nals intelligence—made a huge difference
in the outcome.
This is a very useful collection, carefully
researched and written, adding insight
to what we know of Churchill’s varied
diplomatic and military roles in a world
that moved from cavalry charges to hy-




Mullis, Tony R. Peacekeeping on the Plains: Army
Operations in Bleeding Kansas. Columbia: Univ.
of Missouri, 2004. 273pp. $40.50
Tony Mullis, a serving officer in the
U.S. Air Force, takes a close look at a
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time when approximately 10 percent of
the U.S. Army was intimately involved
in one of the most challenging and po-
litically charged assignments ever given
to the U.S. military. Assigned occupa-
tion duties in a land where tribal loyal-
ties had been the primary form of
government, Army officers, in coopera-
tion with diplomats appointed by the
president, were tasked to assist a fledg-
ling democracy attain statehood while
avoiding incipient civil war. The task
was complicated by the infusion of
ideologically motivated outsiders, most
of them heavily armed. The two main
local factions committed a variety of
atrocities, including the massacre of
innocent civilians. Elections, new to the
area, were viewed with open suspicion
by most of the population. Local mili-
tias were often little more than muscle
for political leaders. Many of the thorn-
ier underlying political issues had reli-
gious and economic overtones. Several
Army officers assigned to these duties
were involved in scandals, and at least
one associated court-martial received
national attention. Meanwhile, power-
ful individuals in Washington dis-
agreed, sometimes publicly, over
tactics, strategy, and policy in the af-
fected region. To make matters worse,
ingrained organizational barriers and
an inherent resistance to change pre-
vented promising new technologies
from being used with maximum effec-
tiveness. Finally, while the Army may
have portrayed its role as one of neutral
professionalism, both Democrats and
Republicans were using the results of
the occupation as a key component of
their respective strategies for the next
presidential election. The year was
1854, and the theater of operations was
the Kansas Territory.
Peacekeeping on the Plains clearly began
life as a doctoral dissertation. In its in-
troduction Mullis lays out his basic
premise. Debunking the perhaps popu-
lar conception that the United States
has but recently come to experience
peace operations, Mullis shows that the
U.S. Army has been involved in mis-
sions of this type since the first days of
the Republic—though this historical in-
volvement has long been overlooked
and underanalyzed. Mullis seeks to be-
gin correcting this omission by examin-
ing in some detail the 1855 punitive
expedition against the Lakota (of the
Great Sioux Nation) as an example of
the Army’s efforts to keep peace in
“Bleeding Kansas.” Chapter 1 gives an
overview of the U.S. Army’s involve-
ment in peace operations, and chapter 2
provides background information on
the issue of slavery and the creation of
the state of Kansas. Chapters 3 and 4
take a detailed look at the 1855 punitive
expedition led by General William S.
Harney. Chapters 5 through 8 deal with
Army operations supporting civil actions
in Kansas from 1854 to 1857. A conclu-
sion and epilogue complete the work.
As was often demonstrated during the
1990s, the line between peace enforce-
ment and war is often difficult to deter-
mine. This was no less true in 1855. The
U.S. Army used deadly force against the
Lakota, took hostages, and committed
various acts that would, by the stan-
dards of today, be judged illegal. Yet, as
Mullis points out, these operations were
carried out with a political objective in
mind, and, in the main, they were ef-
fective. Furthermore, Harney’s success
did have a positive impact, in that they
influenced other tribes to remain
peaceful. Such results would seem to
have contemporary parallels with peace
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operations conducted by the French in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
the British in Sierra Leone, and the U.S.
Marines in Liberia.
The parallels between current opera-
tions in Iraq and those of the Army in
bleeding Kansas are even more strongly
apparent. Faced with a unique and un-
welcome mission, the Army faced a
steep learning curve. There were missed
opportunities and at least several in-
stances of officers engaging in dubious
ethical behavior in order to take advan-
tage of perceived business opportuni-
ties. The initially appointed political
leadership proved too vacillating and
incompetent to deal with the complex
difficulties inherent in the situation.
Furthermore, the entire issue was a
red-hot political football, which the
newly created Republican Party was us-
ing to excoriate the incumbent
Democrats.
Like those against the Lakota, the peace
operations in Kansas were eventually
successful. Nationalizing factional mili-
tias, deploying federal forces to prevent
civil strife, and arresting infiltrating
partisans all contributed to political sta-
bility and a safe election environment.
Yet, as Mullis points out, several facets
of policy either failed or were badly
flawed. These included the failure to
utilize the telegraph to transmit infor-
mation rapidly to and from the area of
operations. Mail was simply too slow to
be operationally relevant—the tele-
graph could have been a powerful tool
in the hands of the administration.
Peacekeeping on the Plains helps fill a gap
in the coverage of some of the formative
experiences of the U.S. Army. This is
valuable in and of itself. However, the
more immediate contribution of the
work is to identify lessons learned in the
mid-1800s that may be applicable in the
early years of the twenty-first century.
However, as one would expect given the
immense technological differences be-
tween the eras, these lessons are rather
general in nature.
For example, it proved impossible to
craft orders so detailed as to cover every
situation the occupying forces encoun-
tered. Until local authorities began ex-
ercising authority they technically did
not possess, the result was a paralysis of
action. In connection with the Lakota
reprisal, Mullis also makes a convincing
argument for assigning older and pre-
sumably more mature officers to posi-
tions that would in these operations,
under normal circumstances, go to
younger officers.
Mullis’s work also shows that the cen-
tral conundrum of peace operations
was as valid in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury as it is today. Enough troops with
the right leadership can impose a peace,
and might even be able to enforce a
peace, but unless the root causes of
conflict are resolved the peace has to be
pinned into place by bayonets and will
not endure. The peace imposed on the
Lakota by the U.S. Army did not last
long; it took a civil war and the destruc-
tion of the Confederacy to deal with the
root causes that led to bleeding Kansas.
As mentioned earlier, this work is
clearly derived from a dissertation, and
for that reason, while it is intellectually
stimulating, at times the writing is
somewhat ponderous, repetitive, and
dry. Yet the contribution this work
makes to understanding both past and
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Herman, Arthur. To Rule the Waves: How the
British Navy Shaped the World. New York:
HarperCollins, 2004. 648pp. $26.95
The subtitle of Arthur Herman’s grand
maritime history To Rule the Waves
gives it all away: How the British Navy
Shaped the World. Through a series of
well-described episodes, Herman con-
vincingly discusses how the Royal Navy
came to dominate the seas and sus-
tained Britain’s ability to expand and
maintain its empire.
From John Hawkins and Francis Drake
to the amazingly named Cloudsley
Shovell, as well as Horatio Nelson, John
Fisher, David Beatty, and the like,
Herman traces the development of
men, ships, and strategies, and the tech-
nologies that forced change.
The initial impulse for trade was
matched by a desire for plunder, so that
the relationship that later developed be-
tween the navy and the merchant trade
required maturation. John Dee, writing
a memorial to Queen Elizabeth in 1577,
proposed a permanent navy as the
“master key wherewith to open all locks
that keep out or hinder this incompara-
ble British empire.” Although the queen
lacked the means, the idea never really
died. John Holland, not quoted by
Herman, wrote in his 1638 “Discourse
of the Navy”: “If either the honour of a
nation, commerce, or trade with all na-
tions, peace at home, grounded upon
our enemies’ fear or love of us abroad,
and attended with plenty of all things
necessary either for the preservation for
the public need, or thy private welfare,
be things worthy thy esteem . . . then
next to God and the King, give thy
thanks for the same to the navy, as the
principal instrument whereby God works
these good things to thee.”
And nothing has changed.
This is a good book that describes all
the twists and turns necessary for a na-
tion to become a great commercial
power and to protect itself from sub-
stantial competition and extraordinary
technological challenges. What Herman
establishes clearly is that ultimately it
was the will to develop a navy and the
willingness to use it in the most cou-
rageous manner, whether as a matter
of policy or as a commander’s indi-
vidual initiative, that effectively sup-
ported the realm.
Unfortunately, Herman is not as well
supported by his publisher. There are
numerous editorial lapses in grammar
and proofreading, and although sub-
stantive factual errors are few, there are
enough to be annoying. For example,
the assertion that the average Britisher
consumed four pounds of sugar a day
in 1700 and twelve pounds a day in
1720 should actually read “per year.”
Saint Michel should read Saint Mihiel.
It is Saint Nazaire, not Nizaire, and
Veinticinco, not Veinticino. There is
also the omission of Port Stanley as a
principal town in the Falklands, and the
incorrect statement that “from [Prince]
Alfred on, every generation of the royal
family would make sure someone carried
on the navy tradition, King George V and
Louis Mountbatten being the most fa-
mous and Prince Philip the most re-
cent” would leave Prince Charles and
Prince Andrew wondering where they
fit in. In citing the Falklands campaign,
Herman also mentions what we in Na-
val Control of Shipping refer to as
“ships taken up from trade.” It is worth
mentioning that without adequate aux-
iliaries a navy may be at risk and that
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without a controllable merchant ma-
rine, a nation may be at risk.
Herman rightly celebrates the daring
and enterprise of British naval officers
and their willingness to use the means
at hand to achieve their goals. A fleet in
being is useless if not backed up by the
commitment to use it. The problem
was, as always, how to pay for the navy,
which Herman cites as the major cause
of Britain’s civil war in 1642. The same
issue faces us in 2005.
PAUL WILLIAM GARBER
Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve, Retired
Stevens, David, ed. The Royal Australian Navy in
World War II. 2d ed. Australia: Allen & Unwin,
2005. 336pp. AUD$39.95
Australia is quintessentially a maritime
nation. From the arrival of Lieutenant
James Cook, RN, in Botany Bay in 1770,
navies have featured heavily in the his-
torical experience of Australia, and for
this naval officer, the navy is rightfully
regarded as “the senior service.” Given
this background, it seems surprising
that there is not more written about
this naval tradition and especially about
the triumphs and tragedies of the Royal
Australian Navy (RAN) in wartime. The
recent publication of a second edition of
David Stevens’s Royal Australian Navy
in World War II fills a very important
gap. First published in 1996, the book
has been augmented significantly in this
new edition.
David Stevens is a former naval officer,
a graduate of the University of New
South Wales and Australian National
University, and currently director of
Strategic and Historical Studies within
the Sea Power Centre–Australia. He
brings a critical and experienced eye
to his editorship, and this is reflected
in the many changes made in this edi-
tion. This book has a new cover, new
photographs, six new chapters, and
substantial updates to all preexisting
chapters, with an increase of over a
hundred pages. This work eschews any
single theme but rather seeks to encap-
sulate an eclectic array of approaches
to the general topic. While initially
disconcerting, this methodology is
skillfully used and provides a holistic
account of the RAN wartime
experience.
The chapters deal with, inter alia, mat-
ters of grand policy concerning Austra-
lian naval strategizing in the lead-up to
the war, interesting accounts of battles
experienced by former crew members,
an outline of regional confrontation
with Vichy French representatives, so-
cial assessments of the officer corps and
female participation in the naval ser-
vice, and a description of industrial re-
organization within Australia, as well as
accounts of naval operational thinking
and planning during the course of the
war. By any measure, the achievements
of the RAN during the conflict were as-
tonishing. At the war’s close, the RAN
comprised 337 ships and over forty
thousand mobilized personnel. The
navy served in almost every theater of
that global war and earned its fair share
of battle glory. As James Goldrick notes
in chapter 1, the RAN had been in-
volved in the sinking of numerous en-
emy capital ships and submarines, the
destruction of over a hundred enemy
aircraft and over 150,000 tons of axis
merchant shipping. Perhaps the
RAN’s most significant achievement
was its ability to keep open sea lines
of communication to Australia at a
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time when Japan had conquered vast
swaths of South East Asia and the South
West Pacific.
There are chapters devoted to a number
of distinguished wartime Australian
senior naval officers, and others that
(re)address some of the perennial mys-
teries, such as the complete loss (and
vanishing) of the cruiser HMAS Sydney
on the eve of the Japanese entry into
the war. The book also devotes a sig-
nificant amount of attention to the
Australian-U.S. alliance. Indeed, such
concentration is not surprising. World
War II represented a sea change for
Australian security thinking, with
attention diverted away from the
United Kingdom and toward the United
States as strategic partner within the
region. Indeed, American readers will
surely find interesting the accounts in
chapter 7 (“The Pacific War: A Strategic
Overview”) and chapter 8 (“Forging an
Alliance? The American Naval Commit-
ment to the South Pacific, 1940–42”) of
the Australian-U.S. military partnership
within the Pacific campaign. Particu-
larly enlightening are the conclusions
drawn of the essential correctness of
prewar U.S. strategic naval thinking and
the thorough testing of naval war plans
at the Naval War College. On the other
side, I am sure that American interest
will also be piqued by the chapter by
Commodore Loxton (retired), giving
his account of postwar American revi-
sionism concerning the battle of Savo
Island. In this chapter he notes his at-
tendance as a student at the Naval War
College’s newly founded Naval Com-
mand Course (as the Naval Command
College, today the senior of the school’s
two international programs, was then
known), and in 1959, his participation
in a study that emphasized U.S. virtue
and Australian failings in that battle.
Having been a badly wounded partici-
pant in the battle, he observes, “My
arguments against some of those hy-
potheses were therefore largely based
on an innate belief that we Austra-
lians and our Royal Navy Admiral
could not have done as badly as we
were led to believe. At the time I thought
that I had not made much of an im-
pression, but the following year Savo
was not studied.”
David Stevens has produced a book that
is both highly readable and engaging.
He provides a much needed public face
for the Royal Australian Navy wartime
experience, and he effectively preserves
the legacy of the period. Since the Sec-
ond World War, the RAN has contin-
ued to fight alongside its U.S. Navy
allies in conflicts ranging from Korea
and Vietnam through Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM.
For the American reader, this book pro-
vides rare insight into the historical
events that formed the genesis of the
modern Royal Australian Navy identity
and thus has allowed an inside under-
standing of the impulses that continue
to drive it. The RAN is a steadfast and
reliable partner to the USN; gaining this
appreciation of it is reason enough to
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Wiencek, Henry. An Imperfect God: George Wash-
ington, His Slaves and the Creation of America.
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003.
404pp. $26
Our nation’s first commander in chief,
George Washington, is back in the
news. At Mount Vernon they are striv-
ing to recast Washington’s image as
America’s first action hero, while also
sponsoring a high-tech, computer-
driven rejuvenation of him to figure out
exactly what he looked like at ages nine-
teen, forty-five, and fifty-seven. These
current labors, part of an eighty-five-
million-dollar “To Keep Him First”
campaign, have been bolstered by the
efforts of others. The University of Vir-
ginia is in the process of publishing The
Papers of George Washington (fifty-
two of the ninety volumes have been
completed), and the New York Metro-
politan Museum of Art recently exhib-
ited thirteen stunning portraits of
Washington by the Rhode Island–born
artist Gilbert Stuart.
A recent outburst of serious and ex-
tremely enjoyable books about the man
has reinforced this worthwhile cause.
The three books chosen for this review,
all published within the last two years,
emphasize a particularly important
theme concerning Washington’s in-
credibly eventful life—the development
of his character and his growth as a
man. One is a full biography, one fo-
cuses on the American Revolution, and
the third explores Washington’s atti-
tudes on slavery; they make for a rich
collection of informative reading.
It is generally accepted that Washington
has become ever more remote from the
hearts and minds of his countrymen
and women. To use a prevalent expres-
sion, he is perhaps the “deadest, whitest
male in American history.” To paraphrase
Richard Brookhiser, he is in our text-
books and in our wallets but not in our
hearts. Perhaps these books will at least
help put him back in our minds, if not
in our hearts.
The leadoff selection, His Excellency:
George Washington, is a concise and ex-
ceedingly readable biography by Joseph
Ellis, author of the Pulitzer Prize–
winning Founding Brothers: The Revolu-
tionary Generation (Knopf, 2000). Ellis’s
earlier biographies examined the char-
acters of Thomas Jefferson and John
Adams. He once again has chosen to
center his work on the character of his
subject. Ellis has set out to write not
another epic portrait of Washington
but rather a fresh picture focused
tightly on his character and based in
part upon new scholarship on the revo-
lutionary era. Ellis’s goal is to relate
how Washington became who he was.
He gives us this new portrait of Wash-
ington’s growth most admirably.
In looking for patterns of emerging be-
havior, Ellis cites the combination of
Washington’s bottomless ambition and
near obsession with self-control. He also
traces the development of Washington’s
personality, beginning with his experi-
ences as a young man in the wilderness
of the Ohio Valley. The author states
that what in later years would be re-
garded as aloofness and cold reserve be-
gan with Washington’s need as an
inexperienced colonial officer in the
French and Indian War to insulate him-
self and his reputation from criticism.
To do this, he had to rely on the hard
core of his own merit and self-control,
his strongest assets as a young man on
the way up.
Ellis notes that nothing had a greater
influence on Washington’s rise to dis-
tinction than his marriage to the widow
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Martha Dandridge Custis. Her im-
mense dowry launched Washington to
the level of great planters in Virginia’s
Northern Neck region and provided the
foundation for his rise in wealth and
influence.
Ellis is particularly effective in remind-
ing readers that nothing was inevitable
about the success of either the Ameri-
can Revolution or Washington’s role in
it. If Washington had not been able to
learn from his mistakes early in the
war, caused in large part by his natu-
rally aggressive strategy, the conflict
could well have ended in defeat and sub-
jugation for the colonies. Washington
himself wrote, upon initially arriving at
Yorktown, “What may be in the Womb
of Fate is very uncertain.” Nonetheless,
Washington was the centerpiece around
which the Continental Army and the
cause had formed in 1775, and it was
Washington who sustained the army
for nearly eight years of desperate fight-
ing, which enabled the ultimate victory.
Ellis also notes that historians have re-
cently concluded that the American
Revolution occurred simultaneously
with a virulent smallpox epidemic in
the colonies; it claimed about a hun-
dred thousand lives, many of them sol-
diers. He makes the compelling case
that one of Washington’s most conse-
quential and strategic decisions during
the war was his policy of requiring small-
pox inoculation for all troops serving in
the Continental Army.
In what Ellis calls “the greatest exit in
American history,” Washington re-
turned his commission to Congress in
1783. His retirement from power and
return to Mount Vernon have been
noted by other biographers as the
greatest act of Washington’s life. How-
ever, the author also argues that
Washington’s unique character was pri-
marily molded by his experiences dur-
ing the Revolution. Just as he had
employed a Fabian strategy of avoiding
battles that would have risked the Con-
tinental Army’s destruction, he also
“fashioned a kind of Fabian presidency
that sustained the credibility of the fed-
eral government by avoiding political
battles that threatened to push federal
sovereignty further and faster than pub-
lic opinion allowed.”
In the final chapter of this well written
book, Ellis states that there were two dis-
tinct creative moments in the founding
of America: the winning of indepen-
dence and the creation of nationhood.
Washington was the central figure in
both events, and his judgment, in Ellis’s
view, on all major political questions
proved prescient—this “remarkably re-
liable judgment derived from his ele-
mental understanding of how power
worked in the world.”
Ellis ends his search for how Washington
became the “unquestioned superior” of
all the Founding Fathers by declaring
that Washington “was that rarest of
men: a supremely realistic visionary, a
prudent prophet . . . devoted to getting
the big things right. His genius was his
judgment.”
If the American Revolution was the key
experience in forming Washington’s
personality and character, David
Hackett Fischer’s outstanding book
Washington’s Crossing goes a very long
way to explain why. Fischer, a historian
at Brandeis University and author of
the equally masterful Paul Revere’s Ride
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1994) and Albion’s
Seed (Oxford Univ. Press, 1989), re-
minds us again that historical events are
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not the products of irresistible forces
outside the influences of human choice.
They are instead the result of “decisions
and actions by people who had oppor-
tunities to choose and act otherwise.”
The summer, fall, and winter of 1776
was a time when human choices and ac-
tions truly mattered in determining the
fate of the rebelling American colonies.
In the famous words of Thomas Paine,
first published in The American Crisis
on 19 December of that year, they were
“times that try men’s souls.”
The British had landed more than thirty-
three thousand crack troops near New
York during the summer and had
driven Washington and the Continental
Army from New York across New Jersey
all the way to the banks of the Delaware
River. They also had seventy warships
lurking off the coast. America had
none. The British had taken Rhode
Island and threatened Philadelphia.
American morale was at a nadir, while
British smugness and confidence were
soaring, and the “glorious cause” hung
by a slender thread. This “cataract of
disaster” was compounded both by the
thousands of Americans who were
signing oaths of loyalty to the crown
and by the hard evidence at roll call that
the Continental Army was shrinking
daily. To reverse this desperate situa-
tion seemed almost hopeless, but it
happened; Fischer masterfully relates
not only how but why, and the deeper
implications of it all.
Fischer expertly recounts the even now
unbelievably dramatic facts. On Christ-
mas night of 1776, Washington led a
ragged army of 2,400 colonials across
the ice-choked Delaware River during a
raging storm. After marching all night,
they surprised and defeated a garrison
of 1,500 tough and well-led Hessian
soldiers at Trenton. These professional
troops were not drunk from celebrating
Christmas but exhausted from standing
vigilant guard and fighting off harassing
militia attacks. Within a few days after
the New Year, the American forces had
thwarted a violent British counterattack
in Trenton, then slipped away over-
night to surprise and defeat a British
brigade at Princeton. These victories as-
suredly revitalized the American cause
and saved the American Revolution.
Fischer greatly enriches the story of
these historic and climactic events. He
argues that after the loss of New York,
Washington changed and adopted a
new strategy that became an element of
the new American way of war. This
strategy was in part Fabian, as noted by
Joseph Ellis—that is, to avoid a risky
general action but strike only when a
“brilliant stroke could be made with . . .
probability of success.” Washington
also adapted and learned to use artil-
lery, initiative, speed, and intelligence
as force multipliers, and he evolved an
adaptive system of counsel and com-
mand that contrasted markedly with
the rigidity of control in the British
military.
The new way of war also included much
more. It embodied Washington’s belief
in what John Adams called a “policy of
humanity,” extending quarter in battle
and insisting on the decent treatment of
prisoners, which aligned the conduct of
the war with the values of the Revolu-
tion. These values were further extended
by Washington’s strict prohibitions
against the pillaging of civilian property
and by his insistence on deference to
his civilian superiors in Congress.
Fischer also comments on the unabash-
edly heroic painting Washington Cross-
ing the Delaware, by Emanuel Leutze.
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He reminds us that the magnificent
(twenty by twelve feet) canvas that now
hangs in New York’s Metropolitan Mu-
seum of Art is highly symbolic. Completed
in 1851, the painting was intended to
inspire the mid-nineteenth-century Eu-
ropean revolutionaries and depict the
crucial importance of Washington’s
ability to unite the diverse Americans
pictured in the boat to pull together in
the common cause of freedom.
Fischer concludes his superlative book
in the same manner Leutze conceived
his painting—with a message for his
contemporaries. He states that the mes-
sage of Washington’s crossing “tells us
that Americans in an earlier generation
were capable of acting in a higher spirit,
and so are we.” Trenton and Princeton
were brilliant strokes, and Washington’s
Crossing is both a brilliant description
of the events and an illumination of the
man who made them possible.
If Americans in an earlier generation
were capable of acting in a higher spirit,
there is a reasoned argument to be
made that George Washington himself
did so particularly in the fourth para-
graph of his last will and testament. Af-
ter the brief first sections of the will,
where Washington declared himself a
citizen of the United States, settled his
few debts, and provided for his wife,
Martha, he began the fourth paragraph
with the following extraordinary sen-
tence: “Upon the decease of my wife, it
is my Will & desire that all the Slaves
which I hold in my own right, shall re-
ceive their freedom.”
The story tracing Washington’s tortured
journey to personal awareness and moral
change concerning slavery, and ulti-
mately to the act of emancipation, is
superbly told by Henry Wiencek in his re-
visionist work An Imperfect God: George
Washington, His Slaves, and the Creation
of America. Wiencek, winner of a Na-
tional Book Critics Circle Award for his
earlier book The Hairstons: An American
Family in Black and White (St. Martin’s,
1999), sees the Revolution as the primary
experience that motivated Washington’s
reflection and ultimate change on slavery.
Wiencek does not see Washington’s free-
ing of his slaves as a parting act of grace
or as a sign of his natural benevolence but
as a testament to a “profound moral
struggle,” one that represented a “repudi-
ation of a lifetime of mastery.”
Tracing Washington’s path to repudia-
tion of slavery is a difficult task, necessar-
ily filled with subtleties of interpretation.
As one historian has said of Washington,
“no more elusive personality exists in
history.” Nonetheless, Imperfect God aptly
reinforces what Joseph Ellis notes, that
the Revolution transformed almost every-
thing, both for the country and for
Washington.
Washington initially came to own
slaves through inheritance from his fa-
ther (at age eleven) and then from his
half-brother Lawrence. Although he
used his slaves and his wife’s dower
slaves to work the five joining farms of
Mount Vernon his entire life, there are
clues that Washington’s long transfor-
mation concerning slavery began at
least as early as 1769. Wiencek empha-
sizes that Washington took part in a
slave lottery in Williamsburg that year
and witnessed a slave auction “consist-
ing chiefly of boys and girls, from 14 or
15 down to the ages of two or three
years.” Wiencek believes that this auc-
tion and similar experiences caused
Washington to reflect on the monstrous
cruelty of breaking apart families, so
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that by the mid-1770s he had offered to
buy an entire family he did not need
rather than separate its members. In
1786, Washington wrote that he never
wanted to purchase another slave unless
there were most unusual circumstances,
referring to “that species of property
which I have no inclination to possess.”
Yet it was as commander in chief in
Boston in 1775 that Washington really
began to see blacks as human beings
rather than as something to be owned.
He must have been shocked on arriving
in Massachusetts to see large numbers
of black men bearing arms. He was in-
troduced to a black hero of Bunker Hill,
and the black poet Phillis Wheatley
wrote a poem in his honor. In response
to Wheatley’s poem and her accompa-
nying letter, Washington invited her to
his headquarters in Cambridge. He was
changing his view of blacks, and the
greatest impact of this change was in
the Continental Army. His general or-
ders issued 30 December 1775 stated:
“As the General is informed, that Num-
bers of Free Negroes are desirous of en-
listing, he gives leave to recruiting
Officers, to entertain them, and prom-
ises to lay the matter before the Con-
gress.” This was a new policy, and
according to Wiencek, “Washington
won the Revolutionary War with an
army that was more integrated than any
military force until the Vietnam War.”
Wiencek further traces Washington’s
change in attitude after the war. With
the encouragement of the Marquis de
Lafayette, Washington, before he be-
came president, had deeply reconsid-
ered the implications of slavery. In
1786, he wrote that he hoped the Vir-
ginia legislature would abolish slavery
“by slow, sure, & imperceptible degrees.”
Wiencek believes there is evidence that
by 1789 Washington had experienced a
moral epiphany, as he outlined a plan in
secret to sell his western lands to finance
gradual emancipation of his slaves. In
1794, Washington wrote to a relative, “I
am principled against selling negroes, as
you would do cattle in a market,” and he
later stated to a friend that the “unfortu-
nate condition” of his slaves “has been
the only unavoidable subject of regret.”
In the end, he did what no other slave-
owning Founding Father did. He freed
the 123 slaves he had legal control over
at Martha’s death and provided from
his estate for the care and basic educa-
tion of those who most needed it for
the next thirty-three years. All this was
done despite his wife’s (and his ex-
tended family’s) embittered opposition.
He realized that this act made him a
stranger in his own land. He had once
remarked to Edmund Randolph that if
slavery continued to divide America,
“he had made up his mind to move and
be of the northern.”
Wiencek’s book gives a balanced view
of his subject. He is careful to place
Washington in the context of his times,
neither apologizing for nor condemn-
ing him. He does not avoid the fact that
Washington owned, worked, punished,
bought, and sold slaves. Yet the sum of
Washington’s stature as a founder is
not diminished by Wiencek’s portrait
but rather better brought to light.
In sum, these three excellent books help
to reveal Washington as a man in full
who had the self-awareness, the will,
and the moral courage to change. He
saw life steadily, and he tried to see it
whole. There is still a great deal to ad-
mire and to learn from his personal
journey as a human being.
WILLIAM M. CALHOUN
Naval War College
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The twenty-second of our monograph series, China’s Nuclear Force Moderniza-
tion, edited by Lyle J. Goldstein with Andrew S. Erickson, is now available from
the editorial offices and online. Professor Goldstein, of the Strategic Research
Department of the College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies, has been at the
forefront of recent research into China’s future. In this project he has guided a
handful of naval officers through the puzzle of China’s ongoing nuclear mod-
ernization programs. With the able assistance of Andrew Erickson, these sailor-
scholars have examined various aspects of nuclear modernization, from ballistic
missile defense to nuclear command and control.
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
(SAIC) PUBLICATION PRIZE
Timothy D. Miller and Jeffrey A. Larsen, both employees of SAIC, have won the
2004 SAIC Publication Prize in the category of economics, policy, and arms con-
trol, for their coauthored “Dealing with Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons:
Cash for Kilotons,” in our Spring 2004 issue. The award comprised a trophy, a
small cash prize, and an opportunity to brief the article to the annual conference
of senior company executives.
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